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ABSTRACT 
Positive Clinical Psychology (PCP) argues that positive and negative psychological 
constructs are jointly important for explaining psychological problems. “Positive” 
constructs have been explicitly focused on by positive psychology researchers and 
“negative” constructs have been explicitly focused on by mental health researchers. This 
thesis examines the relationship between positive and negative constructs in relation to 
four psychological problems: depressive symptoms (Chapter 2), anxiety-problems 
(Chapter 3), suicide attempts (SAs) (Chapter 4 and 5), and nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI) 
(Chapter 4 and 5). Clarifying how psychological problems are most appropriately 
conceptualised has implications for definitions, diagnostic criteria, measurement, and 
clinical interventions. This thesis provides evidence that some constructs form bipolar 
continua, having a positive pole and a negative pole, whilst other constructs do not. 
Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that well-being and calmness respectively form continua 
with depressive and anxiety symptoms. In contrast, Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate that SA 
and NSSI cognitions do not form a continuum with another construct. Results indicate that 
positive and negative constructs appear to have different relationships to one-another 
depending on the construct under investigation. Constructs that are common in the general 
population – such as depressive symptoms, anxiety symptoms, well-being symptoms, and 
calmness symptoms – appear to be bipolar, having a positive and a negative pole. 
Psychological constructs that are rare in the general population and which specifically 
characterise psychological problems (rather than being an extreme manifestation of a 
common psychological experience) – such as SA and NSSI cognitions – appear to be 
unipolar. The replication of scientific findings also features strongly throughout this thesis. 
Each chapter may therefore have a timely bearing on the emerging “replication crisis” 
literature.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. The Conceptual and Methodological Context to this Thesis 
This thesis is conceptually underpinned by Positive Clinical Psychology (PCP), 
which has advocated the joint importance of “negative” and “positive” psychological 
constructs for understanding and treating psychological problems (Johnson & Wood, 2017; 
Joseph & Wood, 2010; Wood & Johnson, 2016; Wood & Tarrier, 2010). “Negative” 
psychological constructs typify psychological problems; these are variables that 
particularly characterise psychological problems, which have typically been examined by 
mental health researchers. In contrast, “positive” psychological constructs are variables 
that have been examined by positive psychology researchers (and others, as discussed 
below). PCP argues that positive and negative psychological constructs are equally 
important for explaining psychological problems and therefore that it is important and 
beneficial for the emerging positive psychology research field to be integrated with the 
voluminous evidence base concerned with understanding and treating psychological 
problems (Johnson & Wood, 2017; Joseph & Wood, 2010; Wood & Johnson, 2016; Wood 
& Tarrier, 2010).  
PCP puts forward two major predictions to support its argument for the joint 
importance of “negative” and “positive” psychological constructs when understanding and 
treating psychological problems. The first is that most psychological constructs are 
bipolar, consisting of a positive pole and a negative pole. For example, depressive 
symptoms are generally understood to be a unipolar, continuous construct that ranges from 
infrequent, weak depressive symptoms to frequent, strong depressive symptoms (Joseph & 
Wood, 2010). Conceptualising depression as a bipolar construct involves hypothesising 
that depressive symptoms constitute one pole of a continuum that has an opposite pole. In 
Chapter 2, a conceptual and methodological argument is put forward that depressive 
symptoms form one end of a depression-well-being continuum, where depression can be 
understood as the “negative” pole of this continuum, and well-being as the opposite, 
“positive” pole of the same continuum (Joseph & Wood, 2010). The depression-well-being 
continuum is hypothesised to range from high depressive symptoms, through a 
hypothetical zero point, to high well-being symptoms.  
The second major prediction of PCP is that “positive constructs” provide important 
unshared explanatory power in relation to psychological problems (Johnson & Wood, 
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2017; Joseph & Wood, 2010; Wood & Johnson, 2016; Wood & Tarrier, 2010). As stated, 
“positive” constructs are variables that particularly characterise well-being, which have 
typically been examined by positive psychology researchers. Both of PCP’s core 
predictions are explained further and explored below.  
This thesis tests PCP’s core predictions in relation to four psychological problems: 
depressive symptoms (Chapter 2), anxiety-problems (Chapter 3), suicide attempts (SAs) 
(Chapter 4 and 5), and nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI) (Chapter 4 and 5). Although this 
thesis is predominantly contextualised by PCP, it is also, to a lesser extent, contextualised 
by the methodological need for scientific findings to replicate, which has a timely bearing 
on the current “replication crisis.” The replication crisis is an emerging literature debating 
whether important scientific findings replicate and the implications of this.  
An overview of PCP and the replication crisis are provided next, along with details 
of how this thesis positions itself and has relevance for each of these literatures. Before this 
discussion, the broader context for focusing equally on positive and negative constructs is 
briefly outlined and “positive” and “negative” are further defined. Importantly, and as 
discussed further below, PCP has not been explicit or consistent in stating and explaining 
its core tenants, which may have led to some misconceptions about its conceptual position 
and aims (Held, 2016). This thesis attempts to make a contribution in its own right by 
clarifying and testing PCP’s core messages and making them more explicit.  
1.2. The Joint Importance of Positive and Negative Constructs in Explaining and 
Predicting Psychological Problems 
PCP draws attention to the joint importance of positive and negative psychological 
constructs for explaining human suffering (Johnson & Wood, 2017; Joseph & Wood, 2010; 
Wood & Johnson, 2016; Wood & Tarrier, 2010). This, of course, is not a new claim. There 
are many indications in popular culture and psychological science that human existence 
can be understood in terms of positive and negative facets, and that positive and negative 
are complementary (rather than opposing) forces. In Chinese philosophy, yin and yang – 
translated as “dark” and “bright" or "negative” and “positive" – describe how seemingly 
contradictory forces are actually interconnected and interdependent in the natural world, 
and how they may give rise to each other as they relate to one another. Everything has yin 
and yang (for instance, shadow cannot exist without light) and the taijitu symbol that 
represents yin and yang shows a balance between two opposites with a portion of the 
opposite element in each section.  
 Different religions often refer to positive and negative as a means to make sense of 
and explain the phenomenology of human existence (e.g., God and the Devil). Comic 
17 
 
books almost always involve the interplay of heroes and villains to denote the good and 
bad facets of humanity, often exploring how people, even heroes, are neither totally “good” 
nor totally “bad.” In emotion research, positive and negative affect are both recognised as 
important facets of human existence that have fundamental and equally important 
relationships with behaviour, motivation, and cognition (e.g., Barrett & Russell, 1998; 
Carver & Scheier, 1998; Russell & Carroll, 1999a; Yik, Russell & Steiger, 2011). 
Positive and negative constructs have been examined in relation to psychological 
problems, and this thesis particularly tests PCP’s conceptualisation of the relationship 
between positive and negative constructs (see Johnson & Wood, 2017; Joseph & Wood, 
2010; Wood & Johnson, 2016; Wood & Tarrier, 2010). Many scholars outside of PCP 
have also drawn attention to the joint importance of positive and negative constructs in 
relation to psychological problems. For example, some cognitive-behavioural theories 
suggest that positive and negative cognitions about behaviour (cognitions about the 
advantages and disadvantages of a particular behaviour) have a central and causal role in 
the development and maintenance of binge eating and overeating (Beck, 2007; Cooper, 
Wells & Todd, 2004) and problematic substance and alcohol use (Beck, Wright, Newman 
& Liese, 1993).  
Ryff and Singer (2003) emphasized the need to appreciate the dialectics between 
positive and negative aspects of living. They wrote that “human well-being is 
fundamentally about the joining of these two realms” (p. 279). Likewise, Snyder and 
Lopez (2007) commented that “future psychologists must develop an inclusive approach 
that examines both the weaknesses and the strengths of people” (p. 9). The joint important 
of positive and negative constructs has also begun to be recognised within the positive 
psychology movement, which initially solely focused on “positive” constructs. Examples 
include Peterson’s (2006a) syllabus for his course on “positive psychology interventions,” 
and Sheldon, Kashdan, and Steger’s (2011) textbook Designing the future of positive 
psychology: Taking stock and moving forward. 
A full discussion of all possible conceptualisations of the relationship between 
positive and negative constructs as they relate to psychological problems is beyond the 
scope of this thesis; the present discussion focuses on PCP’s conceptualisation of the 
relationship between positive and negative constructs. 
1.3. Positive and Negative Terminology and Conceptualisation 
Before discussing positive and negative constructs any further, it is necessary to 
clarify what these terms mean in the context of this thesis. Throughout this thesis, 
“positive” and “negative” are used as they are used in the personality and social 
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psychology literature: to refer to the valence of particular variables. Most commonly, the 
terms “positive” and “negative” are used to refer to affective states. “Positive” is often, 
though not always, synonymous with adaptiveness, advantages, desirability, pleasantness, 
and “good”-ness. “Negative” is often, though not always, synonymous with 
maladaptiveness, disadvantages, undesirability, unpleasantness, and “bad”-ness.  
PCP uses the terms “positive” and “negative” to denote variables that particularly 
characterise well-being and which have been explicitly focused on by positive psychology 
(“positive constructs”) versus variables that particularly characterise psychological 
problems and which have been explicitly focused on by mental health researchers 
(“negative constructs”).  
Positive psychology and PCP both make the distinction between “positive” and 
“negative” as part of arguing for their novelty. As will be seen, positive psychology 
advocated for increasing awareness and research on “positive” constructs, whereas PCP 
advocated the value of integrating research on “positive” and “negative” constructs in 
order to make a call for the emerging positive psychology literature to be integrated with 
the voluminous existing literatures on mental health problems.  
Some might assume that “positive” and “negative” are, respectively, synonymous 
with approach and avoidance motivations. Perspectives differ on this issue (as discussed in 
Chapter 3) and whether this is the case probably depends on the construct in question. For 
example, one dominant theory of self-regulation and emotion, which has much empirical 
support, suggests both positive and negative affect are both linked with approach and 
(separately) avoidance tendencies (e.g., Carver, 2003, 2004; Carver & Scheier, 1998).  
As will be seen, sometimes “positive” and “negative” terminology are used to refer 
not just to separate research literatures but also to the valence of opposite poles of the same 
variable. In this context, “positive” and “negative” are used to refer to opposite poles of a 
single variable. Chapters 2 and 3 renalayse two commonly used clinical scales that contain 
a mixture of “negative” or “negatively-worded” items, which assess the presence of a 
negative construct (e.g., “I felt sad;” “I thought my life had been a failure”) and “positive” 
or “positively-worded” items, which assess the presence of a positive construct (e.g., “I felt 
happy;” “I enjoyed life”) in order to explore the hypothesis that certain psychological 
constructs form bipolar continua that each have a “positive” and a “negative” pole. More 
specifically, Chapter 2 tests whether depression forms one end of a depression-well-being 
bipolar continuum, where depression can be understood as the “negative” pole of this 
construct, and well-being as the “positive” pole of the same construct. Chapter 3 tests 
whether anxiety problems form one end of a bipolar anxiety-calmness continuum, where 
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anxiety can be understood as the “negative” pole of this construct, and calmness as the 
“positive” pole of the same construct.  
1.4. Perceptions of Positive and Negative Constructs 
The preceding discussion illustrates that the language of “positive” and “negative” 
often convey a value judgement. For instance, many people perceive that positive emotions 
such as excitement, enthusiasm, happiness, and calmness are good and to be sought out, 
whereas negative emotions such as sadness, guilt, and anxiety are bad and undesirable and 
to be avoided. Such perceptions underpin experiential avoidance – the tendency to avoid 
negative internal experiences – a key concept in several conceptualizations of 
psychological problems and theories of psychotherapy (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999; 
Gamez et al., 2011). In fact, a large literature supports the notion that emotions of any kind 
are not inherently good or bad; evidencing that positive and negative emotions are equally 
functional as they both provide important information that can be used to guide behaviour 
and respond effectively to the environment (see Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall & Zhang, 
2007).  
These issues get at the heart of what this thesis is about, though, as it is individual 
perceptions that matter. This issue is particularly apparent in Chapters 4 and 5, which 
examine perceptions of SA and NSSI. Like any self-destructive behaviour, to an outsider, 
such behaviours may seem wholly undesirable – but to the person contemplating them or 
engaging in such behaviours, SA and NSSI make sense and confer important perceived 
advantages, for that person in their context, as Chapters 4 and 5 explore. Furthermore, 
although SA and NSSI may be viewed as conferring particular idiosyncratic advantages to 
the person who engages in these behaviours, to clinicians, friends, family, work colleagues, 
and society at large, NSSI is generally viewed as unconstructive at best and highly 
destructive and to be punished and stigmatised at worst (NICE, 2011). Thus, perceptions of 
what is “positive” versus “negative” may differ across informants.  
Some scholars have argued that the language of “positive” and “negative” is 
therefore arbitrary and dependent on one’s perspective and context (Held, 2016; Johnson & 
Wood, 2017; McNulty & Fincham, 2012; Wong, 2011). For example, optimism, the extent 
to which people hold generalized favourable expectancies for their future, might be 
considered a “positive” variable in that high levels of optimism have been linked to lots of 
advantages (Carver, Scheier & Segerstrom, 2010). However, optimism can be understood 
as a bipolar variable that resides on a continuum with pessimism and there appear to be at 
least some cases in which optimism has drawbacks (Carver et al., 2010).  
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Another example is empathy, the process of understanding another person’s 
emotional state (Ferguson, 2016). Ferguson (2016) provides an interesting analysis of the 
adaptiveness of empathy and discusses how empathy may not be indiscriminately 
desirable. He notes that psychopaths have high levels of some kinds of empathy but are 
notably deficient in others. High levels of empathy are also sometimes associated with 
caring so much for other people that an individual neglects their own needs (Baron-Cohen, 
2012), which in psychological therapy terms might be framed as “subjugating” one’s needs 
and emotions (Young, Klosko & Weishaar, 2003). Such findings highlight the likelihood 
that no trait is universally good and adaptive for everyone all of the time and that the 
adaptiveness of particular traits is probably most accurately judged at the individual level 
in relation to each person’s particular context.  
1.5. Definitions of Positive and Negative Constructs in this Thesis 
This discussion has highlighted some of the complexities involved in describing 
“positive” and “negative” psychological constructs. The language of “positive” and 
“negative,” whilst imperfect, is parsimonious and relatively clear, and not using these 
terms has the potential to make the following discussion confusing as it would deviate 
from that used in the positive psychology and PCP literatures. Using this language is 
arbitrary, but doing so is necessary for clarifying what is the opposite of what. Throughout 
this thesis, “positive” will be used to refer to variables that particularly characterise well-
being and which have been explicitly focused on by positive psychology. “Negative” will 
be used to refer to variables that particularly characterise psychological problems and 
which have been explicitly focused on by mental health researchers. As stated, when 
variables are bipolar, “positive” and “negative” are used to refer to opposite poles of the 
same variable, and Chapters 2 and 3 renalayse two commonly used clinical scales that 
contain a mixture of “negative” or “negatively-worded” items, which assess the presence 
of a negative construct (e.g., “I felt sad;” “I thought my life had been a failure”) and 
“positive” or “positively-worded” items, which assess the presence of a positive construct 
(e.g., “I felt happy;” “I enjoyed life”) in order to explore the hypothesis that certain 
psychological constructs form bipolar continua that each have a “positive” and a 
“negative” pole. 
The discussion now turns to positive psychology and PCP in order to set the 
context for a discussion of whether positive and negative constructs are equally important 
for understanding the phenomenology of psychological problems. 
1.6. Positive Psychology 
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 Positive psychology has been defined as “the scientific study of positive 
experiences and positive individual traits, and the institutions that facilitate their 
development” (Duckworth, Steen & Seligman, 2005, p. 630). A full discussion of the 
emergence of the positive psychology movement is provided elsewhere (e.g., Linley, 
Joseph, Harrington & Wood, 2006; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Johnson & 
Wood, 2017; Wood & Johnson, 2016). Briefly, positive psychology developed in the late 
1990s, spearheaded by Martin Seligman. The rationale for its emergence was an argument 
that since World War II, mental health researchers had focused predominantly on the 
negative: on the assessment, understanding, and treatment of mental health problems, and 
critically, that this had occurred to the detriment of focusing on promoting well-being (the 
positive). Positive psychology aimed to raise awareness of the importance of researching 
“positive” traits: psychological traits and constructs that particularly characterise well-
being (Gable & Haidt, 2005; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). It did this by taking an 
extreme position of exclusively focusing on positive traits and particularly aimed to help 
people who were functioning relatively well psychologically further enhance their well-
being and performance.  
1.6.1. Conceptual relationship between positive and negative 
Positive psychology authors argued that the presence of positive traits is not simply 
the absence of negative traits, and that relieving negatives traits does not automatically 
bring about positive traits (Duckworth et al., 2005): “If the positive were just the absence 
of the negative, we would not need a positive psychology, just a psychology of relieving 
negative states” (p. 634). Thus, the variables studied by positive psychology researchers 
are seen to be separate to those studied by mental health researchers. That is, so-called 
“positive” and “negative” variables are each viewed as unipolar, ranging from zero to high 
levels of the particular construct in question.  
1.6.2. Critique 
Positive psychology and mental health researchers both aim to enhance well-being. 
Positive psychology researchers aim to investigate variables that support flourishing and 
well-being whilst mental health researchers aim to reduce distress (Johnson & Wood, 
2017). The positive psychology movement undoubtedly experienced considerable success 
in making the study of “positive” variables interesting and important (Linley et al., 2006). 
However, over time, positive psychology has attracted criticism (e.g., see Joseph & Wood, 
2010; Wood & Tarrier, 2010; Wood & Johnson, 2016), principally that it casts only a 
narrow spotlight on human experience by exclusively focusing on the positive (Joseph & 
Wood, 2010). Furthermore, the claim that psychology had focused exclusively on the 
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negative seemed to be rather overstated and dependent on one’s theoretical and 
epistemological position. For example, this claim appears to overlook the contribution that 
the personality and social psychology literature has made to explaining human nature, 
which has framed with far less reference to “positive” versus “negative” constructs.  
Additionally, plenty of existing, long-established clinical psychology theories and 
interventions include a focus on promoting “positive” constructs in order to ameliorate 
psychological problems. For example, a core aspect of Beck’s cognitive therapy for 
depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979) involves helping people increase their 
engagement in pleasurable and fulfilling activities. Thus, as Mazzuchelli, Kane and Rees 
(2010) observe, there is little to distinguish behavioural activation from positive 
psychology interventions, other than the intention with which it was developed. 
Innumerable other psychological problem treatment models include a balance of relieving 
suffering (reducing the negative) and promoting well-being (promoting the positive), as 
discussed in Chapter 6. Some authors have also observed that positive psychology research 
has often been of relatively poor-quality and that the claims made have often exceeded the 
data (see Wood & Johnson, 2016). For example, several “positive interventions” have been 
developed and implemented that were not justified by basic science research (see Johnson 
& Wood, 2017; Wood & Johnson, 2016; Wood et al., 2010).   
1.7. Positive Clinical Psychology 
The criticisms levelled at positive psychology meant that, increasingly, scholars, 
even Seligman himself, began to move away from the either/or position that positive 
psychology had taken regarding positive and negative constructs to more of a position of 
integration. Just five years after the hallmark positive psychology paper (Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), Seligman and others called for “a complimentary relationship 
between positive psychology and clinical psychology “as usual” (Duckworth et al., 2005, 
p.630) and several authors argued for the value of integrating positive psychology research 
with mental health research (e.g., Aspinwall & Staudinger, 2003; Larsen, Hemenover, 
Norris, & Cacioppo, 2003; Ryff & Singer, 2003). Over time, a zeitgeist shift has begun to 
occur towards a broader position that jointly focuses on alleviating psychological problems 
and promoting well-being (e.g., Ivtzan et al., 2015; Johnson & Wood, 2017; Joseph & 
Wood, 2010; McNulty & Fincham, 2012; Peterson, 2006b; Wood & Tarrier, 2010; Wood 
& Johnson, 2016), which some have labelled the “second wave” of positive psychology 
(Ivtzan et al., 2015; Wong, 2011).  
One prominent component of this shifting zeitgeist was the inception of PCP, 
which, like others, called for positive psychology research to be integrated with the 
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voluminous evidence base concerned with understanding and treating psychological 
problems (Johnson & Wood, 2017; Wood & Tarrier, 2010; Wood & Johnson, 2016). The 
central thesis of PCP is that positive and negative psychological constructs are equally 
important for explaining psychological problems (Johnson & Wood, 2017; Joseph & 
Wood, 2010; Wood & Johnson, 2016; Wood & Tarrier, 2010). PCP argued that integrating 
positive psychology and mental health research would avoid reinventing the wheel by 
duplicating what is already known (Wood & Johnson, 2016), and would confer 
incremental prediction (Johnson & Wood, 2017; Joseph & Wood, 2010; Tarrier & Wood, 
2010). For example, the positive psychology movement has exclusively focused on topics 
such as happiness, and much of the research has started from scratch on the assumption 
that there is no relevant existing research to draw upon (Joseph & Wood, 2010). However, 
this approach disregards existing research that is relevant to understanding “positive” 
variables (variables studied by positive psychology) that exists within the mental health 
field (Joseph & Wood, 2010; Johnson & Wood, 2017; Wood & Johnson, 2016) and other 
literatures.  
More specifically, PCP predicts that depressive symptoms constitute one pole of 
depression-well-being continuum, where depression can be understood as the “negative” 
pole of this continuum, and well-being as the opposite, “positive” pole of the same 
continuum. If this prediction is correct, then the research base on well-being has a bearing 
on that for depressive symptoms, and vice-versa, because depression and well-being are 
the same construct, viewed through different lenses (Joseph & Wood, 2010)1. Chapters 2 
and 3 discuss these issues in depth.  
1.7.1. Conceptual relationship between positive and negative 
The central argument of PCP is that the understanding and treatment of 
psychological problems needs to be based on researching, understanding, treating and 
fostering a balanced and equally weighted focus on positive and negative constructs (Wood 
& Tarrier, 2010). PCP puts forward two major predictions. The first is that most 
psychological constructs are bipolar, consisting of a positive pole and a negative pole. For 
example, tenacity is predicted to be bipolar with giving-up tendencies, flexibility with 
rigidity, self-acceptance with self-rejection, autonomy with subjugation, purpose in life 
with meaninglessness, environmental mastery with defeat, personal growth with 
psychological stagnation, optimism with pessimism, and gratitude with ingratitude 
(Johnson & Wood, 2017). In Chapter 3, a conceptual and methodological argument is put 
                                                          
1 PCP originally proposed a depression-happiness continuum (Joseph & Wood, 2010; Tarrier & Wood, 2010) 
but has since moved away from this terminology due to debate regarding the meaning of “happiness”  
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forward that anxiety symptoms form one end of an anxiety-calmness continuum, where 
anxiety symptoms can be understood as the “negative” pole of this continuum, and 
calmness experiences as the opposite, “positive” pole of the same continuum (Joseph & 
Wood, 2010). The anxiety-calmness continuum is hypothesised to range from high anxiety 
symptoms, through a hypothetical zero point, to high calmness symptoms. 
PCP’s second major prediction is that a focus on variables that particularly 
characterise well-being (“positive” constructs) must equally complement a focus on 
variables that particularly characterise psychological problems (“negative” constructs) in 
mental health research and therapy because positive constructs provide important unshared 
explanatory power in relation to psychological problems. Specifically, positive constructs: 
(1). Can predict psychological problems above and beyond negative characteristics because 
variables studied by positive psychology (e.g., gratitude) are different to those studied 
by mental health researchers (e.g., depression) and therefore share less variance;  
(2). Buffer the impact of negative life events on distress, potentially preventing the 
development of psychological problems; 
(3). Can be promoted in nonclinical populations to promote resilience; 
(4). Can be fostered to treat psychological problems (interventions that aim to increase 
movement towards a “positive” pole of a particular construct can be used encourage 
movement away from the “negative” pole of the same construct, either in isolation or 
alongside traditional clinical interventions) (Johnson & Wood, 2017; Wood & Johnson, 
2016; Wood & Tarrier, 2010). 
1.7.2. Critique 
PCP, like positive psychology, capitalised on an emerging zeitgeist. Neither 
research agenda is totally new. As stated, several authors prior to the inception of PCP 
advocated the value of integrating research from the positive psychology literature with 
existing research on mental health problems (e.g., Aspinwall & Staudinger, 2003; Larsen, 
Hemenover, Norris, & Cacioppo, 2003; Ryff & Singer, 2003). However, positive 
psychology and PCP both appear to have added to and probably extended what other 
authors have said by raising awareness of the importance of variables that might 
particularly explain well-being as they relate to psychological problems. PCP particularly 
focused on advocating the importance and value of integration, a message that is likely to 
provide benefits to the positive psychology and mental health field, as well as other fields. 
Like positive psychology research, PCP is subject to several important criticisms. 
One important concern is that PCP has not always been explicit or consistent in discussing 
and framing its core predictions (Held, 2016), which has rendered its key messages 
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confusing at times. PCP has stated that “most characteristics have both positive and 
negative polls” (and are therefore bipolar) (Wood & Tarrier, 2010; p. 825) and that the 
“great majority of human functioning factors can be regarded as constituting a spectrum 
from negative to positive” (Johnson & Wood, 2017; p. 336). However, at other times, PCP 
has stated that positive and negative psychological constructs are always bipolar, for 
example implicitly with statements such as “characteristics range from low to high” (Wood 
& Johnson, 2016; p. 8), or explicitly with statements such as “all positive or negative 
factors have an inverse” (Johnson & Wood, 2017; p. 335) and “all factors fall on a 
continuum from positive to negative” (Johnson & Wood, 2017; p. 336). Overall, although 
PCP has been somewhat inconsistent in its phrasing, it generally seems to predict that most 
psychological constructs are bipolar, consisting of a positive pole and a negative pole. This 
thesis attempts to make an important contribution to the literature by clarifying and testing 
PCP’s core messages and making them more explicit. 
Another concern that can be raised is that there is very little direct evidence to 
support (or refute) PCP’s central hypothesis that most psychological constructs are bipolar, 
having a positive pole and a negative pole. The authors place a large amount of importance 
(Joseph & Wood, 2010; Wood & Tarrier, 2010) on two studies they conducted (Joseph & 
Lewis, 1998; Wood, Taylor & Joseph, 2010), which demonstrated that depression can be 
understood as forming a continuum with well-being. They also put significant weight in a 
theoretical idea offered by Joseph and Wood (2010), who predicted that anxiety forms a 
continuum with calmness in order to support the notion that most psychological constructs 
are bipolar. However, no evidence was provided to support this hypothesised anxiety-
calmness continuum. Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis address the need for further direct 
evidence in support of PCP’s first key prediction. These chapters test whether depression 
can be understood as forming a depression-well-being continuum and whether anxiety can 
be understood as forming an anxiety-calmness continuum.  
Importantly, PCP has not made a specific prediction regarding the (linear or 
nonlinear) nature or form of the relationship between hypothesised bipolar continua and 
other psychiatric variables, making just an indirect remark that “it is possible that different 
therapies would be needed even if depression/happiness and anxiety/relaxation were 
continuums, if there was a non-linear relationship where different therapies worked better 
at different places on the continuum” (Joseph & Wood, 2010; p. 834). Chapters 2 and 3 of 
this thesis explain the importance of these analyses in detail and provide the first direct 
tests of this issue.  
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Chapters 2 and 3 examine the form of the relationship between the depression-well-
being and other psychiatric variables (Chapter 2) and the calmness-anxiety continuum and 
other psychiatric variables (Chapter 3). Examining the form of these relationships, known 
as “phenomenological continuity” (Flett et al., 1997), would parallel work on stress, for 
example, which has established an inverted-U-shaped relationship between stress and 
memory function in that memory performance is impaired under conditions above or 
below optimal stress levels (Broadbent, 1965; Salehi, Cordero & Sandi, 2010; Yerkes & 
Dodson, 1908). Chapters 2 and 3 argue that these analyses have potentially significant 
implications for the conceptualization of psychological problems and for clinical practice. 
As discussed, PCP’s second major prediction states that variables that particularly 
characterise well-being (“positive constructs”) provide important unshared explanatory 
power in relation to psychological problems (Johnson & Wood, 2017; Joseph & Wood, 
2010; Wood & Johnson, 2016; Wood & Tarrier, 2010). This prediction requires some 
explanation and is potentially open to misinterpretation. It is fairly intuitive to see that 
when positive and negative constructs are separate (unipolar), positive constructs may 
explain incremental validity or even interact with negative constructs. However, this 
prediction is somewhat clear less when bipolar constructs are involved (Held, 2016), which 
have a positive pole and a negative pole. When this is the case, this prediction rests on the 
understanding that positive psychology and mental health researchers have tended to focus 
on different constructs (respectively “positive” and “negative” constructs) (Johnson & 
Wood, 2017). When a construct is bipolar (e.g., a depression-well-being continuum), each 
opposite pole (e.g., depression, well-being) cannot provide unshared explanatory power or 
add incremental validity in relation to the opposite pole because the two constructs are the 
same thing.  
Different bipolar constructs are, however, potentially able to provide important 
unshared explanatory power in relation to psychological problems because the constructs 
are different. For example, gratitude may buffer against depression (see Wood, Froh & 
Geraghty, 2010), even though both constructs are hypothesised to be bipolar, because 
gratitude and depression are separate variables (Johnson & Wood, 2017). Gratitude has 
been predominantly focused on by positive psychology researchers and is hypothesised to 
be the “positive” pole of a gratitude/ingratitude bipolar continuum (Johnson & Wood, 
2017). Depression has been predominantly focused on by mental health researchers and is 
hypothesised to be the “negative” pole of a depression-well-being bipolar continuum 
(Joseph & Wood, 2010; Wood et al., 2010).  
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Gratitude may buffer against depression, not because gratitude is a “positive” 
variable that has generally been studied by positive psychology researchers or because 
depression is a “negative” variable that has generally been studied by mental health 
researchers, but because the constructs are separate. The available measures of gratitude 
and depression happen to tap opposite ends of each bipolar continuum as a result of the 
separate epistemological position of the developers. That is, measures of gratitude just 
measure the “positive” pole of a potential gratitude/ingratitude continuum and, with a few 
exceptions, measures of depression generally just measure the “negative” pole of a 
potential depression-well-being continuum. If gratitude and depression, for example, are 
both found to be bipolar constructs (there has yet to be a test of a gratitude/ingratitude 
continuum), the effect of gratitude buffering against depression would need to be 
understood in terms of scoring high (at the positive end) on a gratitude continuum and 
scoring low (at the negative end) on a separate depression continuum.  
PCP has been very clear about the importance and value of integrating positive 
psychology research (“positive” constructs) with mental health research (“negative” 
constructs) but the subtleties of its second core prediction, that positive and negative 
constructs each provide important unshared explanatory power in relation to psychological 
problems, may not have always come across to readers. It is hoped that the present 
analyses and discussion extends the existing explanations in this respect.  
1.8. Positive and Negative Constructs and this Thesis 
This thesis shines a spotlight on the largely untested central assumptions of PCP. 
Chapters 2 and 3 test: (1) whether depression and anxiety problems can each be understood 
as forming one pole of (separate) bipolar continua (respectively, a depression-well-being 
continuum and an anxiety-calmness continuum), (2) the (linear or nonlinear) form of the 
relationship between these hypothesised continua and other psychiatric variables. Chapters 
4 and 5 test (3) whether some psychological variables are unipolar, and (4) whether 
positive psychological constructs explain additional variance over and above negative 
psychological constructs when predicting psychological problems (Johnson & Wood, 
2016; Joseph & Wood, 2010; Wood & Johnson, 2016; Wood & Tarrier, 2010). The 
conceptual relationship between “positive” and “negative” constructs is therefore 
examined in relation to four psychological problems: depressive symptoms, anxiety-
problems, SA and NSSI. Throughout this thesis, it is argued that testing these issues 
potentially has implications for how affective states are understood and how psychological 
problems are understood and treated. 
1.8.1. Chapters 2 and 3 
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Chapters 2 and 3 examine whether positive and negative traits can, at times, be 
conceptualised as opposite ends of the same bipolar continuum using the examples of 
depressive symptoms (Chapter 2) and anxiety problems (Chapter 3). From the perspective 
of the literature on affect, one popular view suggests that positive and negative affect are 
independent dimensions that each range from zero to intense, such that, for example, 
anxiety or sadness are either present or absent (e.g., Cacioppo, Gardner & Berntson, 1999; 
Gray, 1990; Watson & Tellegen, 1999; Watson, Wiese, Valdya & Tellegen, 1999). 
Another popular view suggests that positive and negative affect are actually opposite poles 
of the same bipolar construct (e.g., Barrett & Russell, 1998; Carver & Scheier, 1998; 
Higgins, 1997; Joseph & Wood, 2010; Russell & Carroll, 1999a, b; Watson & Tellegen, 
1999; Yik, Russell & Steiger, 2011). From the perspective of the literature on 
psychological problems, depressive and anxiety symptoms are usually conceptualised in 
research and practice as separate dimensions (Endler, Cox, Parker & Bagby, 1992; 
Feldman, 1993), but not as dimensions that are continuous with well-being and calmness 
(Joseph & Wood, 2010).  
Chapter 2 explores whether depressive symptoms form one end of a depression-
well-being bipolar continuum and Chapter 3 explores whether anxiety problems form one 
end of a bipolar anxiety-calmness continuum. As discussed below, Chapter 2 replicates a 
key study (Wood et al., 2010) that was used to argue for the notion that positive and 
negative constructs can be bipolar. Although this study was conducted in 2010, to the 
author’s knowledge there has not been another direct test of this issue. However, this 
important finding (Wood et al., 2010) has been taken as key support in relation to PCP’s 
argument for bipolarity, so a replication is much-needed. Chapter 3 provides the first test 
of an anxiety-calmness continuum, as hypothesised by Joseph and Wood (2010). Chapters 
2 and 3 are important as they test whether the two most common psychological problems 
form (separate) bipolar continua.  
The studies presented in these chapters also significantly extend previous findings 
by making the clinical importance of this topic more explicit. These studies test the (linear 
or nonlinear) form of the relationship between the depression-well-being and calmness-
anxiety and continuums and other psychiatric variables. This form is critical to 
understanding anxiety problems, as discontinuities in relationships with other 
psychological conditions could be used to define a natural boundary of problematic 
depressive or anxiety symptoms. Chapters 2 and 3 potentially provide important 
implications for how we understand affect and how we conceptualize psychological 
problems and deliver mental health services, particularly whether it would be equally 
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important to reduce negative constructs (depressive and anxiety symptoms) and promote 
positive constructs (calmness and well-being). 
1.8.2. Chapters 4 and 5 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine whether positive and negative constructs can, at times, 
be conceptualised as separate, using the example of self-injurious cognitions (SICs). SICs 
are cognitions specifically about engaging in self-injurious behaviour (SIB) such as 
“People think that my suicide attempt(s) are selfish” or “Nonsuicidal self-injury helps me 
escape negative emotions.” “SIB” refers to behaviours to deliberately physically injure 
oneself. 
Chapters 4 and 5 describe the development and validation of the Suicide Attempt 
Beliefs Scale (SABS) and the Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS), two new 
self-report measures of SICs. The SABS was developed to measure beliefs about suicide 
attempts (SA). The NSIBS was developed to measure beliefs about engaging in 
nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI). Chapters 4 and 5 also explore whether SA and NSSI are 
each characterised by positive and negative SICs. “Positive SICs” are the idiosyncratic 
individual and interpersonal perceived advantages of SIB (e.g., “My problems are so 
serious that SA is the only option” [individual]; “NSSI makes people take my problems 
seriously” [interpersonal]). “Negative SICs” are the idiosyncratic individual and 
interpersonal perceived disadvantages of SIB (e.g., “NSSI makes my problems worse” 
[individual]; “People judge and criticise my SA” [interpersonal]).  
Previous measures of SICs confined their focus to measuring particular aspects of 
positive SICs. Thus, negative SICs were previously outside of the measurement spotlight 
and a comprehensive measure of positive and negative SICs was not available. Structural 
analyses will explore the conceptual relationship between positive and negative SICs.  
1.9.The Replication Crisis 
Although this thesis is conceptually underpinned by PCP a methodological theme 
that is apparent in every study/chapter, is that of replication. Given the centrality of this 
methodological theme to this thesis, and to psychological science more generally, what 
follows is an overview of the key tenets of replicability and the “replication crisis”, 
followed by a discussion of how each thesis chapter incorporates replication (in order to 
make explicit how replication features as a key methodological narrative for this thesis). It 
is important for contemporary PhD theses to demonstrate an awareness of the replication 
crisis because this so-called “crisis” is a major topical debate currently facing all of 
psychological science. Moreover, Everett and Earp (2015) have argued that the PhD thesis 
is the ideal opportunity to contribute replication attempts to the field.  
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1.9.1. What is the Replication Crisis? 
Simply speaking, the “replication crisis” literature has drawn attention to the fact 
that some key scientific findings do not replicate (e.g., Ioannidis, 2005; Open Science 
Collaboration, 2012), which some have taken as evidence that there may be a “replication 
crisis.” This literature explicitly emphasises and encourages replication and takes a critical 
and thoughtful look at how scientific replication can be defined. 
The replication crisis literature has particularly focused on findings in 
psychological science and biomedicine, although the concept of replication has obvious 
relevance to all of science because reproducibility – the extent to which consistent results 
are observed when individual studies are repeated – is of course one of the defining 
features of science. In fact, some authors contend that replication is “the cornerstone of 
science” because only replication can adjudicate whether a single study reporting an 
original result represents a true finding or a false positive result (Simons, 2014, p. 76). 
Replication matters and it is often assumed in science. The worst case scenario for 
the replication crisis debate is that the “scientific literature is too good to be true” (Bakker, 
van Dijk & Wicherts, 2012, p. 543); one cannot believe anything that is published, and 
psychology is filled with mostly invalid and false explanations (Braver et al., 2014). If 
particular key findings do not replicate, researchers may have fruitlessly expended 
resources in the pursuit of false leads, and policy and practice may have been based on 
false information (Open Science Collaboration, 2012). A low estimate of the 
reproducibility of current findings potentially brings the quality of published research into 
question, motivating further investigations of reproducibility, and catalysing changes in 
practice and publishing standards (Bertamini & Munafò, 2012; LeBel & Peters, 2011). On 
the flip side, devoting resources to confirmation instead of innovation is a poor investment 
if the original findings are valid (Open Science Collaboration, 2012); hence why 
replication has been de-emphasised in terms of grant funding and publishability. A high 
estimate of the reproducibility of current findings could therefore nullify concerns of a 
replication “crisis” by bolstering confidence in conventional research and peer-review 
practices (Open Science Collaboration, 2012). 
1.9.2. Types of Replication 
Broadly speaking, there are two types of replication designs. “Exact” or “direct” 
replications are replications that operationalize both the independent and the dependent 
variable(s) in exactly the same way as the original study. The purpose of such replication 
attempts is to verify the original findings (Stroebe & Strack, 2014). Exact replications are 
both useful and necessary in applied research. For example, repeatedly applying exactly 
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the same procedure is critical for establishing the efficiency of a specific intervention, 
where, depending on the subject matter (e.g., cancer treatment), a lack of reliability could 
have fatal consequences (Stroebe & Strack, 2014).  
“Conceptual” replications aim to replicate findings by testing hypotheses that were 
examined in a particular study using a different study design (Stroebe & Strack, 2014). The 
purpose of conceptual replications is to see whether a given phenomenon is apparent 
across a range of conditions (Schmidt, 2009). Although conceptual replications can be very 
informative (especially as content for narrative reviews), they may not be able to identify 
false positive results because differences between original and replication studies may be 
due to procedural differences (Maxwell, Lau & Howard, 2015). For this reason, the 
replication crisis literature has emphasised exact or direct replications, especially of 
experiments.  
1.9.3. The Zeitgeist of Replication 
Although there is general agreement that replicability is important, there are 
relatively few successful replication studies (Open Science Collaboration, 2012), which 
indicates either that findings are false (i.e., those replication studies that have been 
attempted fail to produce supportive findings) or that journals are biased against replication 
studies whatever their result (Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Neuliep & Crandall, 1990, 1993; 
Rosenthal, 1979).  
Everett and Earp (2015) and Earp (2015) have argued that the replication crisis can 
be understood as a disciplinary “social dilemma,” wherein the collective interests of the 
field and society are at odds with the private interests of individual researchers. This social 
dilemma arises because of the contradiction that replication attempts are viewed as 
important indications of rigorous and reliable science by the field and society, whilst at the 
same time the individuals who actually conduct those replications “are looked down on as 
bricklayers and not [as] advancing [scientific] knowledge” (Makel et al., 2012, p. 537). 
Thus, conducting replication attempts is seen as professionally costly for individuals 
because such endeavours involve shifting energy and resources away from projects that 
involve original thinking and new ideas onto projects that are less likely to be published 
(Earp, 2015; Everett & Earp, 2015). This problem is argued to be particularly acute for 
early career academics who experience the “publish or perish” pressure more acutely than 
established academics (Everett & Earp, 2015).  
1.9.4. Replication Attempts 
The “replication crisis” as it relates to psychology was most famously recently 
illustrated in the Reproducibility Project, which involved 270 researchers attempting to 
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directly replicate almost 100 psychology studies (Open Science Collaboration, 2012, 
2015). Each team selected a key finding from a single study for replication. Researchers 
solicited feedback on their research design from the original authors before collecting data 
in order to identify potential barriers to replication. Where threats to replication were 
identified, efforts were made to either remedy these or else such factors were coded as 
potential predictors of reproducibility and written into the replication report (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2012, 2015). The outcome is that according to one of several measures of 
reproducibility, only 36% of results could be confirmed; by another statistical measure, 
47% could. The results of the Reproducibility Project therefore suggested a major problem 
with reproducibility, potentially bringing psychological science into disrepute.  
Another large-scale illustration of the “replication crisis” was provided via a recent 
survey of 1576 researchers that was conducted by the journal Nature. This survey revealed 
that >70% have tried and failed to reproduce another scientist’s experiments, and >50% 
have failed to reproduce their own experiments (Baker, 2016). However, <31% of 
respondents believed that a failure to reproduce published results means that the result is 
probably wrong, and most believed that they still trust the published literature (Baker, 
2016). 
1.9.5. Reproducibility is Complex 
The initial furore of a replication “crisis” is increasingly being accompanied by a 
more thoughtful consideration of the complexities of replication, with increasing 
discussions of the nuances and facets of reproducibility. For example, the American 
Psychological Association (2015) emphasized the possibility that hidden moderators 
rendered the Reproducibility Project’s replications ineffective, and an independent re-
examination of the Reproducibility Project’s results found that when correcting for 
sampling error, power, and bias, the data in fact indicate that the reproducibility of 
psychological science is quite high (Gilbert, King, Pettigrew & Wilson, 2016; for a reply, 
see Anderson et al., 2016).  
The issue of reproducibility is, in fact, complex and a direct replication is unlikely 
to produce a perfect replication (Patil, Peng & Leek, 2016). Several authors have also 
highlighted that there are no established criteria or consensus for deciding that a finding 
has indeed replicated or what replication actually means (Gómez, Juzgado, & Vegas, 2010; 
Valentine et al., 2011). “Successful” replication might be defined narrowly (i.e., obtaining 
the same statistically significant effect as the original study) or broadly (i.e., obtaining a 
directionally similar, but not necessarily statistically significant, result) (Open Science 
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Collaboration, 2012), or with no reference to the statistical significance of findings 
(discussed below). 
A failure to replicate a finding does not conclusively indicate that the original 
finding was false because there are myriad possible reasons for findings not replicating. 
These include: Type II error (some true findings will fail to replicate purely by chance, 
with an occurrence rate of 1−β); insufficient power (the actual size of the effect is lower 
than originally reported, making it more difficult to detect); “researcher degrees of 
freedom” (researcher decision-making when collecting and analysing data, e.g., Should 
more data be collected? Which conditions should be compared?); publication bias; fraud; 
problems with the design, implementation, or analysis of the original or replication study; a 
failure to recognize and document the circumstances and social context in which research 
takes place; changes in the population over time; and other known and unknown factors 
(Baker, 2016; Braver et al., 2014; Cesario, 2014; Cohen, 1962; Cumming, 2014; Earp & 
Trafimow, 2015; Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2016; John, Loewenstein & Prelec, 2012; Klein 
et al., 2012; Maxwell et al., 2015; Meehl, 1990; Open Science Collaboration, 2012; Patil et 
al., 2016; Rosenthal, 1979; Simmons, Nelson & Simonsohn, 2011; Stroebe & Strack, 
2014).  
Some authors have also argued that direct replications arguably contribute little to 
scientific knowledge because they simply demonstrate that the original outcome was 
reproducible (Stroebe & Strack, 2014). The researcher may not be any wiser as to whether 
the original study was a good test of the theory to be tested because even though the 
experiment may have been poorly designed, a faithful replication might result in the same 
finding (Stroebe & Strack, 2014). However, if a particular hypothesis is supported using 
different designs (a conceptual replication), the researcher will have gained additional 
information, bolstering their trust in an underlying theory (Stroebe & Strack, 2014). 
Additionally, failures to replicate a research finding cannot be used as indicators of fraud, 
nor can successful replications be invoked as indication that the original study was 
honestly conducted (Stroebe & Strack, 2014). For example, Diederik Stapel, a prominent 
social psychology researcher who committed major scientific fraud, wrote in his 
autobiography how he was always pleased when his invented findings were replicated 
(Stroebe & Strack, 2014). 
1.9.6. Robust Methods for Establishing Replication 
Some solutions have been proposed to the complexities of replication, including: (i) 
Conducting multiple, independent, adequately powered replication studies (Maxwell et al., 
2015); (ii) using Bayesian statistics to compare the weight of evidence for competing (null 
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and alternative) hypotheses (Braver et al., 2014; Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2016); (iii) using 
meta-analysis to combine the results of replication studies (Braver et al., 2014); (iv) 
developing theories to explain inconsistent findings (Stroebe & Strack, 2014); and (v) 
directly testing whether findings are actually heterogeneous or due to publication bias and 
explaining substantive heterogeneity in terms of moderator variables using meta-analysis 
(Borenstein et al., 2009; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).  
It is worth noting the importance of power in replication attempts (point (i) in the 
above list), as this is a critical issue where replication is concerned, and one that is fairly 
easily remedied at the design stage of research. Several of the discussions of the issue of 
replicability have highlighted the fact that replication attempts have been underpowered 
(e.g., Braver et al., 2014; Maxwell et al., 2015; Patil et al., 2016). This has sometimes 
occurred, for instance in the Reproducibility Project, because power estimates were based 
on observed effect sizes in the original studies (Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2016). This means 
that, in the event that the original effect sizes were inflated, the sample size 
recommendations from prospective power analysis will be underestimates, and therefore 
replication studies will tend to find mostly weak evidence as well (Etz & Vandekerckhove, 
2016; Maxwell et al., 2015). 
The notion that research is often underpowered has been long lamented. Cohen 
(1962) estimated that the typical power of published psychological studies does not exceed 
0.5. More recently, for example, Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (1989) found a similar value 
among studies conducted in the subsequent 25 years, indicating that the low power of most 
earlier published behavioural research was not rectified by Cohen’s findings. If all 
psychological research were carried out with power near .95 or even .80, replication 
problems would arguably diminish. True effects would virtually always achieve 
significance and virtually always be replicable, and researchers would start being more 
interested in effect sizes (Braver et al., 2014).  
A re-analysis of the findings of the Reproducibility Project concluded that the 
apparent failure to replicate many target effects can be adequately explained by 
overestimation of effect sizes (or overestimation of evidence against the null hypothesis) 
due to small sample sizes and publication bias in the psychological literature (Etz & 
Vandekerckhove, 2016). The authors used Bayesian analysis and found that the majority of 
replication attempts (64%) did not provide strong evidence for either the null or the 
alternative hypothesis in either the original or the replication, and no replication attempts 
provided strong evidence in favour of the null. In all cases where the original paper 
provided strong evidence but the replication did not (15%), the sample size in the 
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replication was smaller than the original. Where the replication provided strong evidence 
but the original did not (10%), the replication sample size was larger (Etz & 
Vandekerckhove, 2016). 
Elaborating on the use of meta-analysis to examine the replicability of findings 
(points (iii) and (v) in the above list), the meta-analytic perspective very usefully 
discourages dichotomous decisions regarding successful replication based on p < .05, and 
instead advocates continuous descriptive criteria such as effect size estimates and their 
confidence intervals (Braver et al 2014; Cumming, 2014). As is well-known, the .05 
criterion for what constitutes convincing, reliable, “statistically significant” evidence is 
completely arbitrary. In Rosnow and Rosenthal’s (1989) words, “surely, God loves the .06 
nearly as much as the .05” (p. 1277). Additionally, “Fisher offered the idea of p values as a 
means of protecting researchers from declaring truth based on patterns in noise. In an 
ironic twist, p values are now often manipulated to lend credence to noisy claims based on 
small samples” (Gelman & Loken, 2014, p. 460). 
Applying meta-analysis to the issue of replication, our confidence should increase 
that the phenomenon under study is genuine and true (replicable) to the degree that the 
combined criterion remains significant, whereas indices of heterogeneity (e.g., Q and I2) 
remain small and nonsignificant. Larger Q and I2 values should prompt the search for 
plausible moderator variables which explain heterogeneity among replication attempts 
(Borenstein et al., 2014; Braver et al., 2014; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Multiple 
independent replications of the same study are therefore needed to definitively evaluate 
replication (Patil et al., 2016). One large-scale replication project called the “Many Labs” 
Replication Project (Klein et al., 2014) did just this, replicating findings 35 or 36 times 
(which would guarantee adequate power to identify true effects) and then pooling the 
results. This approach contrasts with that adopted in the Reproducibility Project mentioned 
earlier and indeed produced a much more heartening result whereby 85% of the original 
studies were successfully replicated. 
1.10. Replication and This Thesis 
1.10.1. Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 presents a direct replication of a study by Wood et al. (2010), who used 
the Center for Epidemiologic Studies-Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) to re-
examine the structure of depressive symptoms. Wood et al. (2010) used confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) to control for positively and negatively worded items (method 
effects) in an adult and an older adult sample and found that the CES-D measures a bipolar 
continuum that ranges from well-being to depression (Wood et al., 2010). Chapter 2 
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provides a direct replication of these analyses and findings in a large, diverse sample of 
adolescents (N = 4,138). 
1.10.2. Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 presents a direct replication of a study by Vautier and Pohl (2009), who 
used the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1970) to re-examine the 
structure of state and trait anxiety. The authors used structural equation modelling (SEM) 
to control for item wording (method effects) in the French adaptation of the STAI. Trait 
and state STAI scales were each found to measure one construct (Vautier & Pohl, 2009). 
Chapter 3 discusses how this study is limited because it utilised an exclusively adult 
sample who completed the French adaptation of the STAI. It was therefore unclear whether 
these results would generalize beyond adults and to the original and more commonly used 
English language version of the scale. Chapter 3 attempts to directly replicate the analyses 
and findings of Vautier and Pohl (2009) using two large samples (N = 4,138 and 1,824). 
1.10.3. Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 describes the development of the SABS and NSIBS, two new measures 
of beliefs about SA and beliefs about NSSI. Replication is a critical facet of scale 
development and validation and I explore whether important findings replicate in several 
ways. In the development paper (Chapter 4), the SABS and NSIBS are developed across 
six large, independent samples of people with lived experience of SIB (total N = 3,313). A 
series of separate Exploratory Factor Analyses (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
(EFA) will be conducted in order to locate a robust and generalizable factor structure for 
the SABS and NSIBS.   
1.10.4. Chapter 5 
The validation paper for the SABS and NSIBS (Chapter 5) explicates the internal 
consistency, test retest reliability, convergent, discriminant, criterion, and incremental 
validity of the SABS and NSIBS. Replication also features strongly here, in that all of the 
psychometric analyses will be conducted in relation to at least two independent samples. 
Conclusions will then be drawn based on the consensus of results across different samples, 
which again, provides some confidence that results are relatively robust and generalizable.  
1.11. Published Material 
As mentioned, this thesis is structured around four core chapters (Chapters 2-5), 
with an Introduction (Chapter 1) and General Discussion (Chapter 6). Each chapter has 
been written and presented in a format that is appropriate for publication in a high ranking, 
peer-reviewed journal. Chapters 2 and 3 present manuscripts that have been published in 
the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology and the Journal of Affective Disorders, 
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respectively. Chapters 4 and 5 present manuscripts that will be submitted to Psychological 
Assessment. This thesis format and structure was specifically chosen in order to explicitly 
demonstrate how completing this PhD led to the development of a wide range of research 
and academic skills and knowledge. (The learning that occurred as a result of completing 
this PhD is discussed in more depth in Chapter 6).  
1.11.1. Note on Collaboration and Published Material 
As the thesis chapters present manuscripts that have either been published or which 
will shortly be submitted to academic peer-reviewed journals, a note on collaboration and 
published material is therefore necessary.  
The research presented in this thesis was completed under the supervision of 
several individuals. The vast majority of the guidance and input, and my development as a 
researcher, came from my principal supervisor, Prof Alex M. Wood. Prof Alex M. Wood 
and Dr Peter J. Taylor provided information, advice, guidance, and feedback on 
conceptualisation, writing, and statistical analyses for Chapters 2 and 3, and are therefore 
recognised as co-authors. Profs Alex M. Wood, Ronan E. O’Carroll, and Rory C. 
O’Connor provided information, advice, guidance, and feedback on conceptualisation, 
writing, and statistical analyses for Chapters 4 and 5, and are therefore recognised as co-
authors.  
The data collection that took place for Chapters 4 and 5 was conducted entirely by 
me. All statistical analyses were undertaken solely by me. Each manuscript was written 
almost entirely by me, with occasional editing by my supervisors during the very final 
stages of manuscript preparation.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. The Centre for Epidemiologic Studies-Depression (CES-D) Scale Measures a 
Continuum From Well-Being to Depression: Testing Two Key Predictions of 
Positive Clinical Psychology 
 
2.1.Abstract 
Two core but untested predictions of Positive Clinical Psychology (PCP) are that 
(1) Many psychiatric problems can be understood as one end of bipolar continua with well-
being, and (2) that reducing psychiatric symptoms will provide an equal (near linear) 
decrease in risk for several other psychiatric variables, irrespective of position on continua.  
We test these predictions in relation to a purported well-being/depression continuum, as 
measured by the Center for Epidemiologic Studies-Depression (CES-D), a popular 
measure of depressive experiences in research and clinical practice. A large (N = 4,138), 
diverse sample completed the CES-D, which contains a mixture of negatively worded and 
positively worded items (e.g., “I felt sad,” “I enjoyed life”). The latter are conventionally 
reverse scored to compute a total score. We first examined whether purportedly separate 
well-being and depression CES-D factors can be reconceptualised as a bipolar well-
being/depression continuum. We then characterised the (linear or nonlinear) form of the 
relationship between this continuum and other psychiatric variables. Both predictions were 
supported. When controlling for shared method bias amongst positively worded items, a 
single factor well-being/depression continuum underlies the CES-D. Baseline levels on this 
continuum are found to have near linear relationships with changes in anxiety symptoms, 
aggression, and substance misuse over time, demonstrating that moving from depression to 
well-being on the CES-D provides an equal decrease in risk for several other psychological 
problems irrespective of position on the continuum. The CES-D does not measure well-
being as comprehensively as established scales of well-being. Results support calls for 
mental health services to jointly focus on increasing well-being and reducing distress, and 
point to the value of early intervention and instilling resilience in order to prevent people 
moving away from high levels of well-being. 
 
This chapter has been published as: Siddaway, A. P., Wood, A. M., & Taylor P. J. (2017). 
The Centre for Epidemiologic Studies-Depression (CES-D) scale measures a continuum 
from well-being to depression: Testing two key predictions of Positive Clinical 
Psychology. Journal of Affective Disorders, 213, 180-186.  
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2.2.Introduction 
Well-being is becoming an increasingly central focus of international policy (e.g., 
Department of Health, 2009; Mental Health Commission of Canada, 2009). The positive 
psychology movement was proposed in order to raise awareness of the importance of 
researching psychological traits and constructs that promote well-being (Gable & Haidt, 
2005; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). This literature has burgeoned and recent years 
have seen an increasing shift towards a broader position that jointly focuses on alleviating 
psychological problems and promoting well-being (e.g., Ivtzan et al., 2015; Joseph & 
Wood, 2010; McNulty & Fincham, 2012; Peterson, 2006b; Wood & Tarrier, 2010), which 
some have labeled the “second wave” of positive psychology (Ivtzan et al., 2015; Wong, 
2011).  
One prominent component of this shifting zeitgeist has been the inception of 
Positive Clinical Psychology (PCP), which has called for positive psychology research to 
be integrated with the voluminous evidence base concerned with understanding and 
treating psychological problems (Wood & Tarrier, 2010, as clarified in Johnson & Wood, 
in press). Numerous articles (e.g., Johnson & Wood, in press; Lomas, 2015; Joseph & 
Wood, 2010; Wood & Tarrier, 2010; Wong, 2011) and at least three books (Ivtzan et al., 
2015; Peterson, 2006b; Wood & Johnson, 2016) have now summarized evidence which 
supports this integration. These demonstrate, for example, that: (i) constructs studied by 
positive psychology researchers can independently predict psychological problems over 
and above clinical constructs; (ii) that constructs studied in positive psychology can confer 
resilience to psychological problems; and (iii) that interventions which aim to move people 
towards well-being can also be used to help people move away from psychological 
problems, either in isolation, or alongside clinical interventions.  
Although this progress is promising, the notion that positive psychology research 
can and should be integrated with the existing evidence base for psychological problems 
remains largely untested. This study explores this issue by testing two core predictions 
made by PCP using the example of depressive experiences. The first prediction to be tested 
here is the idea that many psychological problems in fact form continua with well-being. A 
well-being/psychological problem continuum would indicate that research on either area 
has implications for the opposite pole (Joseph & Wood, 2010; Wood & Tarrier, 2010) and 
would suggest that the language of “positive” and “negative” is arbitrary and dependent on 
one’s perspective and context (Johnson & Wood, 2017; McNulty & Fincham, 2012; Wood 
& Johnson, 2016). This conceptualization would align with the substantial research base 
demonstrating that psychological problems are best-viewed as continuous rather than 
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discrete categories (e.g., see Bentall, 2003; Haslam et al., 2012; Markon et al., 2011) and 
which has examined continuously distributed transdiagnostic constructs and mechanisms 
(e.g., see Harvey et al., 2004). 
We test this key prediction in relation to a hypothesized depression/well-being 
continuum using the Center for Epidemiologic Studies-Depression (CES-D) scale (Radloff, 
1977). The CES-D is one of the most frequently used self-report measures of depressive 
experiences (Santor et al., 2006) and there is extensive support for its psychometric 
properties (Ensel, 1986; Radloff, 1977; Roberts, 1980; Shean & Baldwin, 2008). The fact 
that the CES-D contains a mixture of negatively worded items (e.g., “I felt sad;” “I thought 
my life had been a failure”) and positively worded items (e.g., “I felt happy;” “I enjoyed 
life”) led to the proposal that it could be re-conceptualised as a depression/well-being 
continuum (Joseph, 2006, 2007). It was argued that for a score of zero to occur on the 
CES-D, a person would have to give all of the negatively worded items (e.g., “I felt sad”) 
the lowest possible score (“rarely of none of the time”) and all of the positively worded 
items (e.g., “I enjoyed life”) the highest possible score (“most or all of the time”). For such 
a person it would be misleading to state that they have merely indicated an absence of 
depressive experiences; such an individual has also clearly indicated the presence of well-
being (Joseph, 2006, 2007; Joseph & Wood, 2010).  
One existing study has tested whether the CES-D can be re-conceptualized as a 
well-being/depression continuum (Wood et al., 2010). The authors found that when 
account for item wording using structural equation modeling, the CES-D can indeed be 
understood as measuring a bipolar continuum that ranges from well-being to depression. 
The authors established these findings using separate adult and older adult samples and 
presented evidence that the well-being items (e.g., “I felt happy;” “I enjoyed life”) 
demonstrate convergent validity with the well-validated Scales of Psychological Well-
being (Ryff, 1989). Given the potential practical importance of the suggestion that 
depression forms a bipolar continuum with well-being, and the increasing emphasis on 
replicating scientific findings to ensure that they are robust and generalizable, our first aim 
was to replicate the structural analyses of this previous study using a large, diverse sample 
of adolescents.  
The second prediction made by PCP that we test here is the idea that moving along 
the well-being/depression continuum (total score on the CES-D) towards well-being will 
provide an equal decrease in risk for several other psychological problems, irrespective of 
position on the continuum (Wood & Johnson, in press; Wood & Tarrier, 2010). We test 
this prediction by examining the form of the relationship between the depression/well-
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being continuum and other psychological problems over time, which Flett et al. (1997) 
referred to as “phenomenological continuity.” That is, continuity in the relationship 
between psychological problems and their antecedents, concomitants, or sequalae. 
Accordingly, even if depression is relatively continuous in a psychometric sense, its 
relationship with associated variables could be relatively discontinuous or nonlinear in 
form, defining a natural boundary of depressive experiences (Markon, 2010).  
The benefit of these analyses is that they make the clinical importance of this topic 
more apparent and explicit than merely examining whether a well-being/depression 
continuum exists. One possibility, for example, is that there is no relationship between the 
well-being/depression continuum and other psychological problems up to a particular point 
(e.g., throughout the range of the well-being pole), after which the detrimental 
consequences of depression begin to manifest. Evidence of this relationship would 
corroborate the current emphasis in mental health services on alleviating and treating 
psychological problems. This conceptualization of depression (and other mental health) 
problems underpins psychiatric nomenclature and, as a result, psychiatric and 
psychological interventions tend to be stopped at the point of problem absence. 
An alternative possibility is a linear relationship between the well-being/depression 
continuum and other psychological problems throughout the range of the continuum. This 
relationship would be apparent if depressive experiences increase at a constant rate along 
with other psychological problems, without any threshold defining a change in association. 
Evidence of this relationship would simultaneously highlight the importance of treating 
depression (because as depressive experiences increase, so do other psychological 
problems) and emphasize the usefulness of fostering well-being (because as well-being 
increases, psychological problems decrease). Such evidence would be consistent with calls 
from professional bodies (e.g., The British Psychological Society, 2010) and the mental 
health recovery movement (Anderson, Oades & Caputi, 2003) for mental health services to 
focus not just on tackling psychological problems but also on fostering well-being and 
helping people live a valued, meaningful life.  
We examine these two key predictions of PCP using a large population-based 
archival dataset, which, by implication, involved variability in the latent entity, thereby 
minimizing the likelihood of systematic sampling bias, which could have been introduced 
had we used a purely community or clinical sample (Waller & Meehl, 1998). For example, 
using an undergraduate sample could introduce a systematic sampling bias since only those 
individuals functioning well enough to attend classes would be studied (Hankin et al., 
2005). Likewise, focusing entirely on clinical individuals may limit variability in 
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depressive experiences (Hankin et al., 2005) as clinical samples often exhibit more severe 
symptoms and greater comorbidities than population-based samples (Newman et al., 
1998).  
2.3.Method 
2.3.1. Participants 
The sample comprised 4,138 adolescents and adults aged 13-21 years from 
Hawai‘i. These individuals took part in the five-year longitudinal Hawaiian High Schools 
Health Survey (HHSHS) study conducted by the National Center on Indigenous Hawaiian 
Behavioral Health (NCIHBH). This sample provides a broad spread of ages, ethnicities, 
socioeconomic status,’ and gender (Andrade et al., 2006; Hishinuma et al., 2000). 
Participants for the HHSHS study were sampled from five high schools which were 
selected from both urban and rural areas to obtain a representative sample of adolescents 
residing in Hawaii. Students who provided assent completed the survey in their classrooms 
under the supervision of their teachers. Parents of students younger than 18 years old were 
notified of the study by mail and given an opportunity to refuse participation. Data 
collected during the 1992/1993 (N = 4,164), 1993/1994 (N = 4,182), and 1994/1995 (N = 
1,433) school years were used in this study. There was some missing demographic 
information and incomplete questionnaire responses (see Andrade et al., 2006; Hishinuma 
et al., 2001) and we multiply imputed missing data as best practice (discussed below). 
2.3.2. Measures 
Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression (CES-D; Radloff, 1977). CES-
D responses capture the frequency of feelings and behaviours over the past seven days and 
are rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (rarely or none of the time) to 3 (most or all of 
the time). The CES-D contains 20 items that are summed so that scores have a potential 
range from 0 to 60, with higher scores indicating greater frequency of depressive 
experiences (Radloff, 1977). Numerous studies have examined the factor structure of the 
CES-D (McArdle et al., 2001; Prescott et al., 1998; Radloff, 1977) and these have 
generally suggested that negative and positive items load onto separate factors (see Shafer, 
2006, for a review). There is extensive support for the psychometric properties of the CES-
D, including high internal consistency in community and clinical populations (Cronbach’s 
αs .85 - .90; Ensel, 1986; Radloff, 1977; Roberts, 1980); convergent validity with other 
popular measures of depressive experiences such as the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (r = 
.85; Amtmann et al., 2014) and Beck Depression Inventory-II (Shean & Baldwin, 2008); 
and divergent validity from, for example, aggression (r = .44) and substance use (r = .24; 
Makini et al., 1996). A cutoff score of 16 has been found to have sensitivity and specificity 
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rates of 86.7 and 76.6 for identifying depressed individuals, whereas a cutoff score of 21 
has a sensitivity and specificity rate of 73.0 and 96.1 (Shean & Baldwin, 2008). The CES-
D demonstrated excellent internal consistency (α = .89). 
CES-D items representing depression and well-being were generally positively 
skewed.  
Distribution of distributions of average responses to the STAI State items 
 Number of days per week symptoms experienced, on 
average 
Items <1 day 1-2 days 3-4 days 5-7 days 
Well-being  1306 1182 821 550 
Depression 2180 939 483 275 
 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait scale (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1970). 
Trait anxiety is seen as a relatively stable individual difference in the tendency to respond 
to situations perceived as threatening with elevation in state anxiety (Spielberger et al., 
1970). Items are rated on a 4-point frequency scale based on “how you generally feel.” 
Support for the psychometric properties of the STAI has been extensive (see Spielberger, 
1989; Spielberger et al., 1970). The trait scale demonstrates excellent internal consistency 
(average Cronbach’s αs > .89); excellent test–retest reliability at multiple time intervals 
(average r = .88; Barnes et al., 2002); adequate convergent validity with other measures of 
anxiety (Spielberger, 1989); and divergent validity from, for example, aggression (r = .38) 
and substance use (r = .19; Knight et al., 1983). The STAI demonstrated excellent internal 
consistency (α = 89).  
Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory—Adolescent version (SASSI-A; 
Miller, 1990). The SASSI-A is a brief screen for substance use, impairment, and 
dependency arising from substance use. The SASSI-A has been shown to have good 
psychometric properties, including acceptable internal consistency in the current sample (α 
= .74); and divergent validity from anxiety (r = .19), depression (r = .24), and aggression (r 
= .33; Makini et al., 1996). It has also been shown to concord with a diagnosis of substance 
abuse and dependency on the Diagnostic Interview Schedule for Children (Nishimura et 
al., 2001), predict counselor DSM-III diagnoses for dually diagnosed adolescent inpatients 
(Piazza, 1996), and predict adolescent chemical dependency (Risberg et al., 1995). The 
SASSI-A demonstrated good internal consistency (baseline/1992/1993 school year: α = 
.88; Time 1/1993/1994 school year: α = .88; Time 2/1994/1995 school year: α = .86). 
Braver Aggressiveness Dimension Scale (BADS; Braver et al., 1986). The 
BADS is a 14-item abbreviated self-report measure of child and adolescent aggression. It 
was derived from the longer Youth Self-Report scales (YSR: Achenbach, 1991), the self-
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report version of the Child Behaviour Checklist. Items selected for the BADS were those 
items from the YSR which were significantly more likely to be endorsed by clinically-
diagnosed, conduct disordered children and adolescents. The BADS has good 
psychometric properties, including one year test-retest stability (r = .61) and divergent 
validity (Makini et al., 1996). It demonstrated good internal consistency 
(baseline/1992/1993 school year: α = .85; Time 1/1993/1994 school year: α = .70; Time 
2/1994/1995 school year: α = .64). 
Missing Data 
There were substantial amounts of missing data in the Hawaiian dataset. 6.4% of all 
values were missing for the 1992/1993 school year, 52.2% of all values were missing for 
the 1993/1994 school year, and 22.53% of all values were missing for the 1994/1995 
school year. The missingness was not completely at random (MCAR). We addressed this 
potential problem by multiply imputing missing data on all variables at the item level using 
SPSS version 21.0 (IBM Corp, 2012). Multiple imputation (MI) is increasingly advocated 
as the optimal approach for dealing with missing data (Graham, 2009; Schafer & Graham, 
2002; Shrive et al., 2006). When MI has been compared with alternative methods of 
handling incomplete data (e.g., single imputation methods, complete-case analyses, 
maximum likelihood approaches), it has been shown to generate less biased estimates that 
have more statistical efficiency (e.g., Crawford et al, 1995; Donders et al., 2006; Liu & 
Gould, 2002; Tang et al., 2005). There is also evidence indicating that MI performs well 
across different circumstances, such as small samples, very large multiple regressions, and 
when there are large amounts of missing data (Graham & Schafer, 1999).  
MI works by generating plausible missing values multiple times based on the 
distribution of the observed data. Random components are incorporated into these 
estimated values to reflect their uncertainty. This procedure creates a set of ‘‘complete’’ 
data sets with no missing values. Analyses are then run separately on each data set, and the 
results are pooled across datasets using multiple imputation combining rules (Enders, 
2010; Graham, 2009). The purpose of MI is not to obtain the individual values themselves 
but to estimate unbiased parameter estimates of the data set as a whole (Graham, 2009). 
We followed recommendations to match the number of imputations to the fraction of 
missing information because progressively larger numbers of imputed datasets are needed 
to maximize power in subsequent significance testing (Bodner, 2008; Graham et al., 2007; 
White et al., 2011). 
Statistical Analysis 
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Analyses were conducted using SPSS version 21.0 (IBM Corp, 2012) and R (R 
Development Core Team, 2009). The CFAs were performed using the R lavaan package, 
version 0.5-18 (Rosseel, 2012). Positively worded CES-D items were reverse scored for all 
analyses. Complete cases were used for these analyses and three CFA models were tested. 
Model 1 was the standard two factor model consisting of separate negatively worded (e.g., 
“I felt sad”) and positively worded (e.g., “I enjoyed life”) items, which were allowed to 
correlate. Model 2 was a single factor model with all items loading on a single factor. 
Model 3 also featured a single substantive well-being/depression factor, however the 
positively worded items were allowed to cross-load onto a second methodological artefact 
factor which accounted for additional residual inter-correlation between these items. 
As CES-D data are ordinal, we employed WLSMV estimation (Flora & Curran, 
2004). Acceptable fit was operationalized as Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) < .08, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) > .90, and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) > .90. 
Good fit was operationalized as RMSEA < .06, CFI > .95, and TLI > .95 (Hu & Bentler, 
1999). The fit of competing CFA models were compared using: (i) Akaike’s Information 
Criterion (AIC; calculated using Maximum Likelihood CFA), which tests the relative fit of 
competing models after adjusting for parsimony (lower AICs indicate less information loss 
and thus a superior model), and (ii) CFI, using a .002 cutoff (Meade et al., 2008). Both 
approaches are argued to be superior to using the chi-square statistic to compare model fit 
because this statistic is known to be highly sensitive to sample size (see Meade et al., 
2008). 
Hierarchical ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions were used to explore linear 
and nonlinear relationships between CES-D scores, treated as a single factor (all items 
summed to produce a total score), and outcome variables. Regressions were conducted 
using MI data. In each analysis, Step 1 involved fitting a model whereby CES-D total 
scores had a linear relationship with the outcome variable measured at the same time 
(1992/1993 school year), or measured at follow-up 1 or 2 years later (1993/1994, 
1994/1995 school years), whilst controlling for scores on the outcome variable at baseline 
(hence it was the change in outcome that we were predicting). Steps 2 and 3 tested whether 
adding a nonlinear term (squared and cubed CES-D total scores) made a significant 
improvement to the amount of variance explained. Improvement in model fit was based on 
ΔR2. Statistically significant deviations from linearity were graphed in order to visually 
display relationships, using unstandardized regression coefficients. This also clarified 
whether nonlinearity was substantive.   
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2.4. Results  
2.4.1. Comparison of CFA Models 
Table I shows that the two factor model (Model 1) demonstrated an improvement 
in fit over the one factor model (Model 2), replicating previous findings regarding the 
factor structure of the CES-D (see Shafer, 2006). Model 3 (a well-being/depression 
continuum) demonstrated an improvement in fit again, thereby replicating the findings of 
Wood et al. (2010). The AIC statistic, which accounts for model complexity, and the 
change in model fit according to CFI (Meade et al., 2008), both pointed to the superiority 
of Model 3, as hypothesized. These results indicate that when shared method bias amongst 
positively worded items is controlled for, a single factor underlies the CES-D items. 
Furthermore, as we argued in the Introduction, Model 3 was also favored on theoretical 
grounds because endorsing positively worded items, which are usually reverse-scored (e.g., 
“I felt happy,” “I enjoyed life”), does not merely indicate the absence of depressive 
experiences; it actually indicates the presence of well-being (Joseph, 2006, 2007; Joseph & 
Wood, 2010).  
2.4.2. Exploration of Linear and Nonlinear Relationships with Outcome Variables 
A series of regression analyses were conducted to explore the form of the 
relationship between the CES-D and outcome variables over time (Table II). Three of the 
eight regression models showed statistically significant nonlinear relationships for Step 2. 
However, the squared term accounted for very little additional variation above and beyond 
the linear main effect (0.7%, 0.1%, 0.2%). One of the eight regression models showed 
statistically significant nonlinear relationships for Step 3. However, again, the cubed term 
accounted for very little additional variation (0.6%). Thus, in all cases the nonlinear term 
failed to make any substantive improvement to the original linear model and results 
provide only very weak evidence of a nonlinear relationship. The observed nonlinearity 
appears to be of statistical but not clinical significance and the relationship between the 
well-being/depression continuum and outcome variables appears to be near linear over 
time. Statistically significant nonlinear relationships were also explored graphically (Figure 
1). The graphs reveal only subtle variation away from perfect linearity.  
Given the large proportion of missing data, we conducted a robustness check of our 
regression analyses using complete cases (see Supplementary material for Chapter 2). 
These results were almost identical (in terms of ΔR2 values), again finding that baseline 
levels on the well-being/depression continuum have a near linear relationship with changes 
in trait anxiety, aggression, and substance misuse over time (regression coefficients are 
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larger than those in Table II as multiple imputation estimates relationships more 
conservatively). 
Overall, the regression analyses and graphs provide evidence that the well-
being/depression continuum (CES-D total scores) has a near linear relationship with 
outcome variables over time. Any nonlinearity appears to be of statistical but not practical 
or clinical significance. These results support our prediction that moving from depression 
to well-being on the CES-D provides an equal decrease in risk for several other 
psychological problems, irrespective of position on the well-being/depression continuum.  
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Table I. Comparison of Three Mean- and Variance-Adjusted Weighted Least Squares CFA 
Models. 
 
Model fit 
Model Χ2 df AIC TLI CFI RMSEA 
1. Two factor 4209.891* 169 163260.390 .920 .929 .082 
2. Single factor 8025.236* 170 165187.856 .845 .861 .115 
3. Single factor, method variance factor 3921.218* 166 163175.121 .924 .934 .080 
Note. N = 4138; CES-D completed during 1993/1994 school year; analyses are reported to 
three decimal places for clarity; AIC statistic produced from Maximum Likelihood CFA; * 
p < .001. 
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Table II. Results of Regression Analyses Comparing Linear and Nonlinear Effects of CES-
D upon Change in Outcome. 
Step Outcome variables B SE B β ΔR2 
 
 
Trait anxiety 
 
  
 
1992/1993 school year (N = 4,069)     
1 Constant 11.243 .194   
 Total CES-D score .702 .010 .744*** .554*** 
2 Constant 9.347 .310   
 Total CES-D score .952 .034 1.008***  
 Total CES-D score squared -.006 .001 -.277*** .007*** 
3 Constant 6.815 .446   
 Total CES-D score 1.493 .077 1.581***  
 Total CES-D score squared -.034 .004 -1.615***  
 Total CES-D score cubed .000 .000 .813*** .006*** 
 
 
Aggression     
1992/1993 school year (N = 4,069)     
1 Constant 1.784 .124   
 Total CES-D score .249 .006 .523*** .274*** 
2 Constant 1.969 .199   
 Total CES-D score .225 .022 .472***  
 Total CES-D score squared .001 .000 .054 .000 
3 Constant 1.695 .292   
 Total CES-D score .283 .051 .595***  
 Total CES-D score squared -.002 .002 -.234  
 Total CES-D score cubed .000 .000 .175 .000 
1993/1994 school year (N = 4,101)     
1 Constant 5.334 .145   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .354 .018 .380***  
 Total CES-D score .027 .008 .062*** .176*** 
2 Constant 4.994 .224   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .354 .018 .381***  
 Total CES-D score .072 .024 .162*  
 Total CES-D score squared -.001 .001 -.105* .001* 
3 Constant 4.660 .314   
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 1992/1993 BADS total score .354 .018 .380***  
 Total CES-D score .144 .053 .324**  
 Total CES-D score squared -.005 .003 -.482  
 Total CES-D score cubed .000 .000 .228 .001 
1994/1995 school year (N = 4,101)     
1 Constant 7.897 .211   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .244 .023 .302***  
 Total CES-D score .020 .009 .051* .115*** 
2 Constant 7.573 .254   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .244 .023 .303***  
 Total CES-D score .062 .023 .161*  
 Total CES-D score squared -.001 .000 -.116* .002* 
3 Constant 7.366 .331   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .244 .023 .302***  
 Total CES-D score .106 .052 .277*  
 Total CES-D score squared -.003 .002 -.384  
 Total CES-D score cubed .000 .000 .163 .001 
 
 
Substance misuse     
1992/1993 school year (N = 4,069)     
1 Constant .262 .038   
 Total CES-D score .045 .002 .336*** .113*** 
2 Constant .259 .062   
 Total CES-D score .045 .007 .339***  
 Total CES-D score squared .000 .000 -.003 .000 
3 Constant .284 .090   
 Total CES-D score .040 .016 .299*  
 Total CES-D score squared .000 .001 .253  
 Total CES-D score cubed .000 .000 .151 .000 
1993/1994 school year (N = 4,101)     
1 Constant 1.122 .041   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .397 .016 .436***  
 Total CES-D score .006 .002 .050* .208*** 
2 Constant 1.059 .059   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .397 .016 .436***  
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 Total CES-D score .014 .006 .119*  
 Total CES-D score squared .000 .000 -.071 .001 
3 Constant 1.009 .086   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .397 .016 .436***  
 Total CES-D score .025 .015 .207  
 Total CES-D score squared -.001 .001 -.277  
 Total CES-D score cubed .000 .000 .125 .000 
1994/1995 school year (N = 4,101)     
1 Constant 1.754 .056   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .221 .020 .297***  
 Total CES-D score  .005 .002 .052* .098*** 
2 Constant 1.681 .071   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .220 .020 .296***  
 Total CES-D score .015 .006 .149*  
 Total CES-D score squared .000 .000 -.101 .001 
3 Constant 1.666 .089   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .220 .020 .296***  
 Total CES-D score .018 .014 .181  
 Total CES-D score squared .000 .001 -.176  
 Total CES-D score cubed .000 .000 .046 .000 
Note: CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression; STAI = State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory; BADS = Braver Aggressiveness Dimension Scale; SASSI-A = 
Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory—Adolescent version; CES-D scale 
completed during 1992/1993 school year; analyses are reported to three decimal places for 
clarity; *p < .05, ***p < .001. 
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Figure 1. Line graphs plotting unstandardized nonlinear regression lines for statistically 
significant ΔR2 values. Total CES-D scores predict outcome variables at different time 
points; CES-D scale completed during 1992/1993 school year. 
  
1992/1993 school year 
 
Aggression as outcome 
1993/1994 school year 1994/1995 school year 
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2.5. Discussion 
This study tested two key predictions made by PCP using the example of 
depressive experiences. We first examined whether the CES-D can be reconceptualised as 
measuring a continuum that ranges from well-being to depression using a large, 
heterogeneous sample. These analyses replicated the novel findings of one previous study 
that used samples of adults and older adults (Wood et al., 2010) and extended them to 
adolescents. This replication was important because of the potential importance of the 
suggestion that depression forms a bipolar continuum with well-being. We used a large, 
ethnically diverse sample that is representative of adolescents residing in Hawaii in order 
to minimize the likelihood of systematic sampling bias, which could have been introduced 
had we used a purely community or clinical sample. Taken together with the previous 
findings (Wood et al., 2010), there is now evidence that the CES-D measures a well-
being/depression continuum in adolescents, adults, and older adults. The CES-D total score 
provides an indication of depressive symptom severity that is based on a combination of 
the presence/absence of depressive experiences and the presence/absence of well-being. 
Importantly, this conceptualisation contrasts with other views regarding the inter-
relationship between psychological problems and well-being, for instance challenging the 
Complete State Model of Mental Health’s (Keyes, 2003, 2007) assertion that “mental 
illness” and well-being form separate continua. 
The theoretical underpinning for our analyses was the suggestion that for a score of 
zero to occur on the CES-D, a person would have to give all of the negatively worded 
items (e.g., “I felt sad”) the lowest possible score (“rarely of none of the time”) and all of 
the positively worded items (e.g., “I enjoyed life”) the highest possible score (“most or all 
of the time;” (Joseph, 2006, 2007; Joseph & Wood, 2010). Responding in this way would 
not, therefore, merely indicate an absence of depressive experiences; it would actually 
indicate the presence of well-being (Joseph, 2006, 2007; Joseph & Wood, 2010). 
Conceptualizing depression as one end of a well-being/depression continuum has the 
advantage of removing arbitrary divides between maladaptive and adaptive. This evidence 
could therefore be used to make an argument against mental health stigma, since everyone 
resides somewhere on the well-being/depression continuum. Our conceptualization of 
depression suggests that individuals who are currently experiencing depressive experiences 
are not qualitatively different from anyone else; at the moment they are simply further 
along the well-being/depression continuum towards high depressive experiences.  
This is the first study to examine the form of the relationship between the well-
being/depression continuum and other psychological problems over time. Our results 
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demonstrate that baseline levels on the well-being/depression continuum have a near linear 
relationship with outcome variables measured at the same time and one and two years 
later. It therefore seems desirable to score highly on the well-being pole of the continuum 
because the higher an individual’s well-being, as measured by the CES-D, the less likely 
that individual is to experience several psychological problems (anxiety symptoms, 
aggression, problematic substance use) over time. These results point to the value of jointly 
focusing on increasing well-being and reducing distress, as doing so promotes resilience 
from developing other psychological problems. They also point to the importance of early 
intervention in order to prevent people moving away from high levels of well-being. As 
depression and well-being form a single continuum, fostering high levels of well-being 
means that individuals have further to move before the onset of depressive experiences; in 
effect raising the threshold for the onset of depressive experiences. These results join 
evidence that anxiety can be understood as residing on a calmness-anxiety continuum that 
also has near linear relationships with other psychological problems over time (Siddaway, 
Taylor & Wood, in press). 
Until recent years, the dominant zeitgeist in mental health services has very 
understandably been to focus on the negative aspects of life and how these can be reduced 
and alleviated. Our results add to an emerging evidence-base which suggests that we may 
need to change the way we think about mental health problems. Our results support calls 
for mental health services to jointly focus on increasing well-being and reducing distress 
(e.g., The British Psychological Society, 2010) and the World Health Organisation’s 
(WHO; 2004) conceptualization of mental and physical health as “a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”  
PCP’s explicit call for a balanced and equal focus on the positive and negative aspect of 
life (Wood & Johnson, in press; Wood & Tarrier, 2010; Wood & Johnson, 2016) aligns 
well with the view offered by the mental health recovery movement, where “recovery” 
involves “the establishment of a fulfilling, meaningful life and a positive sense of identity” 
(Anderson et al., 2003). 
People will of course continue to present to mental health services wanting to 
address their psychological problems. However, the present results could be used to inform 
an evidence-based discussion regarding when to stop interventions and the advantages and 
disadvantages of doing so. The evidence presented here suggests that it may be beneficial 
for clinical interventions to continue beyond the mere absence of depressive symptoms. 
Although this is clearly less cost-effective in the short-term, it could prove to be the most 
cost-effective option long-term. 
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The current results need to be interpreted in light of several limitations, many of 
which stem from using an archival dataset. Further research is clearly needed to 
consolidate arguments regarding a more balanced and equally weighted focus on treating 
problems and increasing well-being. One important limitation of our results arises because 
the CES-D was not designed to measure a well-being/depression continuum; therefore the 
well-being items do not measure this pole of the continuum as comprehensively as 
established scales of well-being. Indeed, the CES-D contains unequal numbers of 
negatively worded and positively worded items, disproportionately weighting the 
depression end of the continuum. Developing and validating a scale that specifically 
measures the well-being/depression continuum is therefore expected to provide additional 
predictive validity over the CES-D.  
It will also be important to establish the form of the relationship between the well-
being/depression continuum and psychological problems other than those measured here, 
as well as measures of positive psychological functioning. Although we used a large, 
heterogeneous sample, it is possible that the nature and form of the well-being/depression 
continuum may change over time or vary across particular groups, for instance as a result 
of cultural changes in how mental health problems are understood. Determining whether 
and how conceptualisations and inter-relationships of psychological problems and well-
being change over time represents a core area of ongoing research. An economic cost value 
analysis that tests the implications of the well-being/depression continuum 
conceptualization and when it is most cost effective to stop interventions is particularly 
needed. 
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2.6. Supplementary Material for Chapter 2 
Table S1. Results of Regression Analyses Based on Complete Cases Comparing Linear 
and Nonlinear Effects of CES-D upon Change in Outcome. 
Step Variables B SE B β ΔR2 
 
 
Trait anxiety as outcome 
 
  
 
1992/1993 school year (N = 3,759)     
1 Constant 10.645 .199   
 Total CES-D score .725 .011 .747*** .558*** 
2 Constant 8.797 .316   
 Total CES-D score .975 .035 1.005***  
 Total CES-D score squared -.006 .001 -.270*** .007*** 
3 Constant 6.858 .449   
 Total CES-D score 1.403 .079 1.445***  
 Total CES-D score squared -.028 .004 -1.316***  
 Total CES-D score cubed .000 .000 .643*** .004*** 
 
 
Aggression as outcome     
1992/1993 school year (N = 3,910)     
1 Constant 1.862 .121   
 Total CES-D score .250 .006 .527*** .278*** 
2 Constant 1.999 .194   
 Total CES-D score .232 .021 .488***  
 Total CES-D score squared .000 .000 .041 .000 
3 Constant 1.845 .277   
 Total CES-D score .266 .049 .560***  
 Total CES-D score squared -.001 .002 -.129  
 Total CES-D score cubed .000 .000 .105 .000 
1993/1994 school year (N = 1,935)     
1 Constant 1.274 .152   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .564 .020 .585***  
 Total CES-D score .039 .010 .085*** .402*** 
2 Constant 1.162 .236   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .564 .020 .585***  
 Total CES-D score .054 .027 .119*  
 Total CES-D score squared .000 .001 -.036 .000 
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3 Constant .819 .334   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .564 .020 .585***  
 Total CES-D score .132 .060 .288*  
 Total CES-D score squared -.005 .003 -.440  
 Total CES-D score cubed .000 .000 .250 .001 
1994/1995 school year (N = 925)     
1 Constant 1.714 .248   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .542 .034 .521***  
 Total CES-D score .030 .016 .060 .309*** 
2 Constant 1.309 .382   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .540 .034 .519***  
 Total CES-D score .088 .045 .178*  
 Total CES-D score squared -.001 .001 -.124 .001 
3 Constant .950 .542   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .540 .034 .518***  
 Total CES-D score .171 .099 .345  
 Total CES-D score squared -.006 .005 -.516  
 Total CES-D score cubed .000 .000 .241 .001 
 
 
Substance misuse as outcome     
1992/1993 school year (N = 3,781)     
1 Constant .223 .038   
 Total CES-D score .044 .002 .334*** .111*** 
2 Constant .221 .061   
 Total CES-D score .044. .007 .336***  
 Total CES-D score squared -.000 .000 -.002 .000 
3 Constant .250 .088   
 Total CES-D score .038 .015 .288*  
 Total CES-D score squared .000 .001 .112  
 Total CES-D score cubed .000 .000 -.070 .000 
1993/1994 school year (N = 1,817)     
1 Constant .228 .042   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .608 .021 .579***  
 Total CES-D score .010 .002 .080*** .376*** 
2 Constant .236 .068   
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 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .608 .021 .579***  
 Total CES-D score .009 .008 .071  
 Total CES-D score squared .000 .000 .009 .000 
3 Constant .200 .097   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .608 .021 .580***  
 Total CES-D score .017 .017 .138  
 Total CES-D score squared .000 .001 -.150  
 Total CES-D score cubed .000 .000 .098 .000 
1994/1995 school year (N = 866)     
1 Constant .454 .068   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .474 .037 .414***  
 Total CES-D score  .013 .004 .103*** .211*** 
2 Constant .353 .107   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .474 .037 .414***  
 Total CES-D score .027 .012 .216*  
 Total CES-D score squared .000 .000 -.118 .000 
3 Constant .337 .154   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .474 .037 .414***  
 Total CES-D score .031 .028 .244  
 Total CES-D score squared -.001 .001 -.186  
 Total CES-D score cubed .000 .000 .042 .000 
Note: CES-D = Centre for Epidemiological Studies-Depression; STAI = State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory; BADS = Braver Aggressiveness Dimension Scale; SASSI-A = 
Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory—Adolescent version; CES-D scale 
completed during 1992/1993 school year; *p < .050, ***p < .001. 
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Table S2. Table Summarizing Which Centre for Epidemiological Studies-Depression 
(CES-D) Items Measure Depression and Well-Being.  
 Depression Well-Being 
Item 1 I was bothered by things that 
usually don’t bother me 
 
Item 2 I did not feel like eating; my 
appetite was poor 
 
Item 3 I felt that I could not shake off 
the blues even with help from my 
family or friends 
 
Item 4  I felt that I was just as good as other 
people 
Item 5 I had trouble keeping my mind 
on what I was doing 
 
Item 6 I felt depressed  
Item 7 I felt that everything I did was an 
effort 
 
Item 8  I felt hopeful about the future 
Item 9 I thought my life had been a 
failure 
 
Item 10 I felt fearful  
Item 11 My sleep was restless  
Item 12  I was happy 
Item 13 I talked less than usual  
Item 14 I felt lonely  
Item 15 People were unfriendly  
Item 16  I enjoyed life 
Item 17 I had crying spells  
Item 18 I felt sad  
Item 19 I felt that people dislike me  
Item 20 I couldn’t get going  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3. Re-Conceptualizing Anxiety as a Continuum that Ranges from High Calmness 
to High Anxiety: The Joint Importance of Reducing Distress and Increasing 
Well-Being 
 
3.1. Abstract 
We first replicate a study by Vautier and Pohl (2009), who used the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI) to re-examine the structure of anxiety. Using two large samples 
(N = 4,138 and 1,824), we also find that state and trait anxiety measure continua that range 
from high calmness to high anxiety. We then significantly extend previous findings and 
make the clinical importance of this topic more explicit by characterizing the (linear or 
nonlinear) form of the relationship between the calmness-anxiety continuum and other 
psychiatric variables for the first time. This form is critical to understanding anxiety 
problems, as discontinuities in relationships with other psychological conditions could be 
used to define a natural boundary of problematic anxiety. Baseline levels on the calmness-
anxiety continuum are found to have a near linear relationship with changes in depression, 
aggression, and substance misuse over time. Taken together, these results indicate the joint 
importance and usefulness of treating anxiety problems and promoting calmness, as doing 
so may promote resilience from developing other psychiatric conditions. Psychiatric and 
psychological interventions that are grounded in this continuum conceptualization would 
logically be stopped when an individual reports experiencing high levels of calmness. Our 
results point to the usefulness of early intervention and prevention (when people begin to 
move away from high calmness) and instilling resilience (by providing interventions to 
move people towards high calmness). 
 
This chapter has been published as: Siddaway, A. P., Taylor, P. J., & Wood, A. M. (2017). 
Re-conceptualizing anxiety as a continuum that ranges from high calmness to high anxiety: 
The joint importance of reducing distress and increasing well-being. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology. 
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3.2. Introduction 
The STAI is “the most widely used device to measure anxiety across cultures” 
(Lonner & Ibrahim, 1989: p. 317) and there is extensive support for its psychometric 
properties (see Spielberger, 1989; Spielberger & Diaz-Guerrero, 1986; Spielberger et al., 
1970). Strong consensus over decades of research has supported a four factor structure that 
consists of state and trait “anxiety present” and “anxiety absent” factors (Bernstein & 
Eveland, 1982; Hishinuma, Miyamoto, Nishimura & Nahulu, 2000; Mook, Van der Ploeg 
& Kleijn, 1992; Spielberger, Vagg, Barker, Donham & Westberry, 1980; Suzuki, 
Tsukamoto & Abe, 2000; Vagg, Spielberger & O’Hearn, 1980; Vigneau & Cormier, 
2008). “Anxiety absent” items (e.g., “I feel calm”) are reverse scored. As currently 
defined, a total score on the state and trait scales therefore involves a combination of the 
“presence” and “absence” of anxiety symptoms. 
Although there has been extensive support for a four factor structure to the STAI, 
there are both conceptual and statistical reasons to suggest that this issue needs to be 
revisited, with implications for how we understand the structure of anxiety. The conceptual 
argument was provided by Joseph and Wood (2010), who observed that reverse scored 
STAI items appear to assess calmness and relaxation (e.g., “I am cool, calm and collected” 
[trait anxiety]; “I feel calm” [state anxiety]), rather than merely the absence of anxiety 
problems. They pointed out that for the lowest possible score on the STAI to occur, a 
person would have to give all of the positively worded items (e.g., “I feel calm”) the 
highest possible score (“Almost always”) and all of the negatively worded items (e.g., “I 
feel anxious”) the lowest possible score (“Almost never”). On this basis, they suggested 
that the lowest score on the STAI does not just indicate the absence of anxiety problems, as 
has been convention in research and practice for decades; it actually indicates the presence 
of calmness and relaxation. The STAI, as conventionally-coded, could therefore be 
(re)conceptualised as ranging from high calmness to high anxiety. Although this 
interpretation of the STAI is new, the idea that anxiety might form a continuum with 
calmness has previously been recognized by the circumplex model of affect (e.g., Kuppens 
et al 2013; Russell, 1980; Russell & Carroll, 1999a, b; Yik et al., 2011) and by Carver and 
Scheier’s (1998) model of affect2.  
The statistical argument for re-examining the factor structure of the STAI is as 
follows. It is common practice for self-report psychiatric scales to include some positively 
                                                          
2 Carver and Scheier (1998) suggest that the avoidance system underlies this continuum and that calmness or 
anxiety are experienced depending on an individual’s perceived effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) in moving 
away from threat. 
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worded items that are reverse scored in order to compute a total score (Woods, 2006). The 
rationale is that these items measure the same construct as the negatively worded items 
(psychiatric symptoms), whilst reducing the tendency for respondents to agree more than 
disagree (acquiescence bias), or respond according to their general feeling about the topic 
rather than the specific content of the items (a response set; Green et al., 1993; Woods, 
2006). However, there is evidence that including positively worded items in psychiatric 
scales can inadvertently lead to the existence of a separate “method factor” that is not 
substantively meaningful (Green et al., 1993; Vautier & Pohl, 2009; Woods, 2006). Two 
Monte Carlo studies demonstrate that the existence of two factors would be inferred from 
the normal methods of exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis if only 10% of 
respondents respond carelessly to positively worded items (Schmitt & Stults, 1985; 
Woods, 2006). When separate factors within a scale respectively contain only positively 
worded and negatively worded items, the potential substantial importance of each factor is 
confounded with potential artifactual effects (Woods, 2006). These observations have led 
to a growing consensus amongst methodologists that factor analytic models need to 
account for item wording when demonstrating the existence of separate substantive factors 
in scales that include reverse scored items (Woods, 2006).    
One study to date has examined the factor structure of the STAI whilst accounting 
for the potential influence of positively worded items (Vautier & Pohl, 2009). The authors 
used structural equation modelling (SEM) to control for item wording (method effects) in 
the French adaptation of the STAI. Trait and state STAI scales were each found to measure 
one construct rather than separate “anxiety present” and “anxiety absent” factors (Vautier 
& Pohl, 2009).  
Although these structural findings have important implications for the scoring and 
interpretation of the STAI, the broad applicability and clinical significance of these 
findings was limited in at least two important respects. First, this study utilised an 
exclusively adult sample who completed the French adaptation of the STAI. It is therefore 
unclear at present whether these results would generalize beyond adults and to the original 
and more commonly used English language version of the scale.  
Second, the form of the relationship between the calmness-anxiety continuum and 
other psychiatric variables remains to be established. This form is critical to understanding 
the boundaries of anxiety problems, as it may be that anxiety has a stronger relationship 
with other difficulties when it reaches a particular level, thereby demarcating what is 
psychopathological versus what is not (Markon, 2010). Flett, Vredenburg and Krames 
(1997) referred to this as “phenomenological continuity,” that is, continuity in the 
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relationship between psychopathology and its antecedents, concomitants, or sequalae. 
Thus, even if anxiety is relatively continuous in a psychometric sense, its relationship with 
associated variables might be relatively discontinuous or nonlinear in form, thereby 
defining a natural boundary of problematic anxiety (Markon, 2010). 
The Current Study 
Given the potential practical importance of understanding the structure of anxiety, 
the present study sought to replicate and extend the findings of Vautier and Pohl (2009). 
We begin by using two large, diverse samples to test whether a hypothesized continuum is 
apparent in the most commonly used, English language version of the STAI when the 
influence of positively worded items is accounted for using SEM. We then extend the 
findings of Vautier and Pohl (2009) by characterizing the (linear or nonlinear) form of the 
relationship between the calmness-anxiety continuum and other psychiatric variables for 
the first time. This approach parallels work on stress, for example, which has established 
an inverted-U-shaped relationship between stress and memory function in that memory 
performance is impaired under conditions above or below optimal stress levels (Broadbent, 
1965; Salehi, Cordero & Sandi, 2010; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). These analyses make the 
clinical importance of this topic more apparent than merely examining whether a 
continuum exists. An analysis of related variables in several domains is required to 
establish phenomenological continuity (Flett et al., 1997); we use measures of depression, 
substance abuse, and aggression, as these are often comorbid with anxiety (Kendler, 
Prescott, Myers & Neale, 2003; Mineka, Watson & Clark, 1998).  We predict that moving 
from anxiety to calmness will provide an equal (near linear) decrease in risk for several 
other psychiatric variables over time, irrespective of position on the calmness-anxiety 
continuum (total score on the STAI). 
Clarifying the form of the relationship between the calmness-anxiety continuum 
and other psychiatric variables has potentially significant implications for the 
conceptualization of psychological problems and clinical practice. For example, it is 
possible that there is no relationship between the calmness-anxiety continuum and other 
psychiatric variables up to a particular point (e.g., throughout the range of the calmness 
pole), after which anxiety symptoms come to have an increasingly detrimental effect. 
Evidence in support of this conceptualisation would point to the well-known deleterious 
effects of anxiety symptoms and therefore support the current emphasis in mental health 
services on alleviating and treating anxiety problems. This conceptualization of anxiety 
(and other mental health) problems underpins psychiatric nomenclature and, as a result, 
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psychiatric and psychological interventions tend to be stopped at the point of anxiety 
problem absence.  
An important alternative conceptualisation is one in which the relationship between 
the calmness-anxiety continuum and other psychiatric variables is linear throughout the 
range of the continuum. Such a relationship would be consistent with increasing 
discussions regarding whether or not it could be advantageous (or cost-effective) for 
clinical services to promote well-being. For example, some professional bodies have called 
for mental health professionals to jointly focus on increasing well-being and reducing 
distress (e.g., The British Psychological Society, 2010). Positive Clinical Psychology has 
endorsed a balanced and equally weighted focus on the positive and negative aspect of life 
(Wood & Tarrier, 2010, as clarified in Johnson & Wood, in press; Wood & Johnson, 
2016). Evidence of a constant linear relationship between the calmness-anxiety continuum 
and other psychiatric variables would indicate both psychometric and phenomenological 
continuity and would therefore provide much-needed evidence to substantiate these 
theoretical arguments. Such evidence would point to the joint importance and usefulness of 
treating anxiety problems and promoting calmness since calmness and anxiety reside on 
the same continuum and changing one therefore changes the other. Psychiatric and 
psychological interventions that are grounded in this conceptualization would logically be 
stopped when an individual reports high calmness and could be initiated when an 
individual begins moving away from high calmness. 
3.3. Method 
Ethical approval to use two existing datasets was granted to the first author by the 
University of Hertfordshire, United Kingdom. The datasets used also received ethical 
approval when they were conducted. 
3.3.1. Participants 
Two samples were used. Sample 1 comprised 4,138 adolescents aged 13-21 years 
from Hawai‘i. These individuals took part in the five-year longitudinal Hawaiian High 
Schools Health Survey (HHSHS) study conducted by the National Center on Indigenous 
Hawaiian Behavioral Health (NCIHBH). This sample provides a broad spread of ages, 
ethnicities, socioeconomic status,’ and gender (Andrade et al., 2006; Hishinuma et al., 
2001). Participants for the HHSHS study were sampled from five high schools during five 
consecutive school years (1991/1992 to 1995/1996). The schools were selected from both 
urban and rural areas to obtain a representative sample of adolescents residing in Hawaii. 
Students who provided assent completed the survey in their classrooms under the 
supervision of their teachers. Parents of students younger than 18 years old were notified 
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of the study by mail and given an opportunity to refuse participation. Data collected during 
the 1992/1993 (N = 4,164), 1993/1994 (N = 4,182), and 1994/1995 (N = 1,433) school 
years were used in this study. These three school years were used because of the large 
sample size and inclusion of the variables of interest. This sample completed the STAI and 
measures of depression, aggression, and substance misuse. There was some missing 
demographic information and incomplete questionnaire responses (see Andrade et al., 
2006; Hishinuma et al., 2001). We multiply imputed missing data as best practice 
(discussed below). However, the dataset authors report that there were no significant 
differences on the STAI between participants who had intact versus missing data 
(Hishinuma et al., 2001).  
Sample 2 comprised 1,824 British pregnant women aged 16-43 years (M = 26.8 
years) from the Cambridge Prenatal Screening Study (CPSS). The purpose of the study 
was to examine the knowledge, attitudes, anxieties, and experiences of pregnant women 
booked for antenatal care at hospitals with differing screening policies. Participants were 
recruited from nine District hospitals within 60 miles of Cambridge (United Kingdom; 
UK) between 1990-1991. They provided information by telephone and mail interviews. 
The response rate was 53%. This sample only completed the STAI and was included in 
order to replicate our structural analyses. Trait STAI items were completed at 12 weeks 
pregnant; State STAI items were completed at 35 weeks pregnant and 6 weeks post-natal. 
Full demographic details and procedures are reported elsewhere (Green, Statham & 
Snowdon, 1996).  
3.3.2. Measures 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1970). The STAI is 
described as a measure of anxiety problems. It consists of 40 items. Trait anxiety is seen as 
a relatively stable individual difference in the tendency to respond to situations perceived 
as threatening with elevation in state anxiety (Spielberger et al., 1970). State anxiety is 
conceptualised within the STAI as a transitory emotional state characterized by subjective, 
consciously perceived feelings of tension and apprehension and heightened autonomic 
arousal. The trait scale comprises thirteen negatively worded items (e.g., “I worry too 
much over something that really doesn’t matter”) and seven positively worded items (e.g., 
“I am cool, calm and collected”). Trait items are rated on a 4-point frequency scale based 
on “how you generally feel.” The state scale comprises ten negatively worded items (e.g., 
“I feel anxious”) and 10 positively worded items (e.g., “I feel calm”). State items are rated 
on a 4-point frequency scale, with instructions asking readers to rate based on “how you 
feel right now, that is, at this moment.” State and trait scales demonstrate excellent internal 
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consistency (average Cronbach’s αs > .89) and the trait scale has evidenced excellent test–
retest reliability at multiple time intervals (average r = .88; Barnes, Harp & Jung, 2002). 
The current samples demonstrated similar internal consistency values (Cronbach’s α = .89-
.90). The state scale demonstrates lower temporal stability (average r = .70), as would be 
expected given the nature of the construct (Barnes et al., 2002). Trait and state scales have 
evidenced adequate convergent validity with other measures of state and trait anxiety 
(Spielberger, 1989) and discriminant validity from, for example, aggression (r = .38) and 
substance use (r = .19; Knight, Waal-Manning & Spears, 1983). The STAI has been 
validated with a range of ethnic groups (e.g., Boeke, Duivenoorden & Bonke, 1984; 
Canals, Marti-Henneberg, Fernandez-Ballart, Clivillle & Domenech, 1992; Vautier & 
Pohl, 2009).  The STAI demonstrated excellent internal consistency (α = 89). 
Across both samples and for the State and Trait scales, items representing anxiety 
were generally positively skewed and items representing calmness were either negatively 
skewed or showed a normal distribution.  
Distribution of distributions of average responses to the STAI State items 
  Number of days per week symptoms experienced, on 
average 
 
Sample Items Not at all Somewhat Moderately so 
Very much 
so 
Hawaiian  Calmness  1199 1333 1213 521 
Anxiety 2204 984 431 246 
British  Calmness  292 535 393 139 
Anxiety 691 364 201 97 
 
Distribution of distributions of average responses to the STAI Trait items 
  Number of days per week symptoms experienced, on 
average 
 
Sample Items  
Almost 
never Sometimes Often 
Almost 
always 
Hawaiian  Calmness  826 1366 1270 315 
Anxiety 1223 1558 677 331 
British  Calmness  574 537 554 105 
Anxiety 648 809 222 91 
 
Centre for Epidemiological Studies-Depression (CES-D; Radloff, 1977). The 
CES-D is one of the most frequently used self-report measures of depressive experiences 
(Santor, Gregus & Welch, 2006). Responses capture the frequency of feelings and 
behaviours over the past seven days and are rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (rarely 
or none of the time) to 3 (most or all of the time). The CES-D contains 20 items that are 
summed so that scores have a potential range from 0 to 60, with higher scores indicating 
greater frequency of depressive experiences (Radloff, 1977). The CES-D has been shown 
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to have good psychometric properties, including high internal consistency in community 
and psychiatric populations (Cronbach’s αs = .85 - .90; Ensel, 1986; Radloff, 1977; 
Roberts, 1980); convergent validity with other popular measures of depressive experiences 
such as the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (r = .85; Amtmann et al., 2014) and Beck 
Depression Inventory-II (r = .86; Shean & Baldwin, 2008); and discriminant validity from, 
for example, aggression (r = .44) and substance use (r = .24; Makini et al., 1996). The 
CES-D demonstrated excellent internal consistency in the current sample (Cronbach’s α = 
.88). A cutoff score of 16 has been found to have sensitivity and specificity rates of 86.7 
and 76.6 for identifying depressed individuals, whereas a cutoff score of 21 has a 
sensitivity and specificity rate of 73.0 and 96.1 (Shean & Baldwin, 2008). The CES-D has 
been validated with a range of ethnic groups (e.g., Andrade et al., 2006; Garrison, Addy, 
Jackson, McKeown, et al., 1991). It demonstrated excellent internal consistency 
(baseline/1992/1993 school year: α = .89; Time 1/1993/1994 school year: α = .89; Time 
2/1994/1995 school year: α = .90). 
Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory—Adolescent version (SASSI-A; 
Miller, 1990). Six items were administered from the Substance Abuse Subtle Screening 
Inventory-Adolescent (SASSI-A; Miller, 1990) as a brief screen for substance use and 
impairment and dependency arising from substance use. The SASSI-A has been shown to 
have good psychometric properties, including acceptable internal consistency in the current 
sample (Cronbach’s α = .74); and discriminant validity from anxiety (r = .19), depression 
(r = .24), and aggression (r = .33; Makini et al., 1996). The SASSI-A also been shown to 
concord with a diagnosis of substance abuse and dependency on the Diagnostic Interview 
Schedule for Children (Nishimura et al., 2001), predict counselor DSM-III diagnoses for 
dually diagnosed adolescent inpatients (Piazza, 1996), and predict adolescent chemical 
dependency (Risberg, Stevens, & Graybill, 1995). The SASSI-A has been validated with a 
range of ethnic groups (Nishimura et al., 2001). It demonstrated good internal consistency 
(baseline/1992/1993 school year: α = .88; Time 1/1993/1994 school year: α = .88; Time 
2/1994/1995 school year: α = .86). 
Braver Aggressiveness Dimension Scale (BADS; Braver, Fogas, Sandler & 
Volchik, 1986). The BADS is a 14-item abbreviated self-report measure of child and 
adolescent aggression. It was derived from the longer Youth Self-Report scales (YSR: 
Achenbach, 1991), the self-report version of the Child Behaviour Checklist. Items selected 
for the BADS were those items from the YSR which were significantly more likely to be 
endorsed by clinically-diagnosed, conduct disordered children and adolescents. The BADS 
has good psychometric properties, including good internal consistency in the current 
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sample (Cronbach’s α = .85); one year test-retest stability (r = .61); and discriminant 
validity from anxiety (r = .38), depression (r = .44), and substance use (r = .33), with 
which it shares only moderate correlation (Makini et al., 1996). The BADS demonstrated 
good internal consistency (baseline/1992/1993 school year: α = .85; Time 1/1993/1994 
school year: α = .70; Time 2/1994/1995 school year: α = .64). 
Missing Data 
There were substantial amounts of missing data in the Hawaiian dataset. 6.4% of all 
values were missing for the 1992/1993 school year, 52.2% of all values were missing for 
the 1993/1994 school year, and 22.53% of all values were missing for the 1994/1995 
school year. The missingness was not completely at random (MCAR). We addressed this 
potential problem by multiply imputing missing data on all variables at the item level using 
SPSS version 21.0 (IBM Corp, 2012). Multiple imputation (MI) is increasingly advocated 
as the optimal approach for dealing with missing data (Graham, 2009; Schafer & Graham, 
2002; Shrive, Stuart, Quan & Ghali, 2006). When MI has been compared with alternative 
methods of handling incomplete data (e.g., single imputation methods, complete-case 
analyses, maximum likelihood approaches), it has been shown to generate less biased 
estimates that have more statistical efficiency (e.g., Crawford, Tennstedt & McKinlay, 
1995; Donders, van der Heijden, Stijnen & Moons, 2006; Liu & Gould, 2002; Tang, Song, 
Belin & Unutzer, 2005). There is also evidence indicating that MI performs well across 
different circumstances, such as small samples, very large multiple regressions, and when 
there are large amounts of missing data (Graham & Schafer, 1999).  
MI works by generating plausible missing values multiple times based on the 
distribution of the observed data. Random components are incorporated into these 
estimated values to reflect their uncertainty. This procedure creates a set of ‘‘complete’’ 
data sets with no missing values. Analyses are then run separately on each data set, and the 
results are pooled across datasets using multiple imputation combining rules (Enders, 
2010; Graham, 2009). The purpose of MI is not to obtain the individual values themselves 
but to estimate unbiased parameter estimates of the data set as a whole (Graham, 2009). 
We followed recommendations to match the number of imputations to the fraction of 
missing information because progressively larger numbers of imputed datasets are needed 
to maximize power in subsequent significance testing (Bodner, 2008; Graham, Olchowski 
& Gilreath, 2007; White et al., 2011). 
Statistical Analysis 
Analyses were conducted using SPSS version 21.0 (IBM Corp, 2012) and R (R 
Development Core Team, 2009). Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was performed 
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using the R lavaan package, version 0.5-18 (Rosseel, 2012). Positively worded STAI items 
were reverse scored for all analyses. Three CFA models were tested using full information 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation. Model 1 was the standard two factor model 
involving separate negatively worded items (“anxiety present”) and positively worded 
items (“anxiety absent”), which were allowed to correlate. Model 2 was a single factor 
model with all items loading on a single factor. Model 3 featured a single substantive 
anxiety/calmness factor, but all positively worded items were allowed to cross-load onto a 
second methodological artefact factor which takes into account additional residual inter-
correlation between positively worded items. The three CFA models were estimated 
separately for the state and trait subscales and the two samples to ensure that findings were 
not specific to a particular form of the STAI or sample. 
Acceptable fit was operationalized as Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) < .08, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) > .90, Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) > .90. 
Good fit was operationalized as RMSEA < .06, CFI > .95, and TLI > .95 (Hu & Bentler, 
1999). Competing models were compared using (i) Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), 
which tests the relative fit of competing models after adjusting for parsimony (lower AICs 
indicate less information loss and thus a superior model), (ii) CFI, using a .002 cutoff 
(Meade, Johnson & Braddy, 2008), and (iii) Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), where 
lower BIC statistics suggest better fit. Although the AIC and BIC share the same goodness-
of-fit term, the penalty term of BIC is potentially much more stringent than the penalty 
term of AIC so BIC tends to choose fitted models that are more parsimonious than those 
favored by AIC. The AIC, CFI, and BIC model comparison indices have the advantage of 
being less compromised by large sample sizes when compared to the chi-squared and chi-
squared difference statistics (see Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Meade et al., 2008).  
As STAI data are ordinal, we conducted a robustness check of our CFA results by 
replicating them using mean- and variance-adjusted weighted least squares (WLSMV) 
estimation. WLSMV estimation has been found to result in unbiased parameter and 
standard error estimates, and acceptable type-I error rates for structural equation modelling 
with (skewed) ordinal variables (Flora & Curran, 2004). Competing models were 
compared using change in model fit according to CFI and RMSEA (Chen et al., 2008).  
 Hierarchical ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions were used to explore linear 
and nonlinear relationships between STAI trait scores, treated as a single factor (all items 
summed to produce a total trait score), and outcome variables. In each analysis, Step 1 
involved fitting a model whereby STAI trait scores had a linear relationship with each 
outcome variable measured at the same time (1992/1993 school year), or measured at 
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follow-up 1 or 2 years later (1993/1994, 1994/1995 school years), whilst controlling for 
scores on the outcome variable at baseline (hence it was the change in outcome that we 
were predicting). Steps 2 and 3 tested whether adding a nonlinear term (squared and cubed 
STAI trait total scores) made a significant improvement to the amount of variance 
explained. Improvement in model fit was based on ΔR2. Statistically significant deviations 
from linearity were graphed in order to visually display relationships, using unstandardized 
regression coefficients. This also clarified whether nonlinearity was substantive. The state 
score, by its very nature, was not expected to reliably predict changes in outcome variables 
over time and so did not feature in these analyses.  
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Comparison of CFA Models 
Table 1 shows that across state and trait items and both samples, the two factor 
model (Model 1) demonstrated an improvement in fit over the single factor model (Model 
2). This replicates previous findings. However, Model 3 subsequently outperformed the 
traditional two factor model, suggesting that when shared method bias amongst positively 
worded items is controlled for, a single factor underlies the STAI items. The AIC and BIC 
statistics, which account for model complexity, and the change in model fit according to 
CFI and RMSEA (Chen et al., 2008), all indicated superiority of Model 3 as hypothesized. 
Overall fit was acceptable for Model 3 in all instances, with the exception of the state items 
in the Hawai‘i sample, where fit indices fell slightly below our criteria. Nonetheless the 
adjusted model demonstrated better fit than the traditional two factor model and was 
therefore favoured.  
Our robustness check employing WLSMV estimation corroborated these results 
(see Supplementary material for Chapter 3). Again, the two factor model demonstrated an 
improvement in fit over the single factor model in all instances. Model 3 outperformed the 
traditional two factor model in the British sample and performed similarly in the Hawai‘i 
sample. Overall fit was acceptable for Model 3 in the majority of instances. Taken 
together, the CFA results using ML and WLSMV estimation support the superiority of 
Model 3 (a calmness-anxiety continuum) over the traditional two factor model (separate 
“anxiety present” and “anxiety absent” factors), suggesting that when shared method bias 
amongst positively worded items is controlled for, a single factor underlies STAI state and 
trait scales.   
3.4.2. Exploration of Linear and Nonlinear Relationships with Outcome Variables 
A series of regression analyses were conducted in the Hawai‘i sample to explore 
the form of the relationship between STAI trait scores and outcome variables over time 
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(Table 2). Three of the nine regression models showed statistically significant nonlinear 
relationships for Step 2. However, the squared term accounted for very little additional 
variation above and beyond the linear main effect (2.4%, 1.6%, 0.1%). Two of the nine 
regression models showed statistically significant nonlinear relationships for Step 3. 
However, again, the cubed term accounted for very little additional variation (0.2%, 0.2%). 
Thus, in all cases the nonlinear term failed to make any substantive improvement to the 
original linear model and these results provide only very weak evidence of a nonlinear 
relationship.  
Potential nonlinearity was further explored by graphing statistically significant 
nonlinear relationships (Figure 1). The graphs reveal only subtle variation away from 
perfect linearity. Given the large proportion of missing data, we conducted a robustness 
check of our regression analyses using complete cases (see Supplementary material for 
Chapter 3). These results were almost identical (in terms of ΔR2 values), again finding that 
baseline levels on the calmness-anxiety continuum have a near linear relationship with 
changes in depression, aggression, and substance misuse over time (regression coefficients 
are larger than those in Table 2 as multiple imputation estimates relationships more 
conservatively). 
Overall, the regression analyses and graphs provide evidence that the calmness-
anxiety continuum (STAI trait total scores) has a near linear relationship with outcome 
variables over time. Any nonlinearity appears to be of statistical but not practical or 
clinical significance. These results support our prediction that moving from anxiety to 
calmness on the STAI provides an equal decrease in risk for several other psychological 
problems, irrespective of position on the calmness-anxiety continuum. 
  
72 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Three Maximum Likelihood CFA Models in two Independent Samples. 
 
 Model fit 
Model Χ2 df AIC BIC TLI CFI RMSEA 
British sample, trait items (N = 1824) 
   
    
1. Two factor 1521.088* 169 105393.044 105618.904 .938 .945 .066 
2. Single factor 2297.308* 170 106167.264 106387.615 .903 .913 .083 
3. Single factor, method variance factor 1399.848* 163 105283.803 105542.716 .941 .950 .064 
British sample, state items (N = 1824)1        
1. Two factor 1778.852* 169 77214.564 77429.490 .928 .936 .083 
2. Single factor 2773.269* 170 78206.982 78416.665 .884 .896 .105 
3. Single factor, method variance factor 1464.346* 160 76918.058 77180.162 .938 .948 .076 
Hawai‘i sample, trait items (N = 4138)2        
1. Two factor 1882.202* 169 150252.538 150503.738 .926 .935 .055 
2. Single factor 8382.153* 170 156750.489 156995.562 .649 .686 .119 
3. Single factor, method variance factor 1773.737* 163 150156.073 150444.033 .923 .938 .054 
Hawai‘i sample, state items (N = 4138)2 
   
    
1. Two factor 4987.366* 169 160309.299 160562.289 .842 .859 .090 
2. Single factor 11325.305* 170 166645.238 166892.060 .636 .674 .136 
3. Single factor, method variance factor 4744.901* 160 160084.834 160393.357 .841 .866 .090 
1STAI at 6 weeks post natal; 2STAI completed during 1992/1993 school year; analyses are reported to three decimal places for clarity; * p < .001 
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Table 2. Results of Regression Analyses Comparing Linear and Nonlinear Effects of STAI 
upon Change in Outcome. 
Step Variables B SE B β ΔR2 
 
 
Depression as outcome 
 
  
 
1992/1993 school year (N = 4,069)     
1 Constant -1.569 .277   
 Total STAI Trait score .788 .011 .744*** .554*** 
2 Constant 4.235 .470   
 Total STAI Trait score .209 .040 .198***  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .012 .001 .567*** .024*** 
3 Constant 6.740 .719   
 Total STAI Trait score -.215 .101 .095*  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .031 .004 .201***  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 .116*** .002*** 
1993/1994 school year (N = 4,101)     
1 Constant 12.715 .398   
 1992/1993 CES-D total score .199 .022 .246***  
 Total STAI Trait score .159 .024 .164*** .149*** 
2 Constant 13.141 .668   
 1992/1993 CES-D total score .222 .023 .242***  
 Total STAI Trait score .119 .056 .122*  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .001 .001 .046 .000 
3 Constant 12.702 1.011   
 1992/1993 CES-D total score .223 .023 .025***  
 Total STAI Trait score  .192 .139 .143  
 Total STAI Trait score squared -.002 .006 .304  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 .176 .000 
1994/1995 school year (N = 4,101) 
 
  
 
1 Constant 19.015 .568   
 1992/1993 CES-D total score .153 .027 .197***  
 Total STAI Trait score .083 .027 .100*** .081*** 
2 Constant 18.687 .774   
 1992/1993 CES-D total score .156 .027 .201***  
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 Total STAI Trait score .113 .058 .137*  
 Total STAI Trait score squared -.001 .001 -.042 .000 
3 Constant 18.354 1.069   
 1992/1993 CES-D total score .157 .027 .202***  
 Total STAI Trait score  .169 .135 .205  
 Total STAI Trait score squared -.003 .006 -.194  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 .089 .000 
 
 
Aggression as outcome 
 
  
 
1992/1993 school year (N = 4,069)     
1 Constant -.053 .169   
 Total STAI Trait score .260 .007 .515*** .266*** 
2 Constant 2.191 .292   
 Total STAI Trait score .036 .025 .072  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .005 .000 .461*** .016*** 
3 Constant 2.747 .447   
 Total STAI Trait score -.058 .063 -.115  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .009 .003 .881***  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .001 .000 -.247 .001 
1993/1994 school year (N = 4,101)     
1 Constant 4.903 .192   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .341 .017 .367***  
 Total STAI Trait score .042 .009 .089*** .175*** 
2 Constant 4.880 .321   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .341 .018 .367***  
 Total STAI Trait score .044 .027 .094  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .000 .001 -.005 .000 
3 Constant 4.951 .484   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .341 .018 .367***  
 Total STAI Trait score .032 .067 .068  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .000 .003 .053  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 -.034 .000 
1994/1995 school year (N = 4,101)     
1 Constant 7.743 .256   
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 1992/1993 BADS total score .244 .023 .302***  
 Total STAI Trait score .021 .010 .051* .311* 
2 Constant 7.416 .342   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .247 .023 .306***  
 Total STAI Trait score .053 .025 .129*  
 Total STAI Trait score squared -.001 .001 -.083 .000 
3 Constant 7.452 .484   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .247 .023 .306***  
 Total STAI Trait score .047 .063 .114  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .000 .003 -.050  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 -.019 .000 
 
 
Substance misuse as outcome 
 
  
 
1992/1993 school year (N = 4,069)     
1 Constant .005 .053   
 Total STAI Trait score .044 .002 .308*** .095*** 
2 Constant .170 .092   
 Total STAI Trait score .027 .008 .192***  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .000 .000 .120* .001* 
3 Constant .469 .141   
 Total STAI Trait score -.024 .020 -.166  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .003 .001 .928***  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 -.474*** .002* 
1993/1994 school year (N = 4,101)     
1 Constant 1.111 .053   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .403 .016 .442***  
 Total STAI Trait score .005 .002 .036* .204*** 
2 Constant 1.125 .085   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .403 .016 .442***  
 Total STAI Trait score .003 .007 .025  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .000 .000 .011 .000 
3 Constant .983 .130   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .404 .016 .443***  
 Total STAI Trait score .027 .018 .211  
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 Total STAI Trait score squared -.001 .001 -.407  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 .246 .000 
1994/1995 school year (N = 4,101)     
1 Constant 1.714 .067   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .222 .020 .298***  
 Total STAI Trait score .005 .002 .051* .097*** 
2 Constant 1.650 .094   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .222 .020 .299***  
 Total STAI Trait score .012 .007 .112  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .000 .000 -.064 .000 
3 Constant 1.532 .133   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .223 .020 .300***  
 Total STAI Trait score .032 .018 .301  
 Total STAI Trait score squared -.001 .001 -.489  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 .249 .001 
Note: STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; CES-D = Centre for Epidemiological Studies-
Depression; BADS = Braver Aggressiveness Dimension Scale; SASSI-A = Substance Abuse 
Subtle Screening Inventory—Adolescent version; STAI Trait scale completed during 
1992/1993 school year; analyses are reported to three decimal places for clarity; *p < .05, 
***p < .001. 
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Depression for 
1992/1993 school year  
 
 
 
Aggression for 
1992/1993 school year  
 
 
  
Substance misuse for 
1992/1993 school year  
 
 
Figure 1. Line graphs plotting unstandardized nonlinear regression lines for statistically 
significant ΔR2 values. Total STAI trait scores predict outcome variables at different time 
points; STAI trait scale completed during 1992/1993 school year. 
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3.5. Discussion 
Our results replicate those of Vautier and Pohl (2009). Like them, we demonstrated 
that state and trait anxiety, as measured by the STAI, can be understood as continua that 
range from high calmness to high anxiety. Our analyses were underpinned by Joseph and 
Wood’s (2010) hypothesis that STAI “anxiety absent” items (e.g., “I am cool, calm and 
collected” [trait anxiety]; “I feel calm” [state anxiety]) assess the presence of calmness, rather 
than the mere absence of anxiety problems. We provided the first evidence to corroborate this 
hypothesis. These results have clear implications for the structure and definition of anxiety as 
they go against the view that anxiety ranges from zero to intense.  
We established an anxiety-calmness continuum using the English-language version of 
the STAI in mixed samples of adults, adolescents, and different ethnic groups from opposite 
sides of the globe (Hawai‘i and the UK) and replicated our results using both ML and 
WLSMV estimation. It was important to clarify that anxiety-calmness continua existed across 
diverse circumstances because the mechanisms underlying anxiety may differ across groups 
(e.g., Field & Lester, 2010; Kirmayer, Young & Hayton, 1995; Manson, 1996), which could 
lead to misleading artifacts of non-invariant measurement (e.g., item content or wording that 
is biased against a given group). The use of a large dataset that is representative of 
adolescents residing in Hawaii minimized the likelihood of systematic sampling bias, which 
could have been introduced had we used a purely community or clinical sample. 
Previous factor-analytic evidence for separate “anxiety present” and “anxiety absent” 
factors likely arose because there is additional common variance between positively worded 
items that is unrelated to the underlying latent variable. Based on item content, the STAI state 
and trait continua can be reconceptualized as calmness-anxiety continua (Joseph & Wood, 
2010; Vautier & Pohl, 2009). This conceptualization is more intuitive than the “anxiety 
present” and “anxiety absent” conceptualization. We note that it is still appropriate to 
continue to reverse score positively worded STAI items in order to produce total state and 
trait scores. However, in light of the present findings, STAI users are advised to interpret total 
state and trait scores as an indication of anxiety problem severity that is based on a 
combination of the presence/absence of anxiety problems and the presence/absence of 
calmness, understanding that as anxiety problems increase, calmness decreases (and vice-
versa).  
As the STAI shows high convergent validity with other leading measures of anxiety 
problems (Barnes et al., 2002; Knight et al., 1983; Spielberger, 1989), a calmness-anxiety 
continuum may be apparent in other scales that contain factors that consist of entirely 
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positively and negatively worded items. Scales which measure anxiety or calmness, but 
which do not contain a mixture of positively and negatively worded items, are presumably 
measuring one half of the continuum. Evidence of a calmness-anxiety continuum suggests 
that existing research into anxiety problems will have relevance for the field of calmness and 
relaxation research, and vice-versa, and that studying anxiety or calmness separately may be 
unnecessarily duplicating research effort (Joseph & Wood, 2010).  
This is the first study to characterise the form of the relationship between the 
calmness-anxiety continuum and other psychiatric variables. These analyses make the clinical 
importance of this topic more apparent and explicit than merely examining whether a 
continuum exists as Vautier and Pohl (2009) did. Our results demonstrate that baseline levels 
on the calmness-anxiety continuum have a near linear relationship with outcome variables 
measured at the same time and one and two years later. Thus, there is no intrinsic way to 
demarcate problematic degrees of anxiety (or beneficial degrees of calmness) based on how 
anxiety or calmness are related to other psychiatric variables. That these results were apparent 
over time suggests that moving along the continuum towards high calmness provides 
continuous and long-term protection against experiencing other psychological problems.  
The present study provides evidence to substantiate calls by professional bodies (e.g., 
The British Psychological Society, 2010), the Positive Clinical Psychology movement (e.g., 
Wood & Tarrier, 2010, as clarified in Johnson & Wood, in press; Wood & Johnson, 2016), 
and many clinicians, for clinical services to adopt a broader focus that jointly involves 
reducing distress and increasing well-being. Our results point to the usefulness of early 
intervention and prevention (when people begin to move away from high calmness) and 
instilling resilience (by providing interventions to move people towards high calmness). 
Fostering high levels of calmness would mean that individuals have further to go before they 
reach high levels of anxiety. Psychiatric and psychological interventions that are grounded in 
a continuum conceptualization would logically be stopped when an individual reports high 
calmness. Patients, service commissioners and others may of course want interventions to 
stop at the point of problem absence. However, the present results provide an evidence-base 
to inform a collaborative discussion around when to stop treatment and the advantages and 
disadvantages of doing so. This process may already be happening when clinicians construct 
relapse prevention plans and offer booster sessions with people who have finished treatment.  
 We are hopeful that our findings could help support a case for publically funded 
clinical services to accept the promotion of well-being into their remit. That well-being 
interventions often fall outside the focus of publically funded clinical services means that 
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efforts to help the public address this need (e.g., through self-help books, self-development 
courses, and other “interventions”) are often offered by unaccredited and untrained 
individuals. We find this concerning, as we strongly believe that clinical interventions should 
be targeted, theory-driven, evidence-based, and provided by suitably qualified, ethically-
practicing professionals.  
Our results could be extended in a number of ways. Because cost considerations have 
a substantial impact on service delivery and often outweigh theoretical or moral arguments, 
the current results need to be accompanied by a comprehensive economic cost value analysis 
which tests the implications of the continuum conceptualization and when it is most cost 
effective to stop interventions. It is obviously less cost-effective in the short-term to stop 
interventions at the point of well-being rather than mere problem absence, or to start 
interventions when people begin to move away from high calmness but before a severe 
psychological problem becomes manifest. However, this approach may prove to be the most 
cost-effective solution overall if it provides long-term protection from other problems, 
especially amongst high risk groups. Research is also needed to characterise the form of the 
relationship between the calmness-anxiety continuum and other psychiatric variables in 
relation to all age groups who complete the STAI.  
We also note that the current findings were limited in not accounting for random and 
systematic measurement error (Barrett & Russell, 1998; Green et al., 1993). Future research 
investigating the calmness-anxiety continuum could account for intraindividual mood 
variation and measurement error by taking repeated (e.g., daily) continuous measures of 
mood using different response formats. 
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3.6. Supplementary Material for Chapter 3 
Table S1. Comparison of Three Mean- and Variance-Adjusted Weighted Least Squares CFA 
Models in two Independent Samples. 
 
Model fit 
Model Χ2 df AIC TLI CFI RMSEA 
British sample, Trait items (N = 1824)a       
1. Two factor 1737.857* 169  .948 .954 .071 
2. Single factor 4027.596* 170  .872 .886 .112 
3. Single factor, method variance factor 1681.756* 163  .948 .955 .071 
British sample, State items (N = 1824)a       
1. Two factor 3445.255* 169  .905 .916 .118 
2. Single factor 6323.236* 170  .823 .842 .161 
3. Single factor, method variance factor 2792.752* 160  .920 .932 .109 
Hawai‘i sample, Trait items (N = 4138)b       
1. Two factor 3448.257* 169  .937 .944 .076 
2. Single factor 13518.638* 170  .744 .771 .152 
3. Single factor, method variance factor 3370.175* 163  .936 .945 .076 
Hawai‘i sample, State items (N = 4138)b       
1. Two factor 8547.603* 169  .891 .903 .118 
2. Single factor 18207.190* 170  .766 .790 .173 
3. Single factor, method variance factor 8480.062* 160  .885 .903 .121 
aSTAI at 6 weeks post natal; bSTAI completed during 1992/1993 school year; analyses are 
reported to three decimal places for clarity; * p < .001. 
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Table S2. Results of Regression Analyses Based on Complete Cases Comparing Linear and 
Quadratic Effects of STAI upon Change in Outcome. 
Step Variables B SE B β ΔR2 
 
 
Depression as outcome 
 
  
 
1992/1993 school year (N = 3,759)     
1 Constant -1.255 .271   
 Total STAI Trait score .770 .011 .747*** .558*** 
2 Constant 4.715 .448   
 Total STAI Trait score .154 .039 .150***  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .013 .001 .622*** .030*** 
3 Constant 7.200 .666   
 Total STAI Trait score -.285 .096 -.277***  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .033 .004 1.593***  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 -.576*** .003*** 
1993/1994 school year (N = 1,834)     
1 Constant 3.351 .447   
 1992/1993 CES-D total score .348 .028 .366***  
 Total STAI Trait score .236 .028 .244*** .327*** 
2 Constant 5.564 .775   
 1992/1993 CES-D total score .321 .028 .338***  
 Total STAI Trait score .021 .068 .021  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .005 .001 .253*** .004*** 
3 Constant 4.728 1.141   
 1992/1993 CES-D total score .324 .029 .340***  
 Total STAI Trait score  .171 .165 .176  
 Total STAI Trait score squared -.002 .007 -.105  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 .213 .000 
1994/1995 school year (N = 870) 
 
  
 
1 Constant 5.068 .703   
 1992/1993 CES-D total score .332 .046 .334***  
 Total STAI Trait score .185 .046 .184*** .239*** 
2 Constant 6.622 1.204   
 1992/1993 CES-D total score .311 .047 .313***  
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 Total STAI Trait score .031 .107 .031***  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .004 .002 .176 .002 
3 Constant 6.140 1.797   
 1992/1993 CES-D total score .313 .048 .315***  
 Total STAI Trait score  .117 .261 .117  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .000 .012 -.021  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 .116 .000 
 
 
Aggression as outcome 
 
  
 
1992/1993 school year (N = 3,812)     
1 Constant .117 .134   
 Total STAI Trait score .257 .007 .523*** .274*** 
2 Constant 2.215 .277   
 Total STAI Trait score .040 .024 .081  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .005 .000 .460*** .016*** 
3 Constant 2.826 .411   
 Total STAI Trait score -.069 .059 -.140  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .010 .003 .965***  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 -.299* .001* 
1993/1994 school year (N = 1,889)     
1 Constant .781 .199   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .543 .020 .563***  
 Total STAI Trait score .056 .010 .119*** .402*** 
2 Constant 1.356 .341   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .538 .020 .558***  
 Total STAI Trait score -.004 .030 -.008  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .001 .001 .135* .001* 
3 Constant 1.371 .500   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .538 .020 .558***  
 Total STAI Trait score -.007 .073 -.014  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .001 .003 .149  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 -.008 .000 
1994/1995 school year (N = 901)     
1 Constant 1.275 .320   
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 1992/1993 BADS total score .518 .033 .501***  
 Total STAI Trait score .05 .02 .10* .311* 
2 Constant 1.038 .545   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .520 .034 .503***  
 Total STAI Trait score .073 .049 .148  
 Total STAI Trait score squared -.001 .001 -.054 .000 
3 Constant .884 .809   
 1992/1993 BADS total score .520 .034 .504***  
 Total STAI Trait score .101 .119 .204  
 Total STAI Trait score squared -.002 .005 -.184  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 .077 .000 
 
 
Substance misuse as outcome 
 
  
 
1992/1993 school year (N = 3,804)     
1 Constant .017 .051   
 Total STAI Trait score .041 .002 .299* .090*** 
2 Constant .218 .087   
 Total STAI Trait score .020 .008 .146*  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .000 .000 .159* .002*** 
3 Constant .462 .130   
 Total STAI Trait score -.023 .019 -.171  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .002 .001 .881***  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 -.428* .002* 
1993/1994 school year (N = 1,826)     
1 Constant .161 .057   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .619 .021 .583***  
 Total STAI Trait score .010 .002 .080*** .374*** 
2 Constant .218 .097   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .618 .021 .582  
 Total STAI Trait score .004 .009 .033  
 Total STAI Trait score squared .000 .000 .049 .000 
3 Constant .040 .142   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .619 .021 .583***  
 Total STAI Trait score .037 .021 .287  
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 Total STAI Trait score squared -.001 .001 -.537  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 .351 .001 
1994/1995 school year (N = 862)     
1 Constant .307 .089   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .471 .036 .413***  
 Total STAI Trait score .015 .004 .124*** .213*** 
2 Constant .275 .151   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .471 .036 .413***  
 Total STAI Trait score .019 .014 .152  
 Total STAI Trait score squared -.007 .000 -.029 .000 
3 Constant -.071 .224   
 1992/1993 SASSI-A total score .472 .036 .414***  
 Total STAI Trait score .082 .033 .655*  
 Total STAI Trait score squared -.003 .001 -1.171*  
 Total STAI Trait score cubed .000 .000 .676* .004* 
Note: STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; CES-D = Centre for Epidemiological Studies-
Depression; BADS = Braver Aggressiveness Dimension Scale; SASSI-A = Substance Abuse 
Subtle Screening Inventory—Adolescent version; STAI Trait scale completed during 
1992/1993 school year; analyses are reported to three decimal places for clarity; *p < .050, 
***p < .001. 
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Table S3. Table Summarizing Which State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) Items Measure 
Anxiety and Calmness.  
 Trait items State items 
 Anxiety Calmness Anxiety Calmness 
Item 1  I feel pleasant  I feel calm 
Item 2 I tire quickly   I feel secure 
Item 3 I feel like crying  I am tense  
Item 4 I wish I could be 
as happy as others 
seem to be 
 I am regretful  
Item 5 I am losing out on 
things because I 
can’t make up my 
mind soon enough 
  I am at ease 
Item 6  I feel rested I feel upset  
Item 7  I am “calm, 
cool, and 
collected” 
I am presently 
worrying over 
possible 
misfortunes 
 
Item 8 I feel that 
difficulties are 
piling up so that I 
cannot overcome 
them 
  I feel rested 
Item 9 I worry too much 
over something 
that really doesn’t 
matter 
 I feel anxious  
Item 10  I am happy  I feel 
comfortable 
Item 11 I am inclined to 
take things hard 
  I feel self-
confident 
Item 12 I lack self-
confidence 
 I feel nervous  
Item 13  I feel secure I am jittery  
Item 14 I try to avoid a 
crisis or difficulty 
 I feel “high 
strung” 
 
Item 15 I feel fed up   I am relaxed 
Item 16  I am content  I feel content 
Item 17 Some unimportant 
thought runs 
through my mind 
and bothers me 
 I am worried  
Item 18 I take 
disappointments 
so keenly that I 
can’t put them out 
of my mind 
 I feel over-excited 
and rattled 
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Item 19  I am a steady 
person 
 I feel joyful 
Item 20 I become tense and 
upset when I think 
about my present 
concerns 
  I feel pleasant 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4. Characterizing Self-Injurious Cognitions Part I: Development of the Suicide 
Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) and the Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale 
(NSIBS) 
 
4.1. Abstract 
Self-injurious cognitions (SICs) are cognitions about deliberately injuring oneself 
(self-injurious behavior; SIB). Existing measures of SICs provide varying content coverage, 
pointing to a lack of consensus; or do not elucidate why people engage in SIB specifically, 
rather than performing another behavior. Such measures have also not tested whether it is 
possible or useful to conceptualise suicide attempts (SA) and nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI), 
two forms of SIB, as separate constructs. We developed the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale 
(SABS) and Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS) to address these issues. A 
companion article (Part II) describes the validation of these instruments. We tested whether 
SA and NSSI are considered separate constructs by asking participants to complete a large 
item pool separately in relation to SA and NSSI. Different ratings of exactly the same items 
for the two behaviors justified the development of separate scales. A series of exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses across six large, heterogeneous samples (total N = 3,313) 
revealed that the SABS consists of seven correlated factors, the NSIBS consists of ten 
correlated factors, and these instruments are separate. SA and NSSI are characterised by 
some very similar beliefs and some beliefs that are specific to SA or NSSI. Both instruments 
contain factors that describe how SA or NSSI relates to oneself and others. Results indicate 
that SA and NSSI are similar but distinct phenomena, supporting the use of separate 
terminology and definitions of SA and NSSI, and indicating that SA and NSSI need to be 
separated in research designs. 
 
Chapter 4 will be submitted for peer-review to Psychological Assessment as: Siddaway, A. 
P., Wood, A. M., O’Carroll, R. E., & O’Connor, R. C. Characterizing Self-Injurious 
Cognitions Part I: Development of the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) and the 
Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS). 
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4.2. Introduction 
When a clinician encounters someone who is contemplating or has engaged in some 
form of self-injurious behavior (SIB), they are keen to assess the precise details of exactly 
what that person is thinking, and, where relevant, in the details of the SIB itself. This 
information can be coupled with theory and other clinical and contextual information to make 
individualised predictions about risk and to formulate targeted therapeutic interventions. An 
individual’s cognitions specifically about SIB – their self-injurious cognitions (SICs) – 
convey what SIB means to that person. For example, “People think that my suicide attempt(s) 
are selfish” or “Nonsuicidal self-injury helps me escape negative emotions.” Understanding 
the specific content of an individual’s SICs is absolutely vital because people contemplate 
SIB far more than they take action (e.g., Fergusson, Beautrais & Horwood, 2003; Ten Have 
et al., 2009; Kessler, Berglund, Borges, Nock & Wang, 2005; Nock, Prinstein & Sterba, 
2009), and because clinical services seek to avoid SICs translating into action. Cognition and 
behaviour are equally important, although the most accurate way to conceptualise SIB is 
probably in terms of cognitions about SIB that for some people, at some times, manifest 
behaviorally.  
Comprehensive and reliable measurement of SICs is a critical foundation for 
understanding, researching, preventing, and treating SIB and, after over 50 years of research, 
one might assume that the measurement and conceptualisation of SICs would be clear and 
agreed. Unfortunately, however, this does not appear to be the case, as we outline below. This 
article (Part I) describes the development of two new multidimensional self-report measures 
of SICs, the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) and the Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs 
Scale (NSIBS), which were designed to extend and improve on existing measures. We 
developed these scales in an attempt to characterise SICs in much greater detail than has ever 
been done before, and to test whether the same cognitions characterise suicide attempts (SA) 
and nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI). A companion article (Part II; Siddaway, Wood, O’Carroll 
& O’Connor, in submission) describes the validation of the SABS and NSIBS.  
Defining Self-Injurious Behavior 
SIB is uniquely characterised by cognitions and behavior that involve deliberately 
physically injuring oneself. This conceptualisation distinguishes SIB from: (1) incidental 
physical injuries sustained as part of generally accepted sociocultural practices (e.g., body 
piercing, tattooing, bikini-line waxing, neck elongation, facial scarification; Clarke & 
Whittaker 1998; Favazza, 1989); (2) behaviors which immediately but unintentionally result 
in physical injury (e.g., accidentally touching something hot; drink driving; skin picking; nail 
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biting; hair-pulling); (3) behaviors in which physical injury may sometimes be a delayed or 
unanticipated side-effect (e.g., smoking, over-eating, binge drinking, or unprotected sex); and 
(4) behaviors which are self-defeating/self-destructive but which do not lead to physical 
injury (e.g., remaining in an emotionally abusive relationship). 
Two forms of SIB can be distinguished depending on the presence or absence of any 
reported or inferred intent to kill oneself (Linehan et al., 2006; Muehlenkamp, 2014; Nock et 
al., 2008; Silverman et al., 2007a, b). A “suicide attempt” (SA) is when someone 
intentionally physically injures themselves because they want and expect to kill themselves. 
“Suicide” may or may not be a consequence of a SA (Brown, Henriques, Sosdjan & Beck, 
2004; De Moore & Robertson, 1999). “Nonsuicidal self-injury” (NSSI) is when someone 
intentionally physically injures themselves, but with no desire or intention of killing 
themselves or being dead3. SA and NSSI often co-occur (Klonsky, May & Glenn, 2013; 
Nock et al., 2006) and relate to one-another (see Table 1). For example, the NSIBS Anti-
suicide factor (described later) taps perceptions that engaging in NSSI is a useful and possible 
means of avoiding acting on suicidal thoughts (e.g., “NSSI is a compromise instead of killing 
myself”). Whether or not SAs and NSSI are facets of the same construct is an issue of 
ongoing controversy (Kapur, Cooper, O’Connor & Hawton, 2013; Muehlenkamp, 2014; 
Posner, Brodsky, Yershova, Buchanan & Mann, 2014; Silverman, 2016).  
Limitations of Existing Measures 
A large body of research has attempted to understand the thinking involved in SIB. 
This has resulted in the development of a range of instruments (for reviews, see Batterham et 
al., 2014; Brown, 2001; Kodaka, Postuvan, Inagaki & Yamada, 2010; Rothberg & Geer-
Williams, 1992; Winters, Myers & Proud, 2002). Broadly speaking, these instruments 
measure one or more of the following: (1) The presence or absence of thoughts about suicide 
and/or NSSI (e.g., Linehan et al., 2006; Nock et al., 2007); (2) the characteristics of suicide 
and/or NSSI thoughts (e.g., frequency, duration, intensity, onset; Beck & Steer, 1991; Claes 
& Vandereycken, 2007; Gratz, 2001; Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Linehan & Comtois, 1996; 
Linehan et al., 2006; Nock et al., 2007; Osman et al., 2001; Sansone et al., 1998; Whitlock et 
al., 2014); (3) perceptions that are thought to underlie suicidal thoughts and/or SA 
specifically, such as hopelessness, defeat/entrapment, burdensomeness, unlovability, 
unbearability, unsolvability, thwarted belongingness, and acquired capability (Beck & Steer, 
                                                          
3 These issues get at the semantics and idiosyncratic meanings that different individuals associate with different 
terms.  
91 
 
1993; Gilbert & Allan, 1998; Rudd et al., in preparation; Van Orden et al., 2012); and (4) the 
reasons, functions, and motivations for engaging in or refraining from SA and/or NSSI (Beck 
& Steer, 1991; Holden, Kerr, Mendonca & Velamoor, 1998; Kleindienst et al., 2008; 
Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Lewis & Santor, 2008; Linehan, Goodstein, Nielsen & Chiles, 1983; 
Lloyd et al.,1997; Ma & Klonsky, 2013; Matson et al., 1999; Nock et al., 2007; Osman et al., 
1998; Osuch et al., 1999; Santa Mina et al., 2006; Turner, Chapman & Gratz, 2014; Whitlock 
et al., 2014). As we outline next, existing measures of the content of SICs (points 3 and 4 in 
the list above) are limited in several important ways, each of which points to the need to 
develop alternative scales. 
Specificity 
One major shortcoming with many cognitive constructs thought to underlie SAs, such 
as impulsivity, depression, hopelessness, and perceptions of defeat/entrapment, is that these 
constructs do not elucidate why people engage in a SA and/or NSSI specifically – rather than 
performing some other behavior. In fact, accumulating evidence demonstrates that these 
constructs are relevant to a large number of people and psychological problems (e.g., Anestis, 
Soberay, Gutierrez, Hernandez & Joiner, 2014; Klonsky & May, 2014; Siddaway, Taylor, 
Wood & Schulz, 2015); the vast majority of individuals reporting these perceptions do not 
attempt suicide, die by suicide, or engage in NSSI (Goldstein, Black, Nasrallah & Winokur, 
1991; Selby et al., 2014). For example, depression is common in people who make a SA but 
the vast majority of depressed individuals will not attempt to take their own life or die by 
suicide (Bostwick & Pankratz, 2000).  
Focussing on cognitions about SIB (SICs) is an approach that may be particularly 
informative in clarifying why some people, at some times, intentionally physically injure 
themselves, rather than choosing to use an alternative self-regulatory strategy (e.g., listen to 
music; go for a walk; problem-solve; ruminate; get drunk) in response to a particular internal 
or external trigger (e.g., emotional distress; social exclusion). Strong endorsement of SICs 
may be a specific, defining, and time-varying feature of SIB. 
Construct Validity 
Measures of the reasons, functions, and motivations4 for SAs and NSSI are 
presumably more specific to SIB but are themselves subject to several content-based 
limitations. Most importantly, there are fifteen or so of these measures and each scale 
provides different content coverage. This highlights a lack of consensus regarding exactly 
                                                          
4 These terms and concepts seem to be used fairly interchangeably in the literature. 
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which cognitions characterise SIB. Furthermore, several of these scales contain multiple 
items that assess certain types of content but only single items that assess other content 
domains. This is a potential problem because meaningful content-based factors cannot be 
identified when only a single relevant marker is included in the item pool (Clark & Watson, 
1995; Loevinger, 1957).  
Although existing scales cover a range of content, no study to date has included a 
wide range of SICs in the same item pool and conducted structural analyses to explore 
exactly which SICs best characterize SIB. Taken together, these issues mean that it is unclear 
which cognitions reliably characterise SIB and what factor structure best describes SICs. 
These issues also make it unclear whether any between-study differences observed to date are 
due to substantive factors, or are simply due to the use of different scales that provide varying 
and potentially incomplete content coverage. 
Prediction, Vulnerability and Maintenance 
The ability to predict, prevent, or stop SIB presumably stems from an understanding 
of SIB vulnerability and maintenance. Unfortunately, however, the phrasing of measures of 
the reasons for SAs and NSSI may have precluded these measures from being used to 
investigate how SICs might contribute to SIB vulnerability and maintenance. For example, 
the Inventory of Statements About Self-Injury (Klonsky & Glenn, 2008) assesses 13 
functions of NSSI; each item begins with “When I self-harm, I am …” Likewise, the 
Inventory of Motivations for Suicide Attempts (Ma & Klonsky, 2013) asks respondents to 
explain why they attempted suicide using items which begin with “I attempted suicide 
because I…”  
The phrasing used in these measures assumes that people have already attempted 
suicide or engaged in NSSI, meaning that individuals who are at high risk of SIB but have yet 
to take action (e.g., as a result of protective internal or external moderator and mediator 
variables) would not be administered these measures. Asking about reasons for SA or NSSI 
potentially limits the predictive ability of these measures because the same reasons may be 
endorsed whether SIB occurred yesterday or 10 years ago, even though an individual may no 
longer endorse SICs at all5. The phrasing of these measures also precludes them being used 
to examine the transition from the first episode of SIB, to repeating SIB, or to examine 
                                                          
5 The ability to sensitively measure individual differences in SICs and SIB is especially critical because of low 
base rates; measuring inter-participant variability increases power by increasing the amount of information 
available for analyses (McClelland & Judd, 1993). 
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cognitive maintenance factors (e.g., in current versus recovered SIB groups; as a result of 
psychological therapy modifying cognitions about SIB). 
Conceptual Debate 
One final concern that can be raised against existing measures of SICs is that they 
have not directly contributed to the debate regarding whether it is possible or useful to 
conceptualise SA and NSSI as one or two constructs (see Kapur et al., 2013; Muehlenkamp, 
2014; Posner et al., 2014; Silverman, 2016). Clarifying whether and how SICs differ across 
SA and NSSI has potentially major implications for how we understand, describe, and 
individualise interventions for SA and NSSI.  
The Current Research 
The various issues discussed suggest that existing scales may not comprehensively or 
reliably measure the cognitive content that characterises SA and NSSI. Our goals in this 
article were to develop comprehensive, theory-driven, multidimensional measures of SICs 
and to clarify whether the same set of items and/or factors characterise SA and NSSI. We 
note several key features of our approach.  
First, the SABS and NSIBs were designed to measures beliefs about SA and NSSI 
(rather than thoughts, assumptions, attitudes, reasons, or some other type or level of 
cognition): items were phrased to reflect beliefs (absolute statements of the way things are 
regarding SA and NSSI). From a cognitive therapy perspective (e.g., Beck, Rush, Shaw & 
Emery, 1979), beliefs are conceptualised as relatively enduring personal meanings that confer 
vulnerability across situations, but which also potentially fluctuate or change due to a range 
of factors. We developed measures of beliefs about SA and NSSI because we were interested 
in developing scales that could provide explanatory power beyond current measures (beliefs 
are thought to explain other types of mental activity; e.g., Beck et al., 1979). Beliefs about 
SIB potentially transcend individual differences in the phenomenology of SIB (e.g., people 
can have different automatic thoughts, mental images, or expectations regarding SIB during 
different episodes of SIB but the beliefs that underline all SIB episodes might be relatively 
stable).  
Second, whilst we were interested in measuring beliefs, we were also keen to develop 
instruments that could measure differences between individuals and track changes within 
individuals. The SABS and NSIBS therefore ask how much the reader currently agrees with 
(endorses) each SIC. Third, to enable all potential factors to emerge reliably in structural 
analyses, we generated a large and varied item pool and included multiple markers to define 
each potential cognitive content domain. We then conducted factor analyses on the entire 
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item pool and deleted cross-loading items in order to maximise the discriminant validity of 
individual subscales.  
Fourth, our desire to clarify whether the cognitions that characterise SA are the same 
as those that characterise NSSI led us to invent a methodology that would directly test this 
question (more on this below). The outcome of these analyses would justify the development 
of separate scales or a single scale. 
Fifth, when developing these scales, we were acutely aware of the need to balance 
comprehensiveness against utility. That is, whilst we were keen to develop instruments that 
measure a wide range of important content, the finished scales would need to be short enough 
to be appropriate for a population who are often highly distressed and experiencing comorbid 
psychological problems and cognitive changes such as impaired problem-solving ability (see 
O’Connor & Nock, 2014, for a review). We achieved this balance by retaining just a subset 
of items from the final factor structure we obtained in Sample 5, ensuring that each subscale 
had at least a good level of internal consistency (α≥.8; Clark & Watson, 1995; Nunnally 
1978; see Part  II). 
Last, because substantive validity begins with the creation of a broad item pool that 
seeks to measure a particular theory (Clark & Watson, 1995; Loevinger, 1957), candidate 
items were generated to operationalize the hypothesis that three domains of SICs characterise 
SA and NSSI. Specifically, we predict that the content of SA and NSSI cognitions involves 
“positive SICs”, “negative SICs” and “facilitating SICs” about SIB. A parallel review article 
elaborates this hypothesis and explores whether the existing literature can be 
reconceptualised in terms of the three proposed domains of SICs.  
“Positive SICs” are cognitions about the idiosyncratic individual and interpersonal 
perceived advantages of SA and NSSI (e.g., “Attempting suicide changes the way that I am 
thinking” [individual]; “NSSI helps me fit in with other people” [interpersonal])6. The 
presence and activation of these cognitions are predicted to motivate people to engage in SA 
and NSSI.  
We recognise that there are advantages and disadvantages to doing or not doing any 
behavior and SIB is no different. Thus, “negative SICs” are cognitions about the idiosyncratic 
individual and interpersonal perceived disadvantages of SIB (e.g., “NSSI makes my problems 
                                                          
6 The terminology “positive” is used to convey an individual’s perception. “Positive” and “negative” 
terminology are commonly used to describe the valence of psychological phenomena, particularly emotions. 
“Positive” is not used to imply that SA or NSSI may be perceived as a “helpful” or “constructive” option; only 
that these behaviours are sometimes seen as personally advantageous and therefore desirable option. 
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worse” [individual]; “People think that my suicide attempt(s) are selfish” [interpersonal]). 
The presence and activation of these cognitions are predicted to motivate people to avoid SA 
and NSSI.  
Activation of positive and negative SICs is hypothesised to involve competing 
motivations to approach and avoid SIB, which is distressing. For example, “I want to cut 
myself but I know it’s bad for me.” A third domain of cognitions, “facilitating SICs,” are 
predicted to arise in response to strongly conflicting positive and negative SICs and enable a 
person to proceed with a behavior that they know to be unconstructive. Facilitating SICs 
(e.g., “Just do it,” “It’s OK to cut if I’m really upset”) resolve cognitive dissonance by 
justifying and giving “permission” to self-injure by strengthening positive and/or inhibiting 
negative SICs.  
The three domains of SICs are suggested to be potentially apparent before, during, 
and after SIB and to interact to maintain SIB. We predict that SA and NSSI are each 
characterised by the three domains of SICs; however the exact content of SA and NSSI 
cognitions will potentially differ due to differences in the nature of these behaviours (e.g., 
frequency, lethality), their consequences, and how each is socially-constructed. Candidate 
items for the SABS and NSIBS were generated to measure all three domains of SICs. 
4.3. Overview of Measure Construction 
We highlight several key aspects of scale construction; further details are provided in 
the Supplementary material for Chapter 4. 
Recruitment 
The SABS and the NSIBS were developed over six large, heterogeneous samples 
(total N = 3,313) of people with lived experience of SIB (see Table 1). All samples were 
recruited online from a broad range of SIB and mental health forums, support websites, and 
mental health charities worldwide. We specifically recruited individuals with lived 
experience of any type of SICs or SIB. This sampling strategy enabled us to obtain large, 
heterogeneous samples and we hoped that this strategy would allow us to develop measures 
that would be broadly applicable (sampling individuals who vary widely in terms of SICs and 
SIB e.g., SIB methods, medical lethality and harm, and psychological comorbidity). 
Sampling individuals outside of clinical settings was also consistent with our theoretical 
assumption that SICs are continuous traits, rather than discrete, dichotomous entities.  
We hoped that anonymous online recruitment from a broad range of sources would 
provide the best possible opportunity to obtain an accurate and representative understanding 
of the phenomenology of SICs because: (1) It is well-established that SIB is a highly 
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stigmatised, often secretive behavior (NICE, 2011), and that the majority of SIB episodes 
(~70%) do not result in presentation to clinical services (e.g., Hawton Rodham, Evans & 
Harriss, 2009); (2) some evidence indicates that online recruitment increases SIB reporting 
by 2-3 times relative to non-anonymous techniques (e.g., Nock et al., 2008); and (3) online 
participation allowed us to randomise the ordering of our item pools, thereby eliminating an 
important potential source of error when presenting large numbers of items. 
Structural Analyses 
The same approach to structural analyses was used in all samples. Parallel analysis 
was used to determine the number of factors to extract (Velicer, Eaton & Fava, 2000; Zwick 
& Velicer, 1986) and the results informed maximum-likelihood exploratory factor analyses 
(EFA) with promax rotation. Various sensitivity analyses were performed to check the 
robustness of the obtained factor solutions and these consistently yielded similar results.  
We were very tentative in our labelling of factors and our deletion of items in 
Samples 1 and 2 and erred more on the side of sensitivity (administering overly large item 
pools to potentially encourage meaningful, distinct factors to emerge). By the time Sample 3 
was collected, we had used EFA to yield a reliable set of factors for the final scales. Thus, 
Samples 3-5 focused more on specificity; that is, locating the strongest and most reliable 
markers for the identified factors. 
In each round of factor analysis, the following criteria were adopted to ensure that 
items would be maximally informative and in order to extract the greatest number of factors 
that would be well defined and reasonably distinct from one-another. When two items 
correlated strongly (≥.75), the item with lowest item total correlation was considered to 
contain redundant information and was deleted (Clark & Watson, 1995). Items with loadings 
<.40 or which demonstrated reasonably strong loadings on more than one factor (>.3) were 
eliminated (Clark & Watson, 1995).  
Parsimony 
We balanced the competing goals of developing scales that are reasonably short (and 
therefore relatively swiftly completed and clinically useful) but nevertheless reliable and 
informative (cf. the "attenuation paradox;" Clark & Watson, 1995; Loevinger, 1954) through 
the following approaches. First, we retained adequate numbers of items in each subscale to 
achieve at least a good level of internal consistency (α≥.8; Clark & Watson, 1995; Nunnally 
1978). Second, as we were keen to develop scales that tap SICs as broadly as possible, rather 
than simply retaining the highest loading items from each subscale (which would have 
improved reliability but reduced validity), when subscales contained enough items to allow it, 
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items were progressively deleted from strongly correlated pairs of items (deleting the item 
with lowest item total correlation) (Clark & Watson, 1995). 
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Table 1 Self-Injurious Cognitions and Behavior and Demographic Characteristics by Sample 
  Thought capture Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 Sample 6 
N  35 698 436 484 380 664 650 
Suicidal thought(s)        
Lifetime presence 33 (94%) 698 (100%) 419 (96%) 469 (97%) 363 (96%) 646 (97%) 628 (97%) 
Lifetime frequency        
 1 0 (0%) 1 (0%) 5 (1%) 3 (1%) 11 (%) 6 (1%) 6 (1%) 
 2-5 8 (24%) 135 (19 %) 48 (11%) 47 (10%) 55 (%) 78 (12%) 60 (9%) 
 5-10 4 (12%) 23 (3%) 56 (13%) 37 (8%) 40 (%) 73 (11%) 70 (11%) 
 10-15 1 (3%) 15 (2%) 25 (6%) 30 (6%) 18 (%) 32 (5%) 50 (8%) 
 15-20 0 (0%) 19 (3%) 14 (3%) 32 (7%) 21 (%) 43 (7%) 38 (6%) 
 20-30 0 (0%) 32 (5%) 28 (6%) 25 (5%) 17 (%) 37 (6%) 26 (4%) 
 30+ 20 (60%) 473 (68%) 243 (56%) 295 (61%) 201 (53%) 377 (57%) 378 (58%) 
Recency         
 Past month 22 (67%) 396 (57%) 255 (59%) 279 (58%) 218 (57 %) 387 (58%) 391 (60%) 
 Past year 10 (30%) 168 (24%) 92 (21%) 118 (24%) 73 (19%) 144 (22%) 135 (21%) 
 1-2 years ago 1 (3%) 62 (9%) 37 (9%) 28 (6%) 30 (8%) 51 (8%) 39 (6%) 
 2+ years ago - 72 (10%) 35 (8%) 44 (9%) 42 (11%) 64 (10%) 63 (10%) 
Suicide attempt(s)        
Lifetime presence 16 (48%) 505 (72%) 268 (62%) 323 (67%) 247 (65%) 427 (64%) 410 (63%) 
Lifetime frequency        
 1 3 (9%) 112 (16%) 60 (14%) 55 (11%) 33 (9%) 84 (13%) 81 (13%) 
 2-5 9 (27%) 157 (23%) 134 (31%) 167 (34%) 127 (33%) 210 (32%) 197 (30%) 
 5-10 1 (3%) 190 (27%) 47 (11%) 52 (11%) 38 (10%) 79 (12%) 71 (11%) 
 10-15 0 (%) 12 (2%) 14 (3%) 20 (4%) 23 (6%) 23 (4%) 29 (5%) 
 15-20 0 (%) 9 (1%) 6 (1%) 8 (2%) 3 (1%) 9 (1%) 13 (2%) 
 20-30 2 (6%) 9 (1%) 5 (1%) 10 (2%) 12 (3%) 7 (1%) 8 (1%) 
 30+ 1 (3%) 16 (2%) 2 (0%) 11 (2%) 11 (3%) 15 (2%) 11 (2%) 
Recency         
 Past month 2 (6%) 54 (8%) 36 (8%) 32 (7%) 28 (7%) 65 (10%) 44 (7%) 
 Past year 4 (12%) 135 (19%) 81 (19%) 94 (19%) 82 (22%) 124 (19%) 123 (19%) 
 1-2 years ago 10 (30%) 102 (15%) 49 (11%) 64 (13%) 34 (9%) 58 (9%) 89 (14%) 
 2+ years ago - 214 (31%) 102 (23%) 133 (67%) 103 (27%) 180 (27%) 154 (24%) 
NSSI thought(s)        
Lifetime presence 25 (76%) 698 (100%) 418 (96%) 467 (96%) 330 (87%) 633 (95%) 614 (95%) 
Lifetime frequency        
 1 0 (0%) 2 (0%) 1 (0%) - 2 (1%) 3 (1%) 3 (1%) 
 2-5 0 (0%) 16 (2%) 17 (4%) 12 (3%) 20 (5%) 8 (1%) 6 (1%) 
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 5-10 0 (0%) 15 (2%) 9 (2% ) 7 (1%) 19 (5%) 12 (2%) 5 (1%) 
 10-15 3 (9%) 24 (3%) 8 (2%) 12 (3%) 10 (3%) 16 (2%) 15 (2%) 
 15-20 0 (0%) 3 (0%) 11 (3%) 14 (3%) 8 (2%) 13 (2%) 21 (3%) 
 20-30 3 (9%) 22 (3%) 13 (3%) 24 (5%) 11 (3%) 18 (3%) 19 (3%) 
 30+ 18 (55%) 616 (88%) 359 (82%) 398 (82%) 260 (68%) 563 (85%) 545 (84%) 
Recency         
 Past month 16 (48%) 537 (77%) 339 (78%) 367 (76%) 239 (63%) 496 (75%) 478 (74%) 
 Past year 4 (12%) 99 (14%) 51 (12%) 67 (14%) 59 (16%) 98 (15%) 90 (14%) 
 1-2 years ago 4 (12%) 24 (3%) 11 (3%) 16 (3%) 12 (3%) 16 (2%) 17 (3%) 
 2+ years ago - 38 (5%) 17 (4%) 17 (4%) 20 (5%) 23 (4%) 29 (5%) 
NSSI Behavior(s)        
Lifetime presence 22 (67%) 678 (97%) 411 (94%) 464 (96%) 321 (85%) 624 (94%) 604 (93%) 
Lifetime frequency        
 1 0 (0%) 3 (0%) 2 (1%) 3 (1%) 7 (%) 1 (0%) 6 (1%) 
 2-5 0 (0%) 38 (5%) 26 (6%) 25 (5%) 32 (%) 27 (4%) 21 (3%) 
 5-10 6 (18%) 30 (4%) 11 (3%) 24 (5%) 24 (%) 24 (4%) 23 (4%) 
 10-15 0 (0%) 15 (2%) 28 (6%) 13 (3%) 13 (%) 24 (4%) 30 (5%) 
 15-20 0 (0%) 11 (2%) 22 (5%) 24 (5%) 16 (%) 24 (4%) 29 (5%) 
 20-30 3 (9%) 29 (4%) 39 (9%) 26 (5%) 14 (%) 38 (6%) 37 (6%) 
 30+ 24 (73%) 553 (79%) 283 (65%) 349 (72%) 215 (57%) 486 (73%) 458 (70%) 
Recency         
 Past month 8 (24%) 356 (51%) 227 (52%) 214 (44%) 135 (36%) 340 (51%) 320 (49%) 
 Past year 7 (21%) 181 (26%) 106 (24%) 146 (30%) 112 (30%) 162 (24%) 171 (26%) 
 1-2 years ago 7 (21%) 63 (9%) 36 (8%) 43 (9%) 26 (7%) 65 (10%) 45 (7%) 
 2+ years ago - 78 (11%) 42 (10%) 61 (13%) 48 (13%) 57 (9%) 68 (11%) 
Co-occurring suicide and NSSI thoughts        
Lifetime presence 10 (29%) 564 (81%) 351 (81%) 384 (79%) 280 (74%) 515 (78%) 497 (77%) 
Lifetime frequency        
 1 0 (0%) 13 (2%) 2 (1%) 6 (1%) 6 (2%) 8 (1%) 8 (1%) 
 1-5 2 (6%) 85 (10%) 48 (11%) 45 (9%) 49 (13%) 57 (9%) 54 (8%) 
 5-10 2 (6%) 27 (4%) 35 (8%) 35 (7%) 30 (8%) 52 (8%) 42 (7%) 
 10-15 0 (0%) 13 (2%) 25 (6%) 23 (5%) 23 (6%) 41 (6%) 38 (6%) 
 15-20 2 (6%) 5 (1%) 36 (8%) 32 (7%) 19 (5%) 25 (4%) 44 (7%) 
 20-30 3 (9%) 10 (1%) 14 (3%) 24 (5%) 19 (5%) 38 (6%) 32 (5%) 
 30+ 1 (3%) 411 (59%) 191 (44%) 219 (45%) 134 (35%) 294 (44%) 279 (43%) 
Recency         
 Past month 3 (9%) 266 (38%) 167 (39%) 177 (37%) 131 (35%) 248 (37%) 247 (38%) 
 Past year 4 (12%) 167 (24%) 110 (25%) 104 (21%) 82 (22%) 155 (23%) 147 (23%) 
 1-2 years ago 3 (9%) 59 (9%) 37 (9%) 48 (10%) 26 (7%) 54 (8%) 43 (7%) 
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 2+ years ago - 72 (10%) 37 (9%) 55 (1%) 41 (11%) 58 (9%) 60 (9%) 
Age  31.74 (10.09) 30.52 (10.70) 25.50 (9.73) 26.53 (9.72) 31.18 (11.80) 27.98 (10.10) 28.20 (10.38) 
Gender        
 Male 4 (12%) 52 (7%) 28 (6%) 22 (5%) 17 (5%) 30 (5%) 46 (7%) 
 Female 15 (45%) 614 (88%) 364 (84%) 399 (82%) 261 (69%) 513 (77%) 506 (78%) 
 Transgender/Trans* - 6 (1%) 4 (1%) 12 (3%) 8 (2%) 25 (4%) 20 (3%) 
 Non binary gender - 20 (3%) 34 (8%) 48 (10%) 10 (3%) 41 (6%) 33 (5%) 
 Prefer not to say - 5 (1%) 2 (1%) 1 (0%) 7 (2%) 3 (1%) 3 (1%) 
Ethnicity        
 White - - 398 (92%) 447 (92%) 239 (63%) 558 (84%) 554 (85%) 
 Mixed/Multiple ethnic 
groups 
- 
- 
15 (3%) 16 (3%) 15 (4%) 25 (4%) 29 (5%) 
 Asian (Indian, Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi, Chinese) 
- 
- 
6 (2%) 15 (3%) 43 (12%) 15 (2%) 18 (3%) 
 Other ethnic group - - 9 (2%) 3 (1%) 3 (1%) 10 (2%) 5 (1%) 
 Prefer not to say - - 4 (1%) 1 (0%) 3 (1%) 4 (1%) 2 (0%) 
Marital status        
 Single 10 (30%) - 286 (66%) 289 (60%) 159 42 (%) 366 (55%) 356 (55%) 
 Married 5 (15%) - 35 (8%) 46 (10%) 47 (12%) 93 (14%) 79 (12%) 
 Cohabiting 2 (6%) - 56 (13%) 82 (17%) 45 (12%) 84 (13%) 89 (14%) 
 Separated 1 (3%) - 14 (3%) 18 (4%) 20 (5%) 14 (2%) 26 (4%) 
 Widowed 0 (0%) - - 1 (0%) 3 (1%) 2 (0%) 4 (1%) 
 Other 1 (3%) - 38 (9%) 39 (8%) 23 (6%) 45 (7%) 48 (7%) 
 Prefer not to say - - 3 (1%) 7 (1%) 6 (2%) 8 (1%) 6 (1%) 
Employment status        
 Employed - - 142 (33%) 171 (35%) 106 (28%) 248 (37%) 243 (37%) 
 Self-employed - - 18 (4%) 20 (4%) 11 (3%) 22 (3%) 18 (3%) 
 Unemployed - - 62 (14%) 92 (19%) 68 (18%) 104 (16%) 105 (16%) 
 Student - - 172 (39%) 157 (32%) 74 (20%) 184 (28%) 191 (29%) 
 Retired - - 5 (1%) 2 (0%) 7 (2%) 1 (0%) 2 (0%) 
 Other - - 26 (6%) 32 (7%) 31 (8%) 41 (6%) 40 (6%) 
 Prefer not to say - - 7 (2%) 8 (2%) 6 (2%) 12 (2%) 9 (1%) 
Level of education        
 High/Upper school - - 210 (49%) 228 (47%) 108 (29%) 272 (41%) 264 (41%) 
 Business/Technical training 
beyond high/upper school 
- - 68 (16%) 77 (16%) 70 (18%) 126 (19%) 116 (18%) 
 Bachelor degree - - 103 (24%) 115 (24%) 76 (20%) 138 (21%) 163 (25%) 
 Master’s degree - - 27 (6%) 31(6%) 28 (7%) 45 (7%) 45 (7%) 
 Doctoral degree - - 5 (1%) 8 (2%) 5 (1%) 11 (2%) 6 (1%) 
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 Prefer not to say - - 19 (4%) 23 (5%) 16 (4%) 20 (3%) 14 (2%) 
Annual income        
 £0-10,000 - - 241 (55%) 266 (55%) 125 (33%) 299 (45%) 285 (44%) 
 £10-20,000 - - 81 (19%) 92 (19%) 70 (18%) 136 (21%) 138 (21%) 
 £20-30,000 - - 36 (8%) 50 (10%) 30 (8%) 59 (9%) 60 (9%) 
 £30-40,000 - - 13 (3%) 13 (3%) 15 (4%) 30 (5%) 33 (5%) 
 £40-50,000 - - 13 (3%) 5 (1%) 10 (3%) 13 (2%) 18 (3%) 
 £50-60,000 - - 1 (0%) 4 (%) 6 (2%) 6 (1%) 5 (1%) 
 £60-70,000 - - 2 (1%) - 2 (1%) 3 (1%) 3 (1%) 
 £70-80,000 - - 2 (1%) - 1 (0%) 3 (1%) 2 (0%) 
 £80-90,000 - - 1 (0%) - 1 (0%) 3 (1%) 1 (0%) 
 £90-100,000 - - - 1 (0%) 1 (0%) 1 (0%) - 
 £100,000+ - - - 1 (0%) 4 (1%) 2 (0%) 2 (0%) 
 Prefer not to say - - 42 (10%) 50 (%) 38 (10%) 57 (9%) 61 (9%) 
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Item Generation and Refinement 
A large and varied item pool of beliefs about SIB was generated and refined through 
several steps (Figure 1). Separate item pools were initially generated by people with lived 
experience of SIB and the research team. People with lived experience of SIB completed a 
“thought capture” exercise in which they were asked to report any mental phenomena about 
SIB and its sequalae (thoughts, feelings, mental images, dreams or nightmares, memories, 
voices, sounds, smells, sensations, and tastes), including cognitions about physical pain, 
blood, and injuries experienced as part of SIB. Responses to the thought capture exercise 
were combined to create an item pool. The research team concurrently generated an item pool 
by drawing on a broad range of sources, using the guiding framework of positive, negative, 
and facilitating SICs (see Supplementary material for Chapter 4).  
The two item pools were combined and then simultaneously refined by clinicians, 
researchers, and people with lived experience of SIB, retaining any item with unique content. 
Candidate items were rationally organized into themed groups of items (homogeneous item 
composites; HICs; Hogan, 1983) to ensure that sufficient markers were included for each 
potential facet of SICs. The creation of HICs ensured that corresponding factors had a 
reasonable chance of emerging in our subsequent structural analyses. However, the 
construction of HICs does not force corresponding factors to emerge.  
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Figure 1. Item generation and refinement steps 
  
People with lived experience of SIB thought capture (N = 35) 
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4.4. Exploring How Best to Conceptualise Self-Injurious Behavior  
Our desire to clarify whether the cognitions that characterise SA are the same as those 
that characterise NSSI led us to invent a methodology that would directly test this key 
question. To achieve this, we initially phrased items generically in relation to “self-injurious 
behavior” and made no reference to suicidal desire or intent7. Participants were asked to 
complete every item twice: once in relation to SA and once in relation to NSSI. We reasoned 
that different ratings of exactly the same items for the two behaviors would justify the 
development of separate scales, and that similar ratings of exactly the same items for the two 
behaviors would justify the development of a single scale. 
4.4.1. Measure and Procedure 
The item pool consisted of 214 items which were presented in blocks of 25 items per 
page. The ordering of blocks and items within blocks was randomised. Participants were 
asked to indicate how much they currently agree with each SIC on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from Strongly agree to Strongly disagree.  
4.4.2. Results 
Table 2 presents the results of this analysis. The intraclass correlation coefficient 
(ICC) is the most informative statistic and examines how identical ratings are to each other 
by accounting for rank order (whether participants use the Likert scale in the same way) and 
absolute differences (mean levels). The average ICC across all items is .61, which indicates 
“moderate” agreement (Fleiss, 1986; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). This result provides direct 
evidence that participants perceived SA and NSSI as similar but not identical constructs.  
Separate PAs of the SA and NSSI items (detailed further below) revealed different 
numbers of factors for SA (18 factors) and NSSI (22 factors) for exactly the same items. 
Overall, these results indicate that participants viewed SA and NSSI as similar but separate 
constructs. We interpreted this evidence as a rationale to construct separate scales for NSSI 
and SA. Having established the need to construct separate scales to measure SA and NSSI 
cognitions, from this point onwards (Samples 2-6) items were rephrased to refer to SA or 
NSSI (rather than SIB) and separate structural analyses were conducted for SA and NSSI 
item pools.   
  
                                                          
7 The terminology of “self-injurious behaviour” was specifically selected in an attempt to minimize ambiguity 
and misunderstandings. Several other terms were considered, for example “self-harm,” however, these terms 
tend to carry specific associations of SA or NSSI for members of the general public and may therefore have 
introduced error.  
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Table 2 Comparison of Item Responses for Suicide Attempts and Nonsuicidal Self-Injury (Sample 1) 
 
 
Suicide 
attempt 
Nonsuicidal 
self-injury     
Sample 1 Item pool (214 items) M SD M SD 
Mean 
difference 
Cohen's 
d r ICC 
SIB makes my life better 5.61 1.84 5.19 1.97 0.42 0.22 0.57 0.56 
SIB helps me escape from my problems 3.67 2.28 3.35 2.09 0.32 0.15 0.50 0.50 
SIB is an escape from myself 3.07 2.21 2.82 1.96 0.25 0.12 0.46 0.46 
SIB helps me avoid my problems 4.02 2.33 3.95 2.18 0.07 0.03 0.59 0.59 
SIB helps me cope 3.86 2.22 2.20 1.58 1.65 0.86 0.38 0.26 
SIB prevents bad things from happening to me 5.38 2.05 5.43 1.89 -0.05 0.03 0.61 0.61 
SIB changes the way that I am thinking 3.91 2.11 3.07 1.83 0.83 0.42 0.55 0.50 
SIB changes my thoughts so the problems in my life do not seem 
as bad 
4.92 2.06 4.33 2.11 0.60 0.29 0.61 0.59 
SIB clears my mind 4.22 2.13 2.94 1.91 1.28 0.63 0.46 0.39 
SIB stops negative or distressing thoughts 4.25 2.22 3.20 2.04 1.05 0.49 0.53 0.47 
SIB stops upsetting thoughts going round and round in my mind 3.71 2.24 2.78 1.87 0.93 0.45 0.49 0.44 
SIB changes images or scenes that run through my mind 4.24 2.11 3.61 2.02 0.62 0.30 0.61 0.59 
SIB changes images or scenes that I imagine 4.30 2.11 3.81 2.01 0.48 0.23 0.65 0.63 
SIB stops me thinking about upsetting pictures and images 4.30 2.22 3.48 2.13 0.82 0.38 0.63 0.59 
SIB interrupts images or scenes that run through my mind 3.99 2.18 3.03 1.90 0.96 0.47 0.58 0.52 
SIB interrupts upsetting pictures and scenes that run through my 
mind 
3.91 2.22 3.07 1.98 0.84 0.40 0.63 0.58 
SIB stops me feeling numb 4.40 2.13 3.24 2.13 1.16 0.55 0.54 0.47 
SIB stops me feeling detached from myself 4.61 2.12 3.44 2.15 1.17 0.55 0.59 0.51 
SIB refocuses my mind 4.28 2.13 2.90 1.94 1.38 0.68 0.44 0.36 
SIB brings my attention back to my body 4.38 2.13 3.03 1.99 1.34 0.65 0.52 0.43 
SIB makes me feel “real” or alive 4.77 2.16 3.33 2.18 1.44 0.66 0.54 0.45 
SIB is a way to feel something when I otherwise feel nothing 4.39 2.22 3.13 2.17 1.26 0.57 0.58 0.50 
SIB temporarily stops me from feeling anything 3.94 2.23 3.21 2.07 0.73 0.34 0.54 0.51 
SIB makes me feel nothing 4.58 2.18 4.40 2.13 0.18 0.08 0.54 0.54 
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SIB makes me feel detached from myself 3.94 2.23 3.58 2.17 0.36 0.16 0.59 0.58 
SIB helps me forget my problems 4.35 2.24 3.60 2.12 0.75 0.34 0.53 0.50 
SIB solves my problems 5.30 2.12 5.62 1.80 -0.32 0.16 0.54 0.53 
SIB is the best way to change how I feel 4.78 2.09 4.03 2.09 0.75 0.36 0.59 0.55 
SIB makes things seem better, even if only for a little while 3.97 2.26 2.62 1.88 1.35 0.65 0.47 0.38 
SIB makes me feel less upset 4.27 2.18 2.83 1.90 1.45 0.71 0.43 0.34 
SIB is exciting 5.72 1.82 5.40 1.99 0.31 0.16 0.67 0.66 
SIB is pleasurable 5.49 1.90 4.30 2.18 1.19 0.59 0.55 0.46 
SIB makes me less bored 5.94 1.65 5.69 1.85 0.25 0.14 0.72 0.71 
SIB is the best way to calm myself down 4.69 2.11 3.10 1.97 1.59 0.78 0.50 0.38 
SIB reduces tension and stress 3.95 2.23 2.22 1.56 1.73 0.90 0.37 0.25 
SIB provides relief from upsetting thoughts or feelings 3.35 2.21 2.11 1.54 1.25 0.66 0.42 0.33 
SIB is a way to express anger or self-criticism 3.55 2.21 2.27 1.69 1.28 0.65 0.53 0.43 
I engage in SIB to punish myself 3.72 2.34 2.67 2.03 1.06 0.49 0.64 0.56 
SIB is a form of self-punishment 3.47 2.31 2.43 1.89 1.03 0.49 0.59 0.51 
I deserve SIB scars and injuries 3.90 2.29 3.32 2.22 0.59 0.26 0.76 0.73 
SIB makes me a better person 6.05 1.52 5.86 1.69 0.19 0.12 0.68 0.67 
SIB improves my life 5.82 1.74 5.43 1.91 0.39 0.21 0.57 0.55 
SIB makes me who I am 5.25 1.98 4.91 2.11 0.34 0.17 0.72 0.71 
SIB is one of the best things in my life 6.20 1.46 6.07 1.62 0.13 0.09 0.69 0.68 
I have nothing in my life apart from SIB 5.90 1.68 5.93 1.65 -0.03 0.02 0.77 0.77 
SIB is the only thing I've got that’s just mine 5.04 2.15 4.65 2.26 0.40 0.18 0.76 0.74 
I am more similar to people who engage in SIB than to people 
who do not 
4.07 1.99 3.80 1.97 0.27 0.14 0.77 0.77 
My life would be worse without SIB 5.26 1.96 4.67 2.11 0.59 0.29 0.68 0.65 
SIB is a reward or treat for me 6.12 1.54 5.79 1.84 0.33 0.20 0.63 0.61 
SIB is comforting 4.23 2.25 2.83 1.91 1.40 0.68 0.51 0.41 
SIB keeps me in control 4.26 2.25 3.16 2.04 1.10 0.51 0.54 0.48 
SIB makes things more certain, even if only for a while 4.09 2.18 3.68 2.03 0.41 0.20 0.58 0.57 
SIB is the only thing that I can control in my life 4.23 2.24 3.85 2.21 0.38 0.17 0.75 0.74 
I keep SIB as an option in case my problems get worse 2.97 2.20 2.62 1.91 0.34 0.17 0.58 0.56 
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Knowing that I can engage in SIB gives me strength to carry on 
with life 
4.29 2.25 3.73 2.18 0.56 0.25 0.64 0.62 
SIB is always there to fall back on if things get bad enough 2.90 2.19 2.40 1.85 0.50 0.25 0.59 0.56 
SIB releases pressure or tension 3.33 2.20 1.82 1.35 1.51 0.83 0.34 0.23 
SIB is a way of maintaining my independence 5.36 1.99 4.99 2.08 0.37 0.19 0.71 0.69 
SIB shows that I can cope on my own 5.75 1.78 5.18 2.08 0.56 0.29 0.68 0.64 
SIB is a way of caring for myself 5.45 1.96 4.78 2.16 0.67 0.33 0.61 0.58 
SIB injuries give me a valid reason to take care of myself 5.07 1.96 4.56 2.09 0.51 0.25 0.69 0.67 
SIB injuries give me a legitimate reason to take care of myself 4.99 2.01 4.51 2.12 0.48 0.24 0.71 0.69 
I can only be kind towards myself after I have engaged in SIB 5.32 1.91 4.94 2.11 0.38 0.19 0.75 0.73 
SIB is easier to deal with than emotional pain 2.87 2.13 1.84 1.41 1.02 0.57 0.45 0.35 
Focusing on physical pain takes me mind off my emotional pain 3.07 2.16 1.87 1.43 1.20 0.65 0.47 0.35 
SIB injuries remind me of what I have lived through 3.59 2.17 2.83 1.93 0.76 0.37 0.66 0.62 
SIB injuries improve my appearance 6.48 1.16 6.51 1.18 -0.04 0.03 0.64 0.65 
SIB injuries are comforting 4.65 2.19 3.47 2.19 1.18 0.55 0.57 0.50 
SIB injuries show that my feelings are real 3.86 2.20 3.36 2.08 0.50 0.23 0.72 0.70 
SIB injuries show that my feelings are important 4.53 2.15 4.35 2.18 0.18 0.08 0.78 0.78 
SIB makes me more likeable 6.56 1.02 6.54 1.09 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.60 
SIB benefits people around me 5.99 1.77 6.27 1.43 -0.28 0.18 0.58 0.56 
SIB protects important people in my life 5.62 1.95 5.42 2.05 0.20 0.10 0.62 0.62 
SIB makes people take my problems seriously 4.30 2.24 4.65 2.09 -0.35 0.16 0.73 0.72 
SIB makes people take me seriously 4.79 2.19 5.15 1.98 -0.36 0.17 0.74 0.72 
SIB makes other people feel guilty 4.26 2.21 4.49 2.10 -0.24 0.11 0.75 0.75 
SIB influences other people’s behavior towards me 3.72 2.16 3.68 2.06 0.04 0.02 0.77 0.77 
My SIB persuades other people to change their mind 5.93 1.60 6.02 1.55 -0.09 0.06 0.81 0.81 
SIB makes other people help me 4.73 2.12 4.95 1.99 -0.22 0.11 0.71 0.70 
SIB brings out other people’s true feelings towards me 4.40 2.07 4.43 2.02 -0.03 0.01 0.78 0.78 
SIB makes other people understand how distressed I am 3.85 2.24 4.00 2.09 -0.16 0.07 0.73 0.73 
SIB helps me connect with other people 6.02 1.56 5.94 1.64 0.08 0.05 0.72 0.72 
SIB helps me fit in with other people 6.56 1.04 6.53 1.12 0.03 0.02 0.65 0.65 
SIB helps me get accepted by some people 6.22 1.43 6.24 1.43 -0.02 0.01 0.75 0.75 
Other people accept me because of SIB 6.28 1.29 6.27 1.32 0.01 0.01 0.77 0.77 
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SIB makes me feel part of a group 6.38 1.31 6.29 1.44 0.10 0.07 0.67 0.67 
Other people approve of my SIB 6.54 1.11 6.53 1.09 0.01 0.01 0.61 0.61 
SIB makes people care about me 5.38 1.92 5.49 1.84 -0.10 0.06 0.81 0.81 
SIB stops important people in my life from leaving or 
abandoning me 
5.94 1.69 6.05 1.60 -0.11 0.07 0.72 0.72 
SIB shows other people how distressed I feel 3.62 2.27 3.69 2.20 -0.07 0.03 0.74 0.74 
People who engage in SIB are the only people who understand 
me 
4.50 2.10 4.38 2.11 0.12 0.06 0.86 0.86 
SIB helps me escape from harmful relationships 5.02 2.13 5.26 2.04 -0.23 0.11 0.71 0.71 
SIB is a form of rebellion 5.85 1.78 5.72 1.88 0.13 0.07 0.74 0.74 
SIB shows other people how strong I am 6.16 1.44 6.03 1.60 0.12 0.08 0.69 0.69 
SIB is a way to intentionally upset other people 6.18 1.58 6.27 1.48 -0.10 0.06 0.74 0.74 
SIB helps me get revenge against others 6.12 1.60 6.22 1.52 -0.10 0.06 0.73 0.73 
SIB is a way to get back at people who have hurt me 5.95 1.75 6.07 1.67 -0.12 0.07 0.72 0.72 
SIB shows other people that they were wrong 5.76 1.79 5.91 1.71 -0.15 0.09 0.75 0.75 
SIB makes people sorry for the way they treated me 5.63 1.90 5.89 1.72 -0.26 0.14 0.76 0.75 
SIB prevents me from getting hurt in a worse way 4.46 2.25 4.02 2.24 0.44 0.20 0.51 0.50 
SIB prevents me from hurting other people 4.81 2.27 4.53 2.33 0.28 0.12 0.76 0.75 
SIB helps me avoid doing things that I do not want to do 5.01 2.16 5.12 2.09 -0.11 0.05 0.63 0.63 
SIB stops other people from forcing me to do things 5.46 1.98 5.81 1.71 -0.35 0.19 0.74 0.72 
SIB stops people from hurting me 5.25 2.11 5.61 1.89 -0.36 0.18 0.67 0.65 
Other people leave me alone because of SIB 4.71 2.05 4.63 2.05 0.08 0.04 0.83 0.83 
SIB is the only option I have for solving my problems 4.65 2.15 4.56 2.09 0.09 0.05 0.59 0.59 
SIB is the only way to end unbearable pain 3.26 2.30 3.46 2.12 -0.20 0.09 0.52 0.51 
SIB is the only method of coping that works for me 4.63 2.12 3.75 2.12 0.88 0.42 0.56 0.52 
My problems are so serious that SIB is the only option 4.51 2.22 4.41 2.15 0.09 0.04 0.66 0.66 
There are no alternatives to SIB 5.09 2.06 4.90 2.08 0.19 0.09 0.65 0.65 
SIB is the only way to control upsetting pictures and images that 
go through my mind 
4.49 2.20 3.81 2.18 0.68 0.31 0.67 0.64 
I cannot cope without SIB 4.88 2.06 3.95 2.08 0.93 0.46 0.60 0.54 
I rely on SIB 4.94 2.06 3.86 2.12 1.08 0.52 0.51 0.45 
I cannot function without SIB 5.25 1.90 4.48 2.10 0.77 0.39 0.63 0.59 
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If I stopped SIB, I would be overwhelmed by distressing 
thoughts and feelings 
4.14 2.21 3.19 2.08 0.95 0.44 0.60 0.55 
The distress that I would feel if I stopped SIB would be 
unbearable 
4.65 2.10 3.91 2.14 0.74 0.36 0.62 0.58 
I would lose control without SIB 4.72 2.10 3.85 2.15 0.88 0.41 0.62 0.57 
I need to always have SIB as an option in my life 3.64 2.30 3.12 2.10 0.53 0.24 0.61 0.59 
SIB is the best way to deal with my problems 5.20 2.05 4.87 2.12 0.33 0.16 0.60 0.60 
SIB is better than the alternative options 4.54 2.25 3.71 2.16 0.82 0.38 0.49 0.46 
SIB creates a lot of problems for me 3.30 2.08 3.20 1.92 0.10 0.05 0.59 0.59 
SIB makes my problems worse 3.68 2.04 3.96 1.94 -0.28 0.15 0.57 0.56 
SIB has ruined my life 4.67 2.06 4.69 2.05 -0.02 0.01 0.73 0.73 
SIB makes me more distressed than if I did not engage in SIB 4.26 2.16 4.77 1.99 -0.51 0.25 0.59 0.57 
SIB proves that I am impulsive 4.07 2.25 3.72 2.20 0.35 0.16 0.77 0.76 
SIB has made me crazy 4.69 2.15 4.68 2.11 0.01 0.00 0.81 0.81 
SIB is abnormal or bad 3.79 2.19 3.73 2.12 0.06 0.03 0.82 0.82 
The fact that I engage in SIB makes me a bad person 4.53 2.28 4.49 2.30 0.04 0.02 0.82 0.82 
My life would be better without SIB 2.86 2.00 2.89 1.89 -0.03 0.02 0.63 0.63 
SIB is wrong 3.94 2.21 3.99 2.15 -0.05 0.02 0.78 0.78 
SIB is a private act 1.91 1.69 1.37 0.97 0.54 0.39 0.36 0.29 
SIB is destructive 2.20 1.81 2.23 1.64 -0.03 0.02 0.54 0.54 
SIB is physically painful 2.96 1.99 2.51 1.73 0.45 0.24 0.55 0.53 
SIB is a bad option 2.88 2.03 3.09 1.95 -0.21 0.11 0.60 0.60 
SIB brings my most important beliefs into question 3.99 2.18 4.30 2.05 -0.31 0.15 0.78 0.77 
Alternatives to SIB are better than SIB 3.19 2.08 3.41 2.00 -0.22 0.11 0.62 0.62 
There are alternatives to SIB 2.95 2.01 2.80 1.82 0.14 0.07 0.66 0.66 
There are solutions to my problems other than SIB 3.09 2.06 2.92 1.89 0.17 0.09 0.65 0.64 
I hate taking care of my SIB injuries 3.82 2.03 3.82 2.09 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.69 
I hate my SIB injuries 3.61 2.09 3.38 2.13 0.23 0.11 0.68 0.68 
SIB scars or injuries are unattractive 3.13 2.09 2.75 1.98 0.38 0.19 0.75 0.74 
SIB makes me different to other people 3.15 1.97 2.97 1.82 0.18 0.10 0.77 0.77 
SIB damages important relationships in my life 2.96 2.06 2.97 1.94 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.68 
SIB upsets or hurts the people I care about 2.25 1.84 2.17 1.61 0.07 0.04 0.60 0.59 
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SIB makes me a social outcast 3.68 2.06 3.55 2.01 0.13 0.07 0.81 0.81 
I have to hide my SIB 2.23 1.78 1.84 1.43 0.40 0.25 0.44 0.42 
I think less of someone when I learn that they engage in SIB 6.29 1.38 6.22 1.52 0.07 0.05 0.70 0.70 
SIB creates a barrier between myself and others 2.94 1.93 2.75 1.75 0.19 0.11 0.71 0.70 
SIB creates a boundary between myself and others 3.05 1.96 2.80 1.77 0.25 0.13 0.71 0.70 
I cannot talk to other people about my SIB 2.48 1.83 2.35 1.61 0.13 0.08 0.64 0.63 
People exclude me because of my SIB 4.24 2.05 4.18 2.03 0.06 0.03 0.83 0.83 
People reject me because of my SIB 3.85 2.05 3.77 2.00 0.08 0.04 0.82 0.82 
People punish my SIB 4.25 2.11 4.13 2.08 0.12 0.06 0.75 0.75 
People think that my SIB is selfish 2.64 1.88 2.80 1.79 -0.16 0.09 0.65 0.65 
People think less of me when they discover my SIB 3.13 1.91 2.85 1.74 0.28 0.15 0.76 0.74 
People do not understand my SIB 2.23 1.67 1.94 1.32 0.29 0.20 0.55 0.53 
People try to stop my SIB 2.79 2.03 2.87 1.94 -0.08 0.04 0.64 0.64 
People judge and criticise my SIB 2.88 1.91 2.65 1.72 0.22 0.13 0.74 0.73 
SIB leads to unwanted attention from other people 3.04 1.99 2.70 1.81 0.34 0.18 0.63 0.62 
Other people are not interested in my SIB 3.57 1.89 3.27 1.73 0.29 0.17 0.75 0.74 
People think that my SIB is bad or wrong 2.27 1.74 2.00 1.39 0.26 0.17 0.61 0.59 
People think that my SIB is abnormal 2.56 1.78 2.25 1.52 0.31 0.19 0.66 0.64 
SIB controls me 5.24 1.99 4.76 2.10 0.48 0.23 0.65 0.63 
SIB controls my life 5.37 1.94 5.00 2.05 0.38 0.19 0.68 0.66 
I need to regularly engage in SIB 5.56 1.79 4.43 2.12 1.13 0.58 0.51 0.43 
SIB is an addiction 4.54 2.21 3.03 2.12 1.52 0.72 0.52 0.42 
I am addicted to SIB 5.47 1.93 4.21 2.29 1.27 0.60 0.53 0.44 
My SIB will get worse 4.44 2.07 4.23 2.02 0.21 0.11 0.75 0.74 
SIB has taken over my life 5.20 2.03 4.72 2.14 0.49 0.23 0.62 0.61 
I cannot control my SIB 4.80 2.09 4.30 2.08 0.50 0.25 0.64 0.63 
I cannot stop SIB 4.87 2.06 4.08 2.07 0.78 0.38 0.58 0.54 
I am scared that I will injure myself more severely than I intend 4.27 2.34 3.54 2.25 0.73 0.33 0.56 0.53 
I have no control over how I injure myself 5.48 1.86 5.31 1.89 0.17 0.09 0.70 0.70 
I have very little influence over my SIB 4.82 2.04 4.50 2.02 0.33 0.17 0.68 0.68 
Thoughts and urges to engage in SIB are overwhelming 3.05 2.11 2.49 1.75 0.56 0.29 0.58 0.55 
I feel on edge if I don't engage in SIB 4.86 2.05 3.61 2.11 1.25 0.62 0.54 0.46 
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I feel compelled to engage in SIB if I notice that my injuries are 
beginning to heal 
5.40 1.92 4.33 2.33 1.07 0.50 0.62 0.54 
Urges to engage in SIB cannot be resisted 4.60 2.07 3.94 2.06 0.66 0.33 0.62 0.59 
I’m not strong enough to stop SIB 4.51 2.15 3.98 2.15 0.53 0.25 0.67 0.65 
I give myself permission to engage in SIB 4.27 2.21 3.29 2.08 0.98 0.47 0.54 0.49 
I vow that ‘This will be the last time I engage in SIB’ 4.22 2.40 4.43 2.32 -0.21 0.09 0.65 0.65 
I think things that sabotage my efforts to avoid SIB 4.09 2.02 3.78 2.01 0.30 0.15 0.68 0.67 
I think things that make SIB more likely to happen 3.82 2.10 3.51 2.09 0.32 0.15 0.75 0.75 
I have good reasons for SIB 3.33 2.19 2.94 1.99 0.39 0.19 0.68 0.66 
I encourage myself to engage in SIB 5.41 1.94 5.10 2.02 0.31 0.16 0.64 0.64 
I tell myself that I can engage in SIB if I do something to make 
up for it afterwards 
6.00 1.56 5.67 1.79 0.33 0.20 0.68 0.66 
It’s acceptable to engage in SIB if I do it in a particular way 5.00 2.04 4.17 2.15 0.83 0.40 0.59 0.55 
SIB is more acceptable if I have opportunity to do it 5.01 1.95 4.61 2.01 0.40 0.21 0.68 0.67 
I try not to think about the disadvantages of SIB 3.99 2.25 3.48 2.11 0.51 0.23 0.63 0.61 
I ignore problems associated with SIB 4.01 2.12 3.56 2.04 0.45 0.22 0.70 0.69 
I under-estimate the consequences of SIB 3.88 2.24 3.56 2.08 0.32 0.15 0.60 0.59 
I try to ignore the physical pain that comes with SIB 3.99 2.27 4.10 2.34 -0.10 0.05 0.64 0.64 
I tell myself that I deserve the benefits of SIB 4.52 2.21 4.29 2.22 0.23 0.10 0.68 0.68 
I find ways to justify SIB to myself 3.71 2.24 3.22 2.13 0.49 0.23 0.63 0.61 
It’s acceptable to engage in SIB if I’m really upset 4.45 2.17 3.49 2.11 0.96 0.45 0.62 0.57 
The benefits of SIB are worth the risks 4.48 2.26 3.53 2.09 0.95 0.45 0.51 0.47 
I think that SIB won’t be dangerous as long as I am careful 5.11 2.14 3.10 2.10 2.01 0.95 0.37 0.26 
SIB is a problem for some people but it won’t be for me 5.02 1.98 4.75 2.08 0.26 0.13 0.68 0.67 
SIB is more acceptable if I do something to make up for it 
afterwards 
5.82 1.61 5.61 1.73 0.21 0.13 0.73 0.73 
I allow myself to delay when I’ll engage in SIB, knowing that I 
will do it later 
4.15 2.12 3.74 2.10 0.41 0.20 0.50 0.50 
Average values 4.44 2.02 4.02 1.94 0.42 0.24 0.64 0.61 
Note: ICC = Single Measure Two-Way Mixed Absolute Agreement Intraclass Correlation Coefficient; Shrout & Fleiss (1979); SIB = 
self-injurious behavior.  
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4.5. Preliminary Item Pool Analyses: Sample 1 
The goal at this point was to evaluate the nature and quality of the items in our two 
initial item pools and to identify potentially interesting SICs that might be underrepresented. 
4.5.1.  Results 
We began by removing one item (“SIB is comforting”) that had inadvertently been 
included in the item pool twice. 12 strongly correlated items were deleted from the NSSI item 
pool and 3 strongly correlated items were deleted from the SA item pool. PAs were then 
conducted and indicated 22 factors for NSSI and 18 factors for SA. At this stage, the 11 Anti-
suicide items were analysed separately because, in contrast to the rest of the item pool, these 
items had referred to “NSSI” rather than “SIB.” A PA indicated 3 factors. We note, however, 
that PAs of NSSI or SA items which included the Anti-suicide items produced very similar, 
although less interpretable, factor structures. 
Cognitions about Attempting Suicide. An EFA suggested the existence of 11 
potentially meaningful factors. These were tentatively labelled Dependence (26 items; e.g., “I 
would lose control without SIB”), Escape (23 items; e.g., “SIB stops negative or distressing 
thoughts”), Stigma (22 items; e.g., “People judge and criticise my SIB”), Problematic (20 
items; e.g., “SIB is wrong”), Belonging (10 items; e.g., “SIB helps me fit in with other 
people”), Eliciting help (11 items; e.g., “SIB makes people take my problems seriously”), 
Revenge (11 items; e.g., “SIB is a way to get back at people who have hurt me”), Self-
validation (14 items; e.g., “SIB injuries give me a legitimate reason to take care of myself”), 
Valued behavior (15 items; e.g., “SIB makes me a better person”), and Facilitating 
cognitions (11 items; e.g., “SIB is more acceptable if I do something to make up for it 
afterwards”). One factor, tentatively labelled Self-punishment (4 items; e.g., “I engage in SIB 
to punish myself”), appeared to be underrepresented in our initial SA item pool. That is, 
several items correlated together reasonably strongly to form what appeared to be a 
meaningful theme. Five additional items were generated (forming an 8-item HIC) to explore 
whether doing so would allow a meaningful factor to emerge. 
Cognitions about Nonsuicidal Self-Injury.  An EFA suggested the existence of 16 
potentially meaningful factors. These were very tentatively labelled Dependence (28 items; 
e.g., “I cannot cope without SIB”), Release (13 items; e.g., “SIB provides relief from 
upsetting thoughts or feelings”), Stigma (17 items; e.g., “People judge and criticise my SIB”), 
Problematic (22 items; e.g., “I hate my SIB injuries”), Eliciting help (10 items; e.g., “SIB 
makes people take my problems seriously”), Imagery change (5 items; e.g., “SIB interrupts 
images or scenes that run through my mind”), Revenge (11 items; e.g., “SIB helps me get 
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revenge against others”), Facilitating cognitions (15 items; e.g., “SIB is more acceptable if I 
do something to make up for it afterwards”), Self-validation (11 items; e.g., “SIB injuries 
give me a legitimate reason to take care of myself”), Belonging (7 items; e.g., “SIB helps me 
fit in with other people”).  
Five factors appeared to be underrepresented in our initial NSSI item pool. These 
were tentatively labelled, Enjoyable (6 items; e.g., “SIB is exciting”), Anti-dissociation (5 
items; e.g., “SIB stops me feeling numb”), Escape (6 items; e.g., “SIB helps me escape from 
my problems”), Backup plan (6 items; e.g., “I keep SIB as an option in case my problems get 
worse”), and Self-punishment (5 items; e.g., “I engage in SIB to punish myself”). Additional 
items were generated for each of these potential factors to explore whether doing so would 
allow corresponding factors to emerge. 
4.5.2. Discussion 
These results demonstrated that it is possible to identify specific, differentiable 
components of SICs. However, an obvious limitation arises from the possibility that the 
structural analyses may have been confounded by the design or by the administration of a 
large item pool (214 items were completed twice). To address this, we dropped the two-
column methodology, rephrased items to refer to SA or NSSI, and administered fewer items.   
4.6. Preliminary Item Pool Analyses: Sample 2 
This study aimed to explore the generalisability of the factor structure obtained using 
Sample 1 and to examine whether adding new items encouraged additional factors to clearly 
emerge. In total, 62 SA items and 118 NSSI items (including all the Anti-suicide items) were 
administered. 
4.6.1. Results 
PAs indicated 8 SA factors and 13 NSSI factors.  
Cognitions about Attempting Suicide. An EFA suggested the existence of 6 
potentially meaningful factors, which were tentatively labelled Belonging (e.g., “Attempting 
suicide helps me fit in with other people”), Dependence (e.g., “Attempting suicide is the only 
option I have for solving my problems”), Interpersonal influence (e.g., “Attempting suicide 
makes people take my problems seriously”), Self-punishment (e.g., “Attempting suicide is an 
expression of my self-hatred”), Problematic (e.g., “Attempting suicide makes my problems 
worse”) and Escape (e.g., “Attempting suicide changes the way that I am thinking”).  
Cognitions about Nonsuicidal Self-Injury. An EFA suggested the existence of 12 
potentially meaningful factors, which were tentatively labelled Escape (e.g., “NSSI stops my 
emotional pain”), Anti-suicide (e.g., “NSSI is a compromise instead of killing myself”), 
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Enjoyable (e.g., “NSSI is enjoyable”), Interpersonal influence (e.g., “NSSI makes people 
take my problems seriously”), Backup plan (e.g., “I keep NSSI as an option in case my 
problems get worse”), Anti-dissociation (e.g., “NSSI shocks my body so I begin feeling 
again”), Self-punishment (e.g., “I engage in NSSI because I deserve to suffer”), Self-
validation (e.g., “NSSI makes me a better person”), Problematic (e.g., “NSSI makes my 
problems worse”), Stigma (e.g., “People judge and criticise my NSSI”), Imagery change 
(e.g., “NSSI interrupts images or scenes that run through my mind”),and Belonging (e.g., 
“NSSI helps me fit in with other people”).  
4.6.2. Discussion 
The factor structure for SA and NSSI observed in Sample 1 generally replicated in 
Sample 2, although fewer factors emerged and several of the factors were not particularly 
clearly defined (having no obvious single theme). Taken together, the structural results 
observed in Samples 1 and 2 did not provide a definitive indication of the factor structure of 
cognitions about SA or cognitions about NSSI. We addressed this issue by collecting 
additional independent samples and administering most of the items that had been 
administered to Sample 1 as well as the items that had been generated for Sample 2, ensuring 
that multiple markers (at least 6 items so as to form a HIC; Hogan, 1983) were included for 
all potential factors.  
4.7. Development of the Final Scales: Samples 3, 4, and 5 
Three additional samples were collected and each was subjected to a separate EFA 
(see Tables 3 and 4 and Supplementary material for Chapter 4). The same factor structure 
emerged across Samples 3, 4, and 5, indicating that robust and replicable factor structures 
characterize SA and NSSI cognitions. Table 5 presents sample items and summarizes the 
theme conveyed by each subscale that formed the final version of the SABS and NSIBS. 
Cognitions about Attempting Suicide. 7 clearly interpretable and differentiated 
factors emerged across Samples 3-5 to characterize SA cognitions. These were labelled: 
Belonging, Stigma, Self-punishment, Eliciting help, Escape, Dependence, and Revenge. 
Comparing the final factor structure (Table 3) to that obtained in the early stages of scale 
development, six of the seven SABS factors were apparent in Sample 1 (when items has 
referred to “SIB”). Self-punishment had few items and was only a potential factor at that 
stage. Four of the seven SABS factors were apparent in Sample 2 (Belonging, Self-
punishment, Escape, Dependence). The Stigma factor was not apparent in Sample 2 and the 
Eliciting help and Revenge factors merged to form an Interpersonal influence factor.  
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Cognitions about Nonsuicidal Self-Injury. 10 clearly interpretable and 
differentiated factors emerged across Samples 3-5 to characterize NSSI cognitions. These 
were labelled: Escape, Self-punishment, Anti-dissociation, Interpersonal influence, Stigma, 
Dependence, Problematic, Anti-suicide, Enjoyable, and Belonging. One caveat to the NSSI 
structural results is that in Sample 4, the Interpersonal influence and Belonging factors 
merged, presumably because the items were so closely themed/correlated. Comparing the 
final factor structure (Table 4) to that obtained in the early stages of scale development, five 
of the ten SABS factors (Dependence, Stigma, Problematic, Belonging, Enjoyable) were 
apparent in Sample 1 (when items has referred to “SIB”). Nine of the ten NSIBS factors were 
apparent in Sample 2 (Dependence was not apparent).  
Retaining Items for the Finished SABS and NSIBS. To enhance the usability of the 
SABS and NSIBS in clinical practice (e.g., individuals who engage in SIB are often very 
distressed and often have impaired cognition and comorbid psychological problems), we only 
retained a subset of items from each factor. We retained a minimum of 3 items per factor 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) and selected items that tapped different facets of each construct, 
ensuring that each subscale had at least a good level of internal consistency (α≥.8; Clark & 
Watson, 1995; Nunnally 1978; see Part II). We expected that a briefer measure would reduce 
fatigue and response biases and be most appropriate for this population. Tables 3 and 4 
present the final obtained factor structures of the SABS and NSIBS; the underlined items 
denote the items that we retained and which are used in the Part II analyses.  
Facilitating Cognitions. Items designed to measure facilitating cognitions were 
administered to Samples 1-3 in an attempt to encourage a commensurate factor to emerge. 
However, a commensurate factor did not emerge for either SA or NSSI across our structural 
analyses. The items designed to measure facilitating cognitions loaded onto a variety of 
factors and often cross-loaded. These items were therefore omitted from Samples 4 and 5 and 
do not feature in the final versions of the SABS or NSIBS8. 
  
                                                          
8 During the development of the SABS and NSIBS, we also explored whether it would be informative to include 
items tapping how SA and NSSI impair functioning or cause clinical significant distress. However, these items 
performed poorly in our structural analyses. They were omitted from the SABS and NSIBS (see Supplementary 
material for Chapter 5). 
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Table 3 Promax-rotated Loadings of Cognitions about Attempting Suicide in Sample 5 
 Factor loadings 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Belonging         
Attempting suicide helps me fit in with other people .850 .038 .042 -.085 -.082 .059 .073 
Attempting suicide helps me get accepted by some people .848 .052 .026 .110 -.018 -.048 -.070 
Attempting suicide makes me feel part of a group .794 -.011 .042 -.027 -.085 .060 .048 
Attempting suicide helps me connect with other people .771 .015 -.048 .125 .061 .003 -.042 
Other people accept me because of my suicide attempt(s) .701 .028 .036 -.026 .121 -.083 .007 
2. Stigma        
People think that my suicide attempt(s) are selfish .019 .863 -.057 .007 .012 .038 .008 
People judge and criticise my suicide attempt(s) .055 .800 .009 -.034 -.002 .106 -.034 
People think that my suicide attempt(s) are abnormal .007 .789 -.040 .043 .036 -.040 .002 
People punish my suicide attempt(s) .076 .710 .015 -.159 -.093 .119 .173 
Attempting suicide damages important relationships in my life -.059 .688 .091 .021 .022 -.114 .083 
Attempting suicide leads to unwanted attention from other people .034 .595 .016 .099 .090 -.059 -.127 
3. Self-punishment        
I attempt suicide because I deserve to suffer .006 -.021 1.010 -.038 -.015 -.038 -.045 
I attempt suicide to punish myself .008 .034 .925 -.152 .056 -.111 .096 
I deserve suicide attempt scars and injuries .125 .055 .800 .002 -.045 .012 -.162 
I attempt suicide to show how much I hate myself -.004 -.068 .728 .135 .036 .031 .020 
I attempt suicide because I am worthless and unlovable -.073 .168 .566 .141 -.092 .210 -.080 
Attempting suicide is a way to express anger or self-criticism -.100 .014 .402 .067 .180 -.035 .319 
4. Eliciting help        
Attempting suicide makes people take my problems seriously .003 .003 -.125 .899 .050 -.023 -.025 
Attempting suicide makes other people help me .077 -.043 .009 .877 -.071 .020 -.079 
Attempting suicide makes other people understand how distressed I am -.060 .045 .021 .742 .005 -.034 .124 
Attempting suicide shows other people how distressed I feel -.057 .115 .112 .697 -.040 .030 .024 
Attempting suicide makes people care about me .199 -.092 .012 .609 .015 -.042 .101 
5. Escape        
Attempting suicide changes the way that I am thinking .039 .094 -.020 -.078 .885 -.229 -.010 
Attempting suicide clears my mind .061 -.031 .048 -.087 .775 .061 -.048 
Attempting suicide changes my thoughts so the problems in my life do not seem as bad .001 -.038 -.066 .078 .762 -.059 .078 
Attempting suicide helps me forget my problems .031 -.089 .056 .061 .666 .138 -.064 
Attempting suicide stops upsetting thoughts going round and round in my mind -.145 .104 -.039 .069 .607 .193 -.085 
Attempting suicide temporarily stops me from feeling anything -.010 .182 .127 .016 .484 .087 -.112 
6. Dependence        
Attempting suicide is the only option I have for solving my problems -.099 .110 -.024 .091 -.138 .830 -.068 
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Attempting suicide is the only method of coping that works for me .050 .020 -.030 -.069 .043 .786 -.068 
My life would be worse without suicide attempts .252 -.150 .118 -.042 .039 .447 .035 
Attempting suicide makes my life better .263 -.092 -.126 -.035 .219 .432 .081 
Attempting suicide is the only thing I've got that’s just mine -.001 -.042 .068 -.101 .124 .431 .292 
Attempting suicide is the only way to control upsetting pictures and images that go through my mind -.114 .069 .089 -.009 .301 .428 .000 
7. Revenge         
Attempting suicide is a way to get back at people who have hurt me -.020 -.031 .021 .025 -.114 .036 .874 
Attempting suicide is a way to intentionally upset other people .147 .098 -.096 -.018 -.027 -.097 .674 
Attempting suicide shows other people that they were wrong .075 -.021 -.035 .176 -.038 .125 .580 
Attempting suicide is a form of rebellion .188 .034 -.031 .042 .109 -.149 .514 
Attempting suicide stops other people from forcing me to do things .074 .022 .013 .205 .117 .066 .287 
Note. The highest factor loading for each item is highlighted. Underlined items form the final version of the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale 
(SABS) 
 
  
118 
 
Table 4 Promax-rotated Loadings of Cognitions about Nonsuicidal Self-Injury (NSSI) in Sample 5 
 Factor loadings 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Escape           
NSSI helps me escape negative emotions .856 -.053 -.003 -.068 -.073 .012 .038 .045 -.025 .029 
NSSI provides relief from upsetting thoughts or feelings .828 .005 -.014 -.101 .055 -.016 .028 -.033 -.054 .045 
NSSI makes me feel less upset .655 -.090 .051 .024 .024 -.003 -.060 .030 .116 -.005 
NSSI reduces tension and stress .618 -.061 -.067 .044 -.080 .056 .027 .026 .295 -.089 
NSSI helps me escape feeling defeated or helpless .577 .061 .106 .051 -.014 -.057 -.009 .047 .039 .028 
NSSI helps me escape from my problems .567 .037 .014 .046 .010 .159 .035 -.009 .059 -.001 
NSSI temporarily stops me from feeling anything .464 .049 -.067 -.054 .096 .060 .083 -.024 -.007 .154 
NSSI stops me thinking about upsetting pictures and images .442 .095 .078 .073 .174 .086 -.093 -.058 -.113 -.012 
2. Self-punishment           
I engage in NSSI because I deserve to suffer -.107 .848 .005 -.058 .041 .092 -.041 .009 .004 .026 
I use NSSI to punish myself -.021 .839 .031 -.016 -.032 .019 .041 -.053 -.021 -.020 
NSSI is an expression of my self-hatred .078 .836 -.030 .039 -.046 -.072 .076 -.013 -.025 .006 
I engage in NSSI to show how much I hate myself -.043 .834 -.022 .088 -.027 -.071 .018 .031 .050 .006 
I engage in NSSI because I am worthless and unlovable .009 .726 .016 -.034 .084 .070 -.061 .046 -.071 -.018 
I deserve NSSI scars and injuries -.120 .614 .002 -.146 .033 .207 -.086 .063 .110 .113 
NSSI is a way to express anger or self-criticism .258 .567 .017 .136 -.055 -.095 .130 -.059 .026 -.121 
3. Anti-dissociation           
NSSI stops me feeling numb .001 .053 .913 -.020 -.056 -.020 .000 -.057 -.018 .006 
NSSI is a way to feel something when I otherwise feel nothing -.079 .076 .845 -.059 -.002 -.042 -.034 .069 .015 .034 
NSSI stops me feeling detached from myself .048 -.054 .826 .025 -.016 .007 .007 .006 -.101 .025 
NSSI takes me out of a detached state .054 -.105 .818 .039 -.065 .099 .064 -.005 -.055 -.061 
NSSI shocks my body so I begin feeling again .026 .017 .757 .037 .045 -.022 -.002 -.007 .011 -.008 
NSSI makes me feel “real” or alive .014 .042 .634 -.025 .037 -.054 -.040 .023 .185 -.016 
4. Interpersonal influence           
NSSI is a way to intentionally upset other people -.066 -.007 -.117 .720 .066 .016 -.031 .019 .010 -.023 
NSSI makes people sorry for the way they treated me .007 -.051 -.003 .719 .019 .005 -.005 .035 -.004 .034 
NSSI makes people care about me -.002 .032 .047 .711 -.023 -.015 -.039 .030 .024 .033 
NSSI makes people take my problems seriously .004 .054 .120 .691 .018 -.030 .009 -.005 -.033 -.104 
My NSSI persuades other people to change their mind .013 -.021 -.048 .649 -.008 .042 .057 -.043 .015 .136 
NSSI stops important people in my life from leaving or abandoning me -.047 .013 .009 .647 -.016 .155 .028 -.042 -.006 .046 
5. Stigma           
People reject me because of my NSSI -.058 -.012 -.026 .044 .833 .063 -.006 -.065 -.076 .012 
People judge and criticise my NSSI .032 -.042 -.052 .020 .833 -.096 .022 .064 .034 -.035 
People punish my NSSI -.030 .038 -.008 .049 .787 .036 -.117 -.090 -.058 .040 
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People think that my NSSI is selfish .021 -.001 .016 -.017 .787 -.043 .014 .030 -.047 .038 
People think that my NSSI is abnormal .127 -.019 -.029 -.026 .587 -.073 .122 .030 .081 -.090 
People do not understand my NSSI .143 .117 .059 -.081 .462 -.022 .049 .074 .031 -.054 
6. Dependence           
I cannot cope without NSSI .034 -.002 -.013 -.001 -.038 .909 -.058 -.029 -.042 -.006 
NSSI is the only method of coping that works for me .156 -.046 .062 .018 -.014 .772 -.077 .006 -.054 -.045 
My NSSI will get worse -.084 .086 -.011 .024 -.054 .704 .107 .013 -.025 .025 
My problems are so serious that NSSI is the only option .131 -.038 .008 .111 .074 .590 -.047 .091 -.088 -.021 
I need to always have NSSI as an option in my life .045 .071 -.042 .032 .004 .548 -.147 .085 .163 -.059 
I feel on edge if I don't engage in NSSI .156 .091 -.065 -.012 .024 .415 .044 -.046 .236 -.018 
7. Problematic           
NSSI makes my problems worse -.200 .005 .008 .041 .002 -.071 .772 .022 .161 -.012 
My life would be better without NSSI .197 .051 -.041 .002 -.059 -.269 .715 .011 -.142 .019 
NSSI is destructive .074 .021 -.022 .049 .033 -.123 .601 .054 .019 -.021 
NSSI creates a lot of problems for me -.155 -.072 .033 -.030 .236 .171 .584 -.032 .137 -.034 
I hate my NSSI injuries .151 .043 .057 -.054 -.107 .167 .563 -.036 -.276 .028 
NSSI has ruined my life -.090 -.025 .013 -.043 .048 .410 .547 -.014 -.056 .060 
8. Anti-suicide           
NSSI is a compromise instead of killing myself -.032 -.011 -.042 .006 -.056 .058 .074 .888 .013 -.007 
NSSI is a replacement for suicidal behavior .015 .019 .019 -.044 -.051 -.004 -.006 .861 -.013 .035 
I deliberately use NSSI to avoid acting on suicidal thoughts .002 -.015 .052 -.044 .093 .060 -.040 .794 -.067 .028 
NSSI lets me express my suicidal thoughts without risking death .066 .036 -.005 .100 -.009 -.043 .001 .745 .010 -.036 
9. Enjoyable           
NSSI is enjoyable .057 .037 -.106 .010 -.028 -.059 -.060 .021 .808 -.060 
NSSI is satisfying .285 .043 -.037 -.059 -.090 .005 .042 -.014 .640 -.048 
NSSI is uplifting .224 -.056 .002 -.047 -.031 .078 -.102 -.082 .564 .101 
NSSI leaves me feeling energized .101 -.015 .176 .045 .058 -.052 -.076 -.050 .504 .058 
NSSI makes me less bored -.104 .017 .031 .210 -.049 -.030 .063 .030 .488 .111 
NSSI gives me a “high” that feels like a drug high .028 -.062 .213 -.071 .120 .037 .105 -.012 .453 .022 
10. Belonging            
NSSI helps me fit in with other people .011 .031 .001 .030 -.006 -.013 -.033 .008 -.006 .841 
NSSI helps me get accepted by some people .040 .053 -.036 .116 .025 -.081 .019 -.008 .022 .751 
NSSI makes me more likeable .034 -.074 .000 .079 -.089 .049 .041 .068 .060 .640 
Other people accept me because of NSSI .003 .020 .009 .110 -.020 .014 .001 -.045 -.043 .620 
NSSI helps me connect with other people .038 -.051 .026 .190 .100 -.062 -.009 .010 .005 .594 
Note. The highest factor loading for each item is highlighted. Underlined items form the final version of the Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs 
Scale (NSIBS). 
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Table 5 Summary of the Themes Conveyed by the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) and Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS) 
Subscales 
  Perceptions about how SA 
or NSSI relate to oneself or 
other people 
 
Scale/Subscale Sample items Description 
SABS   
Self-punishment I attempt suicide because I 
deserve to suffer 
I attempt suicide because I am 
worthless and unlovable 
Individual 
Perceptions that attempting suicide is a means to punish oneself for being 
fundamentally flawed, bad, and unlovable 
Escape Attempting suicide stops 
upsetting thoughts going 
round and round in my mind 
Attempting suicide 
temporarily stops me from 
feeling anything 
Individual 
Perceptions that attempting suicide provides relief, for a while, from intolerable 
cognitive and emotional experiences (perceptions, perseverative thoughts, distress) 
Dependence Attempting suicide is the only 
option I have for solving my 
problems 
Attempting suicide is the only 
thing I've got that’s just mine 
Individual 
Perceptions that attempting suicide is the only option for self-regulation; that there are 
no alternative options; that attempting suicide provides important advantages; and a 
(counterintuitive) perception that suicide attempts are not necessarily/always expected 
to result in death 
Belonging Attempting suicide helps me 
fit in with other people 
Attempting suicide helps me 
get accepted by some people 
Interpersonal 
Perceptions that attempting suicide leads to meaningful emotional connections and 
support from other people 
Stigma People think that my suicide 
attempt(s) are selfish 
Attempting suicide damages 
important relationships in my 
life 
Interpersonal 
Perceptions that other people do not respond empathically to suicide attempts and 
instead judge, criticise, or punish these behaviors 
Eliciting help Attempting suicide makes 
other people help me 
Attempting suicide shows 
other people how distressed I 
feel 
Interpersonal 
Perceptions that attempting suicide forces or powerfully elicits empathy, validation, 
and meaningful support from other people. The motivation is to elicit help from others 
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Revenge Attempting suicide is a way to 
intentionally upset other 
people 
Attempting suicide shows 
other people that they were 
wrong 
Interpersonal 
Perceptions that attempting suicide is a means to rebel, prove others wrong, or obtain 
revenge for mistreatment. The motivation is to emotionally hurt others 
NSIBS   
Self-punishment I engage in NSSI because I 
deserve to suffer 
I engage in NSSI because I 
am worthless and unlovable 
Individual 
Perceptions that NSSI is a means to punish oneself for being fundamentally flawed, 
bad, and unlovable 
Escape NSSI helps me escape 
negative emotions 
NSSI helps me escape from 
my problems 
Individual Perceptions that NSSI provides an escape from distressing feelings and perceptions 
Dependence My NSSI will get worse 
My problems are so serious 
that NSSI is the only option 
Individual 
Perceptions that NSSI is the only and best option for self-regulation; that there are no 
alternative options; and of reliance on NSSI 
Anti-
dissociation 
NSSI stops me feeling numb 
NSSI makes me feel “real” or 
alive 
 
Individual Perceptions that NSSI counters dissociation and emotional numbness 
Problematic  NSSI creates a lot of problems 
for me 
I hate my NSSI injuries 
Individual 
Perceptions that NSSI is very counter-productive and has resulted in a range of 
negative consequences 
Anti-suicide NSSI is a compromise instead 
of killing myself 
I deliberately use NSSI to 
avoid acting on suicidal 
thoughts 
Individual 
Perceptions that NSSI is a useful and possible means of avoiding acting on suicidal 
thoughts 
Enjoyable NSSI is enjoyable 
NSSI is uplifting 
Individual Perceptions that NSSI is affectively pleasant and positive 
Belonging  NSSI helps me fit in with 
other people 
NSSI helps me connect with 
other people 
Interpersonal 
Perceptions that NSSI leads to meaningful emotional connections and support from 
other people 
Stigma People judge and criticise my 
NSSI 
Interpersonal 
Perceptions that other people do not respond empathically to NSSI and instead judge, 
criticise, or punish it 
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People do not understand my 
NSSI 
Interpersonal 
influence 
NSSI makes people sorry for 
the way they treated me 
NSSI makes people take my 
problems seriously 
Interpersonal 
Perceptions that NSSI is a means to rebel and prove others wrong, and a means to elicit 
meaningful support and care from others. It has items that appear in the SABS Eliciting 
help and Revenge factors 
Note. NSSI = Nonsuicidal self-injury 
 
123 
 
4.8. Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Moving from EFA to Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is best practice in scale 
development because EFA is exploratory and does not test specific hypotheses, control for 
method bias, or account for the fact that some items are purer manifestations of latent 
variables than other items (different items have different factor loadings) (Brown, 2015). 
Conducting EFA and CFA on independent samples is also important because EFA may fit 
particular idiosyncrasies (e.g., random error) of one dataset but not generalise to other 
datasets (Brown, 2015). All CFAs were conducted using the R lavaan package, version 0.5-
23.1097 (Rosseel, 2012).  
Testing Competing Measurement Models for the SABS and NSIBS 
Several potential CFA models were tested in relation to the SABS and NSIBS. These 
tested the generalizability of the EFA results and explored different conceptualizations of the 
EFA factor structures. We first tested the results of the EFAs. We specified 7 correlated 
factors for the SABS and 10 correlated factors for the NSIBS because these factor structures 
had consistently emerged in EFAs of Samples 3, 4, and 5. A correlated factors model allows 
the strength of correlations between factors to vary. We also examined a 9 factor model for 
the NSIBS whereby the items that make up the Interpersonal influence and Belonging factors 
were merged to form one factor. This model was specified because in Sample 4, these factors 
merged. Comparing a 9-factor model against a 10-factor model allowed us to test whether the 
Interpersonal influence and Belonging factors are best understood as two separate closely 
related factors or one single factor.  
Three other potential measurement models were also tested for the items and factors 
that make up the SABS and (separately) the NSIBS. First, a bifactor model was examined in 
which all scale items load on a single general factor and, separately, the items that make up 
each subscale load on corresponding specific factors. The general and specific factors are 
uncorrelated and the specific factors are uncorrelated. In this model, the general factor 
accounts for whatever correlations are observed between factors. However, if factor 
correlations are unequal, the general factor is not able to equally account for the correlation 
between specific factors (Morgan, Hodge, Wells & Watkins, 2015). A bifactor model was 
specified for the SABS and separately for the NSIBS.  
Next, a second-order model was examined in which specific factors (7 in the case of 
the SABS; 10 in the case of the NSIBS) load on a general second-order that might be thought 
of as representing beliefs about SA or NSSI. Last, an additional second-order model was 
examined which specified two general second-order factors representing self versus others. 
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This model was specified to account for the fact that some SABS and NSIBS subscales 
measure cognitions in relation to how SA and NSSI impact oneself whilst other subscales 
measure cognitions in relation to how SA and NSSI impact other people. Specifically, the 
SABS contains three factors that measure beliefs about how SA relate to oneself (Self-
punishment, Escape, Dependence; eg., “I attempt suicide because I am worthless and 
unlovable”) and four factors that measure beliefs about how SA relates to other people 
(Belonging, Stigma, Eliciting help, Revenge; e.g., “Attempting suicide shows other people 
how distressed I feel”). The NSIBS contains seven factors that measure beliefs about how 
NSSI relate to oneself (Self-punishment, Escape, Dependence, Anti-dissociation, 
Problematic, Anti-suicide, Enjoyable; eg., “NSSI helps me escape negative emotions”) and 
three factors that measure beliefs about how NSSI relates to other people (Belonging, Stigma, 
Interpersonal influence; e.g., “NSSI makes people take my problems seriously”).  
Testing Whether the SABS and NSIBS can be Considered Independent 
We next tested whether the SABS and NSIBS can be understood as separate 
scales/constructs to further achieve our aim to directly contribute to the debate regarding 
whether it is possible or useful to conceptualise SA and NSSI as one or two constructs. Five 
of the subscales of the SABS and NSIBS (Self-punishment, Escape, Dependence, Belonging 
and Stigma) convey such a similar theme that these subscales were assigned the same label in 
each scale. These subscales contain very similar items and it is plausible that these subscales 
are redundant and tap the same construct. We therefore directly tested whether identically 
labelled subscales could be best understood as one construct or two separate correlated 
constructs.  
We then explored whether the SABS and NSIBS scales as a whole can be best 
understood as measuring one or two broad constructs. One construct would mean that the 
items and factors that make up the SABS and NSIBS are so closely related that they need to 
be understood as tapping one construct. Two constructs would mean that the items and 
factors that make up the SABS need to be understood as tapping a separate construct to the 
items and factors that make up the NSIBS. We tested whether the SABS and NSIBS are best 
understood as one or two broad scales at the factor level, specifying 17 correlated factors (7 
SABS factors + 10 NSIBS factors), and then the item level, specifying 65 items (26 SABS 
items + 39 NSIBS items).  
Model Fit Statistics 
Acceptable fit was operationalized as Comparative Fit Index (CFI) > .90, Tucker 
Lewis Index (TLI) > .90, and Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA) < .08. 
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Good fit was operationalized as CFI > .95, TLI > .95, Standardized Root Mean Square 
Residual (SRMR) > .08, and RMSEA < .06 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Our data were somewhat 
non-normal so we computed maximum likelihood CFA estimation with “robust” (Huber-
White) standard errors and a scaled test statistic that is (asymptotically) equal to the Yuan-
Bentler test statistic, which adjusts for this issue. “Robust” versions of the Χ2, TLI, CFI, and 
RMSEA are presented, although we note that when standard versions of these fit statistics 
were examined, the model fit results were similar and the conclusions were identical. 
Competing models were compared using (i) Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), where 
lower BIC statistics suggest better fit whilst adjusting for parsimony, and (ii) CFI, using a 
.002 cutoff (Meade, Johnson & Braddy, 2008). The BIC and CFI model comparison indices 
are advocated over the chi-squared and chi-squared difference statistics for judging model fit 
and comparing competing models because these statistics are less compromised by large 
sample sizes and are more sensitive to detect differences (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Meade 
et al., 2008).  
Comparison of CFA Models 
Several competing CFA models are presented in Table 6. The CFA results indicate 
that the SABS and NSIBS each consist of separate correlated subscales. A 7-factor model fit 
the SABS well: The CFI and TLI statistics demonstrated a fit that was between “acceptable” 
and “good” and the SRMR and RMSEA evidenced a “good” fit. A 10-factor model fit the 
NSIBS well: Again, the CFI and TLI statistics demonstrated a fit that was between 
“acceptable” and “good” and the SRMR and RMSEA evidenced a “good” fit. Considering 
the complexity of the CFA models (7 and 10 separate factors), we see these fit statistic results 
as impressive. The bifactor and second-order factor models were a very poor fit.  
Table 6 provides clear evidence that the SABS and NSIBS are best understood as 
being independent from one-another (separate measures). When identically-named subscales 
were compared, model fit statistics consistently indicated that each subscale is best 
understood as being independent from the other identically-named subscale. Models in which 
the identically-named subscales were specified as being part of the same single construct 
provided a very bad fit. The models that examined whether the SABS and NSIBS can be 
understood as one single measure also evidenced very bad fit. 
Taken together, these results indicate that the SABS consists of 7 correlated separate 
subscales, that the NSIBS consists of 10 correlated separate subscales, and that cognitions 
about SA (as operationalized by the SABS) are separate to cognitions about NSSI (as 
operationalized by the NSIBS). These results corroborate our earlier finding that SA and 
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NSSI are perceived as distinct phenomena. They also corroborate the factor structures that 
were observed in independent EFAs in Samples 3, 4, and 5. 
 
  
127 
 
Table 6 Confirmatory Factor Analytic Models of the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) 
and Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS)  
       90% CI for RMSEA 
Model Χ2 df BIC TLI CFI SRMR Lower RMSEA Upper 
SABS         
Model 1. 7 factors 675.528*** 278 62867.149 .930 .940 .053 .047 .052 .057 
Model 2. Bifactor 1053.908*** 273 63320.116 .864 .886 .098 .068 .072 .077 
Model 3. 1 second-
order factor 
1104.455*** 292 63302.895 .863 .877 .100 .068 .073 .077 
Model 4. 2 second-
order factors 
988.344*** 291 63165.730 .882 .895 .104 .063 .067 .072 
NSIBS         
Model 1. 10 factors  1423.947*** 657 91483.309 .925 .933 .055 .042 .045 .048 
Model 2. 9 factors 1660.085*** 666 91686.366 .904 .914 .058 .048 .051 .054 
Model 3. Bifactor  1789.211*** 663 91839.022 .891 .903 .082 .051 .054 .057 
Model 4. 1 second-
order factor  
2036.916*** 692 91638.414 .875 .883 .092 .055 .058 .061 
Model 5. 2 second-
order factors 
1939.026*** 691 91834.671 .884 .892 .116 .053 .056 .059 
Similarly themed subscales         
Self-punishment 2 
factors 
116.719*** 13 16791.346 .918 .949 .044 .108 .128 .150 
Self-punishment 1 
factor 
379.438*** 14 17195.270 .700 .800 .091 .224 .245 .267 
Escape 2 factors 18.177*** 19 20355.477 1.001 1.000 .018 .000 .000 .036 
Escape 1 factor 577.477*** 20 20978.399 .532 .666 .133 .205 .220 .236 
Dependence 2 factors 102.847*** 26 22715.648 .942 .958 .038 .057 .072 .086 
Dependence 1 factor 513.206*** 27 23153.547 .655 .741 .093 .161 .174 .187 
Belonging 2 factors 7.733*** 8 11579.490 1.00 1.00 .013 .000 .000 .052 
Belonging 1 factor 275.261*** 9 11892.280 .705 .823 .075 .210 .234 .258 
Stigma 2 factors 54.103*** 19 19922.562 .968 .978 .036 .042 .061 .080 
Stigma 1 factor 472.795*** 20 20387.292 .655 .753 .098 .184 .200 .216 
SABS and NSIBS 1 scale         
17 factors  2021.872*** 118 38055.757 .542 .602 .127 .158 .164 .171 
65 items 14938.861*** 2015 165339.839 .348 .369 .130 .103 .105 .106 
Note. *** = p < .001. 
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4.9. General Discussion 
We developed the SABS and the NSIBS across six large, independent samples of 
people with lived experience of SIB (total N = 3,313). Our factor analyses revealed clearly 
interpretable and differentiated factors that replicated well across four samples, pointing to 
the robustness and generalizability of our findings. Our results highlight the heterogeneous 
and multidimensional nature of SA and NSSI beliefs: The SABS is characterised by seven 
correlated factors and the NSIBS is characterised by ten correlated factors. 
The development of the SABS and NSIBS present a host of intriguing findings. We 
briefly discuss the key findings. First, the SABS and NSIBS each contain items that measure 
perceptions about how SIB relates to oneself (e.g., “I attempt suicide because I am worthless 
and unlovable;” “NSSI helps me escape negative emotions”) and items that measure 
perceptions about how SIB relates to other people (e.g., “Attempting suicide shows other 
people how distressed I feel;” “NSSI makes people take my problems seriously”). This 
highlights the potential importance of individual and sociocultural factors in explaining the 
development and repetition of SA and NSSI. The SABS and NSIBS each contain a factor we 
labelled Stigma, which taps beliefs that other people do not respond empathically to SA/NSSI 
and instead judge, criticise, or punish these behaviors. Endorsing this subscale, for instance, 
along with the Dependence subscale, would indicate that an individual perceives that SA 
and/or NSSI are their only and/or best option for self-regulation, even though these engaging 
in these behaviors alienates them from significant others. 
Second, several subscales point to similarities between SA and NSSI. For example, 
we found that the SABS and NSIBS both contain an Escape factor, indicating that individuals 
perceive SA and NSSI as potentially providing temporary relief from distressing cognitive 
and emotional experiences. This finding is interesting because several theories posit an 
escape function specifically in relation to SA (e.g., Baumeister, 1990; O’Connor, 2011; 
Williams, 1997) or NSSI (Chapman, Gratz & Brown, 2006).  
We also uncovered a Belonging factor in both instruments, which taps perceptions 
that SA and NSSI will lead to meaningful emotional connections and support from other 
people. The fact that some individuals (rather counterintuitively) believe that SA will 
potentially help them to connect with others illustrates the fact that people construct SA and 
NSSI idiosyncratically. This subscale is also of note given that the interpersonal theory of 
suicide (Joiner, 2005; Van Orden et al., 2010) predicts that thwarted belongingness is a key 
driver of SA. Some items of the SABS Dependence subscale (e.g., “My life would be worse 
without suicide attempts”) especially highlight the fact that people relate to SA and NSSI 
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idiosyncratically. These and other somewhat counterintuitive SABS items suggest that when 
asked about SA, participants actually respond in relation to killing themselves and/or thinking 
or talking about killing oneself. 
Last, the Anti-suicide NSIBS subscale highlights the fact that some individuals 
believe that NSSI is a useful and possible means of avoiding acting on suicidal thoughts. 
Endorsing this subscale presumably indicates a potentially protective factor against SA. 
However, as perceptions can quickly change, and NSSI can result in accidental death9, we 
stress that endorsing the Anti-suicide subscale cannot be interpreted as a strong or stable 
protective factor. 
Characterising Self-Injurious Cognitions  
We argued that a major rationale for developing the SABS and NSIBS arose from the 
fact that there does not seem to be consensus regarding which cognitions characterise SA and 
NSSI. This is evidenced by the existence of fifteen or so measures of the reasons, functions, 
and motivations for SAs and NSSI, and the fact that each of these scales provides somewhat 
different content coverage. The SABS and NSIBS were developed to clarify which beliefs 
characterise SA and NSSI and what factor structure best explains SA and NSSI cognitions. 
We generated extremely large item pools and included multiple markers of potential 
constructs to give meaningful content-based factors a good chance of emerging (Clark & 
Watson, 1995; Loevinger, 1957). It is noteworthy that we included items from existing 
measures of the reasons for SAs and NSSI in our item pools. Perhaps the development of the 
SABS and NSIBS may unify the field somewhat in its understanding of the basic constituent 
elements of SICs.  
Item generation was guided by the broad hypothesis that SICs are characterised by 
positive, negative, and facilitating SICs. We revisit facilitating cognitions below. The 
majority of the subscales of the SABS and NSIBS appear to measure positive SICs 
(cognitions about the perceived advantages of SIB) and few of the subscales appear to 
measure negative SICs (cognitions about the perceived disadvantages of SIB). We 
deliberately refrained from claiming that particular subscales measure either positive or 
negative SICs in order to account for the complex phenomenology of SA and NSSI. It seems 
conceivable, for instance, that some respondents may report that a particular SABS or NSIBS 
item describes an advantage of SIB for them whilst other respondents describe the same item 
                                                          
9 For example, lethality of SIB method can indicate suicidal intent, but not always or reliably (cf. Silverman et 
al., 2007a). Brown, Henriques, Sosdjan, and Beck (2004) found a minimal association between suicide intent 
and medical lethality 
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as a disadvantage of SIB for them. It also seems possible that some subscales contain positive 
and negative SICs. The best way to make sense of the function of particular items will 
probably be to ask each individual whether particular items represent an advantage or a 
disadvantage of SA or NSSI for them, and to test how the activation of particular items 
increases or decreases risk for SA or NSSI. For example, by linking activation of particular 
SABS and NSIBS items to changes in the strength of SA and/or NSSI urges, desire, or intent.  
Conceptual Debate 
Our second major goal in developing the SABS and NSIBS was to test whether SA 
and NSSI are best understood as one construct or two separate constructs. We presented 
several lines of evidence to indicate that, from a cognitions perspective, SA and NSSI are 
separate constructs. In Sample 1, we phrased items generically in relation to “self-injurious 
behavior,” with no reference to suicidal desire or intent. Participants then completed every 
item in our item pool twice: once in relation to SA and once in relation to NSSI. We found 
only moderate agreement between the ratings for SA and NSSI when rating exactly the same 
items, which we took as evidence that participants perceived SA and NSSI as similar but 
separate constructs. We then rephrased items to refer to SA or NSSI and proceeded to 
develop two separate scales. We found consistent evidence across independent samples that 
SA cognitions evidenced a different factor structure to NSSI cognitions.  
We then used CFA to directly test whether the SABS and NSIBS can be understood 
as separate scales. These analyses were particularly important in light of the fact that five of 
the subscales of the SABS and NSIBS (Self-punishment, Escape, Dependence, Belonging and 
Stigma) convey such a similar theme that they were assigned an identical label in each scale. 
Taken together, these analyses revealed clear evidence that the SABS and NSIBS are best 
understood as related but separate measures. The implications of these findings are far-
reaching as they support the use of separate terminology and definitions of SA and NSSI, and 
indicate that SA and NSSI need to be separated in research designs. Although SA and NSSI 
often co-occur in the same individual (Klonsky, May & Glenn, 2013; Nock et al., 2006) and 
relate to one-another (see Table 1), SA and NSSI are separate. Whether or not SA and NSSI 
are separate is analogous to the use of different illicit drugs. For example, a regular drug user 
could quite conceivably hold the same belief about two different drugs, believing that 
cannabis and heroin both help them form meaningful social connections. However, as a result 
of whatever internal or external circumstances, they may strongly endorse this particular 
belief for heroin and only mildly endorse it for cannabis (perhaps their current social circle 
are heavy heroin users). The person may also use heroin more than cannabis. Just like beliefs 
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about cannabis versus heroin, our analyses demonstrate that SA and NSSI cognitions are 
separate – a fact which does not mean SA and NSSI cannot co-occur or relate to one-another 
(the evidence demonstrates they often do) or be underpinned by the same mechanisms.  
Clinical Utility 
We are hopeful that the SABS and NSIBS will be useful to researchers and clinicians 
alike. When used clinically, we advise that the SABS and NSIBS are used to facilitate 
collaborative, close questioning regarding what SA and/or NSSI idiosyncratically means to 
each individual. This information can be coupled with theory and other clinical and 
contextual information to make individualised predictions about risk and to formulate 
targeted therapeutic interventions. Clinicians are advised to explore why respondents endorse 
particular items of the SABS and NSIBS and to link SA and NSSI cognitions to other 
presenting problems and contextual information. The SABS may help individuals clarify 
whether they want to die or whether they actually want their suffering to end. 
We have included a section at the end of the SABS and NSIBS for respondents to 
record important thoughts or beliefs about SA and NSSI that are not included in each scale. 
Given the extensive nature of our item generation and the size of our item pools, it is likely 
that any thoughts or beliefs that are reported will be similar to items that featured in our item 
pools. If this is the case, the clinician will be able to glean an idea of which factor particular 
cognitions are likely to stem from.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
We see our results as very promising but further research is of course needed to 
explicate the construct validity of these instruments more fully. The factor structures we 
reported here seem fairly robust and generalizable. Nevertheless, they must be replicated in 
other samples before they can be considered a definitive account of the structure of our scales 
(e.g., clinical samples, ethnically-diverse samples, samples with different comorbidities). 
Future research particularly needs to examine the measurement invariance of the scales and 
validate their use in different populations. We retained a subset of items from each factor (see 
Tables 3 and 4) because this seemed most appropriate given the mental states of people who 
are considering SA and NSSI. However, researchers who are interested in focusing on 
particular subscales are advised to use the full set of items from each subscale as these will of 
course be more internally consistent and tap each construct more completely.  
It will be useful to develop child and adolescent versions of the SABS and NSIBS as 
well as brief versions of each instrument that can be used in epidemiological research or 
clinical settings where a screening measure is more desirable and practical. We are in the 
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process of developing these instruments. The development of a child and adolescent version 
of the SABS and NSIBS will help clarify whether the same cognitions characterise SA and 
NSSI cognitions across the lifespan and may shed further light on the onset and development 
of SA and NSSI, perhaps with implications for prevention and early intervention. Since a 
thorough assessment of SIB would ideally involve informant reports, it would be interesting 
for informant versions of the SABS and NSIBS to be developed, and for research to explore 
the explanatory value of self-informant discrepancies (Connelly & Ones, 2010; De Los Reyes 
& Kazdin, 2005; Fitzsimons, Finkel & vanDellen, 2015). 
Another important area for future research involves exploring the potential existence 
and role of facilitating cognitions. Facilitating cognitions failed to emerge in our structural 
analysis as a distinct factor. However, these items were frequently endorsed for both SA and 
NSSI (see Supplementary material for Chapter 4), potentially indicating that they have a role 
to play in both sets of behaviors. We believe that facilitating cognitions did not emerge in our 
structural analyses because they likely take the form of “automatic thoughts” (Beck et al., 
1979) and will therefore be more idiosyncratic and situation and person-specific. In contrast, 
the SABS and NSIBS appear to measure relatively enduring (see test retest reliability in Part 
II), widely endorsed personal meanings for SIB that confer vulnerability across SIB 
individual differences and samples. The fact that facilitating cognitions did not emerge in our 
structural analyses is also consistent with the notion that they originate from positive beliefs 
about SA or NSSI (cf. Beck, Wright, Newman & Liese, 1993). This seems a plausible 
hypothesis because people do not give themselves permission to engage in behaviors – 
especially self-destructive behaviors – which have no personal meaning and value.  
Finally, we recognise that our data are exclusively self-report and therefore vulnerable 
to the limitations associated with using a single method (e.g., inflated estimates of 
associations between constructs; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). It will be 
useful for future research to validate the SABS and NSIBS against data collected using other 
methods, such as informant and clinician ratings. 
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4.10.  Supplementary Material for Chapter 4 
Item Generation and Refinement 
Strenuous efforts were made to generate an exhaustive list of distinct cognitions about 
SIB, and to incorporate the perspectives of clinicians, researchers, and individuals with lived 
experience of SIB during the different stages of item generation and refinement (see Figure 1 
in the main article). This methodology aimed to make the scales that were developed 
clinically useful, understandable, and broadly relevant; and to minimise the potential 
influence of researcher bias during the scale development process. Item generation and 
refinement involved the following steps.  
Thought Capture Item Generation  
A “thought capture” qualitative study was conducted in order to elicit a broad and 
representative pool of self-injurious cognitions (SICs) from individuals with lived experience 
of SIB. Attempts were made to elicit a wide range of types of SICs, including thoughts, 
assumptions, beliefs, expectations, reasons, attitudes, imagery, dreams, nightmares, 
memories, and meta-cognitions.  
The questions used to elicit SICs in the thought capture exercise were based on a 
range of methodologies that have been used previously in clinical and health psychology to 
elicit cognitions (e.g., Ajzen & Driver, 1991, 1992; Beck, 1995; Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 
1979; Butler, Fennell & Hackmann, 2010; Miller & Rollnick, 2002; Pearson et al., 2013; 
Wells, 1997, 2000; Winter, 2003). The questions were independently reviewed by five 
National Health Service (NHS) Clinical Psychologists and ten members of the public to 
verify that they were clear and that the protocol was likely to elicit the types of information 
that the research team expected. The questions were further refined based on this feedback.  
Participants were instructed that they would be asked a series of questions about their 
self-injurious thoughts. To avoid fatigue and frustration, participants were explicitly 
instructed that they could skip questions as needed in order to avoid repeating themselves and 
because some of the questions may not be relevant to every person. As we were interested in 
exploring which cognitions characterise any and all types of SIB, and so as not to artificially 
constrain responses, we did not ask participants to differentiate by method of SIB or whether 
the SIB was motivated by suicidal thoughts or intent.  
To avoid confusion and in the interests of eliciting specific and nuanced SICs, 
participants were provided with a definition of self-injurious behaviour (SIB) and a 
clarification of behaviours which we do not consider to be SIB. SIB was defined as 
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“physically hurting or injuring yourself on purpose, whether you intend to kill yourself or not. 
(Also called suicide, self-injury, self-harm).”  
63 thought capture questions were administered. The questions were initially broad 
and open-ended in the aim of minimising the influence of the research team’s position on the 
information reported. Participants were asked to report any thoughts, feelings, mental images, 
dreams or nightmares, memories, and other experiences “(e.g., voices, sounds, smells, 
sensations, tastes, etc)” related to SIB and its sequalae, including cognitions about physical 
pain, blood, and injuries experienced as part of SIB. Thereafter, the questions became 
progressively more specific and guiding in order to comprehensively elicit cognitions in 
relation to each of the three hypothesised domains of SICs (positive SICs, negative SICs, and 
facilitating SICs). The survey ended with a “mop-up” question which asked participants to 
record anything about self-injurious thoughts or behaviour that they had not reported so far. 
Responses were used to form items that were rationally organised into homogeneous 
item composites (HICs; Hogan, 1983) to ensure comprehensive coverage of different 
cognitive themes. This procedure is recommended because having multiple markers (at least 
5 items) for each cognitive theme ensures that a corresponding factor has a reasonable chance 
to emerge during structural analyses. This procedure also helps avoid the inclusion of 
duplicate items in item pools.   
Participants 
Individuals who have thought about or engaged in any form of SIB in the last six 
months were recruited online. They provided responses to the thought capture exercise using 
the survey software Qualtrics. Participants were entered into a prize draw for a chance to win 
a £100 Amazon voucher. 
Research Team Item Generation 
Independent of the thought capture study, the research team generated a broad item 
pool explicitly designed to operationalize positive, negative, and facilitating SICs. Potential 
markers of the three domains of SICs were generated by drawing on a broad range of sources: 
(1) existing measures of the reasons, functions, and motivations for engaging in or refraining 
from SA and/or NSSI (Beck & Steer, 1991; Holden, Kerr, Mendonca & Velamoor, 1998; 
Kleindienst et al., 2008; Klonsky & Glenn, 2009; Lewis & Santor, 2008; Linehan, Goodstein, 
Nielsen & Chiles, 1983; Lloyd et al.,1997; Ma & Klonsky, 2013; Matson et al., 1999; Nock 
et al., 2007; Osman et al., 1998; Osuch et al., 1999; Santa Mina et al., 2006; Turner, 
Chapman & Gratz, 2014; Whitlock et al., 2014); (2) existing measures of perceptions that are 
thought to underlie suicidal thoughts and/or SA specifically, such as hopelessness, 
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defeat/entrapment, burdensomeness, unlovability, unbearability, unsolvability, thwarted 
belongingness, and acquired capability (Beck et al. 1974; Rudd et al., 2015; Van Orden et al., 
2008); (3) themes that have emerged from previous qualitative research on SIB (e.g., Adams, 
Rodham & Gavin, 2005; Brown & Kimball, 2011; Harris, 2000); (4) indications regarding 
SICs in the SIB literature; (5) online social support forums and YouTube testimonials; (6) the 
clinical experience of the first author; (7) cognitive-behavioural theory, research, and 
measures for other self-destructive behaviours, especially binge eating and substance misuse; 
(8) clinical, health, and social psychology theory and research on behaviour, health 
behaviour, behaviour change, and risk perception; and (9) research regarding transdiagnostic 
cognitive processes and metacognition (e.g., rumination, thought suppression, intrusive 
thoughts and memories).  
All items were phrased to describe any form of cognition about SIB, irrespective of 
suicidal intent (i.e. items did not differentiate bwteeen SA and NSSI). No reference was made 
to the method of SIB. Items were rationally organised into HICs.  
Procedure for Combining Item Pools 
A revised item pool was created by combining the item pool that emerged from the 
thought capture exercise with the item pool that had been generated by the research team. As 
with the previous item pools, each item was phrased in relation to “SIB” (self-injurious 
behaviour), rather than specifying suicidal intent or particular SIB methods. When an item 
from each item pool expressed the same content and meaning, the clearest, simplest, or 
shortest item was retained for the revised item pool. All items that expressed unique content 
were included in the new, combined item pool and the research team put no boundaries, 
conditions, or hypotheses on which items should or should not be retained. Although items 
were eventually discarded based on psychometric analyses, beginning the process with an 
over-inclusive item pool ensured that the final instrument/s adequately cover all content areas 
(Clark & Watson, 1995; Loevinger, 1957). 
Item Refinement 
The next step in the scale development was for the combined item pool to be 
(simultaneously) reviewed and refined by three SIB stakeholder groups: (1) Public and 
private sector clinicians from across the world who worked in specialist SIB services or 
services that regularly encountered SIB (e.g., personality disorder treatment services), (2) 
researchers and clinician-academics who have recently (last 5 years) published on SIB, self-
destructive behaviour, or problematic health behaviours, and (3) People with lived experience 
of SIB who have “thought about self-harm, nonsuicidal self-injury, or suicide in the last two 
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years.” Researchers and clinicians were recruited through speculative emails. People with 
lived experience of SIB were recruited online through the same methods as all participants 
were recruited (see main article). 
Participants were not paid. As with the item pool generated by the research team, this 
facet of the scale development process was guided by our underlying hypothesis that the 
presence and interaction of positive SICs, negative SICs, and facilitating SICs characterise 
SA and NSSI. Items were therefore grouped according to the facet of the hypothesis they 
appeared to resemble. Participants were then provided with operational definitions of the 
three SIC domains and asked to rate (Yes/No) whether each item matched the operational 
definition. The following definitions were provided: 
Positive beliefs about SIB are beliefs about the individual and interpersonal 
advantages of SIB. These beliefs are what makes SIB sometimes seem an attractive, 
favourable, or valued option. These beliefs make SIB more likely to occur. (The word 
“positive” does not imply that SIB is seen as a “helpful” or “constructive” option; only that 
it is sometimes seen as an advantageous or desirable option. SIB may in fact be a person’s 
least bad or only option). Do the following items fit this definition of INDIVIDUAL "positive 
beliefs about SIB" / Do the following items fit this definition of INTERPERSONAL "positive 
beliefs about SIB"? 
Negative beliefs about SIB are beliefs about the individual and interpersonal 
disadvantages and detrimental consequences of SIB. These beliefs describe how SIB can be 
perceived as an aversive, unfavourable, or undesirable option. These beliefs make SIB less 
likely to occur. Do the following items fit this definition of INDIVIDUAL “negative beliefs 
about SIB?”” / INTERPERSONAL “negative beliefs about SIB?”” 
“Facilitating thoughts justify and give “permission” to engage in SIB. Facilitating 
thoughts occur in response to conflicting positive and negative beliefs about SIB and make 
SIB more likely to occur. They activate and strengthen positive beliefs about SIB and inhibit 
and weaken negative beliefs about SIB. Facilitating thoughts enable individuals to proceed 
with a behaviour that they know to be unconstructive. Do the following items fit this 
definition of “facilitating thoughts about SIB?” 
 Because the SIB literature is like no other in the extent to which different people 
interpret different terminology to mean different things, definitions of what SIB is and is not 
were provided on every page of each online survey. The following definitions and 
clarifications were provided to each Sample: 
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Self-injurious behaviour = physically hurting or injuring yourself on purpose. It 
includes suicide attempts and nonsuicidal self-injury. 
A suicide attempt = intentionally physically injuring yourself in order to kill yourself.  
Nonsuicidal self-injury = intentionally physically injuring yourself, but with no desire 
or intention of killing yourself or being dead. 
Things that are not a suicide attempt or nonsuicidal self-injury:  
Behaviours which unintentionally cause physical harm long-term (e.g. smoking, over-
eating, binge drinking, eating disorders, unprotected sex) 
Accidentally injuring yourself (e.g. accidentally touching something hot)  
Behaviours which change your body for a cultural reason (e.g. body piercing, 
tattooing) 
A definition of one other domain of SICs termed “anti-suicide cognitions” was also 
provided to Sample 1. These items were hypothesised to be a facet of individual positive 
beliefs about SIB and described using NSSI as a means to avoid acting on suicidal thoughts 
and urges. In contrast to the rest of the item pool (which was phrased in reference to SIB), 
anti-suicide items specified NSSI and SA as separate phenomenon and used the terminology 
of “NSSI” and “suicide”. The following clarification was provided:  
This section asks about a group of thoughts that are specific to nonsuicidal self-injury 
(NSSI). To recap, NSSI involves physically hurting or injuring yourself on purpose with no 
intention or expectation at all of dying. Anti-suicide NSSI thoughts are thoughts about 
engaging in nonsuicidal self-injury as a way to avoid acting on suicidal thoughts or urges 
(i.e. to avoid making a suicide attempt). Do the following items fit this definition of “anti-
suicide NSSI thoughts”? 
 After this exercise, participants in the item refinement stage (researchers, clinicians, 
and people with lived experience of SIB) were asked to indicate whether they believed that 
any self-injurious thoughts were missing from the item pool, whether any items could be 
rephrased to be simpler or clearer, and whether any items should be deleted. Participants were 
also given the opportunity to make comments. Several changes were made to the item pool in 
response to the feedback received. 
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Development of the Final Scales: Samples 3, 4, and 5 
Sample 3 
In Sample 3, 92 SA items and 131 NSSI items were administered.  
Results 
11 highly correlated items were deleted from the NSSI item pool. PAs indicated 11 
SA factors and 12 NSSI factors.  
SA Item Pool. An EFA suggested the existence of 7 interpretable factors, which we 
labelled Dependence (25 items; e.g., “Attempting suicide is one of the best things in my 
life”), Stigma (13 items; e.g., “People judge and criticise my suicide attempt(s)”), 
Interpersonal influence (7 items; e.g., “Attempting suicide makes people take my problems 
seriously”), Escape (11 items; e.g., “Attempting suicide clears my mind”), Belonging (10 
items; e.g., “Attempting suicide helps me fit in with other people”), Self-punishment (8 items; 
e.g., “I attempt suicide to show how much I hate myself”), and Protest (8 items; e.g., 
“Attempting suicide is a way to get back at people who have hurt me”). All of these factors 
were apparent in Sample 1. 
NSSI Item Pool. An EFA suggested the existence of 10 interpretable, clear factors, 
which we labelled Escape (27 items; e.g., “NSSI helps me escape negative emotions”), 
Dependence (15 items; e.g., “I rely on SIB”), Interpersonal influence (13 items; e.g., “NSSI 
helps me get revenge against others”), Stigma (7 items; e.g., “People judge and criticise my 
SIB”), Problematic (12 items; e.g., “NSSI makes my problems worse”), Enjoyable (e.g., 
“NSSI is enjoyable”), Anti-suicide (6 items; e.g., “NSSI is a replacement for suicidal 
behaviour”), Self-punishment (6 items; e.g., “I engage in SIB to punish myself”), Belonging 
(8 items; e.g., “NSSI helps me fit in with other people”), and Anti-dissociation (6 items; e.g., 
“NSSI takes me out of a detached state”).  
Distress and Impaired Functioning Items. The diagnostic criteria for most 
psychiatric diagnoses includes the presence of functional impairment and/or clinically 
significant distress. Several self-report measures that aim to have relevance for the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders include items that measure functional impairment 
and clinically significant distress (e.g., the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale for DSM–5; Foa et 
al., 2015). We explored the effect of adding distress and impaired functioning items to each 
of the SA and NSSI item pools, copying the phrasing used by Foa et al. (2015). The distress 
item in each item pool asked “How much have these beliefs about SA/NSSI been bothering 
you?” The impaired functioning item in each item pool asked “How much have these beliefs 
about SA/NSSI been interfering with your everyday life (for example relationships, work, or 
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other important activities)?” Both items were rated on the same 7-point Likert scale (ranging 
from Strongly agree to Strongly disagree) as that used for the rest of the item pool. These 
items were added to Samples 2 and 3. 
In Sample 2, we found that the two items tapping distress and impaired functioning 
performed poorly. They demonstrated negative factor loadings for SA and NSSI. They 
formed their own factor for SA and joined two items for NSSI to make a factor with no 
obvious theme. The two distress and impaired functioning items were administered to Sample 
3 to further explore the properties of these items for SA and NSSI. These items again had 
negative factor loadings. They formed their own factor for SA and loaded on the Dependence 
factor for NSSI. The poor performance of these items across Samples 2 and 3 meant that they 
were omitted from Samples 4 and 5 and do not feature in the final versions of the SABS or 
NSIBS.  
Discussion 
Sample 3 provided encouraging results: a large number of interpretable factors 
emerged clearly for SA and NSSI. These results were important given the question of which 
factor structure to retain from Samples 1 and 2. The results observed in Sample 3 provided 
further confidence (on top of Sample 2) that the structural results observed in Sample 1 were 
probably not confounded by the design or by the administration of a large item pool. 
Nevertheless, we recognised that the task of developing scales that reliably measure a large 
number of distinct factors is psychometrically challenging and collected an additional 
independent sample to explore whether the factor structure observed in Sample 3 would 
replicate.  
Sample 4 
 At this point, we shifted our emphasis from sensitivity (administering overly 
large item pools to encourage distinct potential factors to emerge) to specificity (only 
including strong markers of a lesser number of clear factors). In Sample 4, we administered 
items that demonstrated reasonably strong loadings (<.40) and that did not cross-load, as well 
as four items that had inadvertently been omitted from Sample 3 (“NSSI is a compromise 
instead of killing myself,” “NSSI is a way to avoid suicidal urges,” “I engage in NSSI 
because I deserve to suffer,” “NSSI stops me feeling numb”). In Sample 4, 40 SA items and 
61 NSSI items were administered.  
Results 
3 highly correlated items were deleted from the SA item pool and 1 highly correlated 
item was deleted from the NSSI item pool. PAs indicated 7 SA factors and 9 NSSI factors. 
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SA Item Pool. An EFA suggested the existence of 7 interpretable, clear factors, 
which we labelled: Belonging (4 items; e.g., “Attempting suicide makes me feel part of a 
group”), Stigma (6 items; e.g., “People judge and criticise my suicide attempt(s)”), Escape (6 
items; e.g., “Attempting suicide stops upsetting thoughts going round and round in my 
mind”), Self-punishment (5 items; e.g., “I attempt suicide because I deserve to suffer”), 
Interpersonal influence (5 items; e.g., “Attempting suicide makes people take my problems 
seriously”), Dependence (6 items; e.g., “Attempting suicide is the only method of coping that 
works for me”), and Protest (5 items; e.g., “Attempting suicide is a form of rebellion”). In 
contrast to previous EFAs, the PA and EFA results concurred for Sample 4. The same factor 
structure emerged across Samples 3 and 4.  
NSSI Item Pool. An EFA suggested the existence of 9 interpretable, clear factors. 
The first factor involved the Interpersonal influence factor (e.g., “My NSSI persuades other 
people to change their mind”) merging with the Belonging (e.g., “NSSI helps me fit in with 
other people”) factor, presumably because the items were so closely themed. The remaining 
factors were: Anti-dissociation (7 items; e.g., “NSSI stops me feeling detached from 
myself”), Self-punishment (7 items; e.g., “I engage in SIB to punish myself”), Dependence (6 
items; e.g., “I cannot cope without NSSI”), Anti-suicide (5 items; e.g., “NSSI is a 
replacement for suicidal behaviour”), Problematic (6 items; e.g., “NSSI makes my problems 
worse”), Stigma (6 items; e.g., “People judge and criticise my SIB”), Enjoyable (7 items; e.g., 
“NSSI is enjoyable”), and Escape (4 items; e.g., “NSSI helps me escape negative emotions”).  
As with the SA items, in contrast to previous EFAs, the PA and EFA results 
concurred for Sample 4. The same factor structure emerged across Samples 3 and 4, except, 
as noted, in Sample 4 the Interpersonal influence and Belonging factors combined to form 
one factor.  
Sample 5 
The PA and EFA results observed in Samples 3 and 4 provide evidence that a robust, 
replicable, and clearly interpretable factor structure has emerged to characterise SA and NSSI 
cognitions. Sample 5 analyses were conducted as an additional check of the generalizability 
of the structural results that had been observed in Samples 3 and 4. In Sample 5, 41 SA items 
and 65 NSSI items were administered.  
Results 
2 highly correlated items were deleted from each of the SA and the NSSI item pools. 
PAs indicated 7 SA factors and 10 NSSI factors.  
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SA Item Pool. An EFA suggested the existence of 7 interpretable, clear factors, 
which we again labelled: Belonging (5 items; e.g., “Attempting suicide helps me fit in with 
other people”), Stigma (6 items; e.g., “People think that my suicide attempt(s) are selfish”), 
Self-punishment (6 items; e.g., “I attempt suicide because I deserve to suffer”), Interpersonal 
influence (5 items; e.g., “Attempting suicide makes people take my problems seriously”), 
Escape (6 items; e.g., “Attempting suicide changes the way that I am thinking”), Dependence 
(6 items; e.g., “Attempting suicide is the only option I have for solving my problems”), and 
Protest (5 items; e.g., “Attempting suicide is a way to get back at people who have hurt me”). 
As we found in Sample 4, the PA and EFA results concurred for Sample 5. The same factor 
structure emerged in Sample 5 as had been observed in Samples 3 and 4.  
NSSI Item Pool. An EFA suggested the existence of 10 interpretable, clear factors, 
which we again labelled: Escape (8 items; e.g., “NSSI helps me escape negative emotions”), 
Self-punishment (7 items; e.g., “I engage in NSSI because I deserve to suffer”), Anti-
dissociation (6 items; e.g., “NSSI stops me feeling numb”), Interpersonal influence factor (6 
items; e.g., “NSSI is a way to intentionally upset other people”), Stigma (6 items; e.g., 
“People reject me because of my NSSI”), Dependence (6 items; e.g., “I cannot cope without 
NSSI”), Problematic (6 items; e.g., “NSSI makes my problems worse”), Anti-suicide (4 
items; e.g., “NSSI is a compromise instead of killing myself”), Enjoyable (6 items; e.g., 
“NSSI is enjoyable”), and Belonging (5 items; e.g., “NSSI helps me fit in with other people”). 
The Interpersonal influence and Belonging factors did not merge in Sample 5. As we found 
in Sample 4, the PA and EFA results concurred for Sample 5. The same factor structure 
emerged in Sample 5 as had been observed in Samples 3 and 4, with the only caveat being 
that in Sample 4 the Interpersonal influence and Belonging factors merged to form one 
factor. 
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Table S1. Descriptive Statistics for Facilitating Cognition Items Across Three Samples 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
 Suicide 
Attempt 
NSSI 
Suicide 
Attempt 
NSSI 
Suicide 
Attempt 
NSSI 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
I give myself permission to XXX 4.27 2.21 3.29 2.08 4.19 2.17 3.32 1.98 4.07 2.22 3.28 2.03 
I vow that ‘This will be the last time I XXX 4.22 2.40 4.43 2.32 - - - - - - - - 
I think things that sabotage my efforts to avoid XXX 4.09 2.02 3.78 2.01 - - - - - - 3.74 1.92 
I think things that make XXX more likely to happen 3.82 2.10 3.51 2.09 - - - - - - - - 
I have good reasons for XXX 3.33 2.19 2.94 1.99 - - - - - - - - 
I encourage myself to XXX 5.41 1.94 5.10 2.02 - - - - - - - - 
I tell myself that I can XXX if I do something to make up for 
it afterwards 
6.00 1.56 5.67 1.79 5.99 1.49 - - 6.01 1.49 5.37 1.93 
It’s acceptable to XXX if I do it in a particular way 5.00 2.04 4.17 2.15 5.35 1.79 4.34 2.09 5.17 1.95 4.34 2.13 
SIB is more acceptable if I have opportunity to do it 5.01 1.95 4.61 2.01 5.09 1.87 4.44 1.94 4.80 1.96 4.38 2.01 
I try not to think about the disadvantages of XXX 3.99 2.25 3.48 2.11 - - - - 3.93 2.19 3.33 2.03 
I ignore problems associated with XXX 4.01 2.12 3.56 2.04 - - - - - - 3.35 1.90 
I under-estimate the consequences of XXX 3.88 2.24 3.56 2.08 - - - - - - - - 
I try to ignore the physical pain that comes with XXX 3.99 2.27 4.10 2.34 - - - - - - - - 
I tell myself that I deserve the benefits of XXX 4.52 2.21 4.29 2.22 - - 4.13 2.15 - - 4.06 2.17 
I find ways to justify XXX to myself 3.71 2.24 3.22 2.13 - - 3.17 2.04 - - 3.11 2.04 
It’s acceptable to XXX if I’m really upset 4.45 2.17 3.49 2.11 - - 3.68 2.16 - - 3.53 2.09 
The benefits of XXX are worth the risks 4.48 2.26 3.53 2.09 - - 3.67 2.04 - - 3.60 2.07 
I think that XXX won’t be dangerous as long as I am careful 5.11 2.14 3.10 2.10 5.57 1.89 - - 5.55 1.85 2.84 1.99 
XXX is a problem for some people but it won’t be for me 5.02 1.98 4.75 2.08 - - - - 4.44 1.98 - - 
XXX is more acceptable if I do something to make up for it 
afterwards 
5.82 1.61 5.61 1.73 5.81 1.57 - - 5.77 1.63 5.20 1.92 
I allow myself to delay when I’ll XXX, knowing that I will 
do it later 
4.15 2.12 3.74 2.10 - - - - - - - - 
Note. XXX denotes the use of different terminology in different Samples: In Sample 1, “SIB” was used; in Samples 2 and 3, “attempt/ing 
suicide” and “NSSI” were used. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5. Characterizing Self-Injurious Cognitions Part II: Validation of the Suicide 
Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) and the Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale 
(NSIBS). 
 
5.1. Abstract 
This article reports the validation of the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) and 
Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS), two new measures of beliefs about suicide 
attempts (SA) and nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI). Both instruments demonstrated moderate 
to excellent test retest reliability over 2-4 weeks and strong internal consistency. The 
subscales of the SABS and NSIBS each measure relatively specific domains of self-injurious 
cognitions (SICs) and each instrument as a whole taps a range of distinct, moderately related 
content. Many of the SABS subscales demonstrate almost no relationship with the NSIBS 
subscales. A range of correlations support the convergent and divergent validity of the SABS 
and NSIBS: both instruments demonstrated small to moderate correlations with a range of 
clinical variables, measures of well-being, and purportedly similar, existing constructs, 
including the reasons for SA and NSSI, reasons to live, current suicidal thinking, and 
perceptions of unlovability, unbearability, burdensomeness, and thwarted belongingness. The 
SABS significantly incrementally predicts previous and current SICs and behavior over and 
above demographic characteristics, clinical, and well-being variables. People increasingly 
endorsed the SABS and NSIBS the more they had progressed from thoughts to taking action 
to engaging in multiple episodes of SA or NSSI, and the more recently they had made a SA 
or engaged in NSSI. Taken together, these analyses supplement those presented in our 
Development article and further demonstrate that the SABS and NSIBS have promising 
psychometric properties and need to be understood as related but separate measures: that 
beliefs about SA and NSSI are similar but distinct. 
 
Chapter 5 will be submitted for peer-review to Psychological Assessment as: Siddaway, A. 
P., Wood, A. M., O’Carroll, R. E., & O’Connor, R. C. Characterizing Self-Injurious 
Cognitions Part II: Validation of the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) and the 
Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS). 
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5.2.Introduction 
This article (Part II) is the second of two companion articles that describe the 
development and validation of the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) and the Nonsuicidal 
Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS). Part I described the development of these scales. This 
article explicates the internal consistency, test retest reliability, convergent, discriminant, 
criterion, and incremental validity of the SABS and NSIBS. 
The SABS was developed to measure beliefs about SA. It consists of a 7-factor 
structure, with three factors measuring perceptions about how SA relates to oneself (e.g., “I 
attempt suicide because I am worthless and unlovable”) and 4 factors measuring perceptions 
about how SA relates to other people (e.g., “Attempting suicide shows other people how 
distressed I feel”). The 7 factors of the SABS are called: Belonging (3 items; e.g., 
“Attempting suicide helps me fit in with other people”), Stigma (4 items; e.g., “People think 
that my suicide attempt(s) are selfish”), Self-punishment (3 items; e.g., “I attempt suicide 
because I deserve to suffer”), Eliciting help (3 items; e.g., “Attempting suicide makes people 
take my problems seriously”), Escape (4 items; e.g., “Attempting suicide changes the way 
that I am thinking”), Dependence (5 items; e.g., “Attempting suicide is the only option I have 
for solving my problems”), and Revenge (4 items; e.g., “Attempting suicide is a way to get 
back at people who have hurt me”). 
The NSIBS was developed to measure beliefs about engaging in NSSI. It consists of a 
10-factor structure, with seven factors measuring perceptions about how engaging in NSSI 
relates to oneself (e.g., “NSSI helps me escape negative emotions”) and three factors 
measuring perceptions about how NSSI relates to other people (e.g., “NSSI makes people 
take my problems seriously”). The 10 factors of the NSIBS are called: Escape (4 items; e.g., 
“NSSI helps me escape negative emotions”), Self-punishment (4 items; e.g., “I engage in 
NSSI because I deserve to suffer”), Anti-dissociation (3 items; e.g., “NSSI stops me feeling 
numb”), Interpersonal influence (5 items; e.g., “NSSI is a way to intentionally upset other 
people”), Stigma (4 items; e.g., “People reject me because of my NSSI”), Dependence (4 
items; e.g., “I cannot cope without NSSI”), Problematic (5 items; e.g., “NSSI makes my 
problems worse”), Anti-suicide (3 items; e.g., “NSSI is a compromise instead of killing 
myself”), Enjoyable (4 items; e.g., “NSSI is enjoyable”), and Belonging (3 items; e.g., “NSSI 
helps me fit in with other people”). 
The literature regarding self-injurious behavior (SIB) is afflicted by a debate 
regarding whether intentional self-injury in order to die (which we refer to as a “suicide 
attempt; SA”) is different from intentional self-injury with no intent to die (which we refer to 
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as “nonsuicidal self-injury; NSSI) (see Muehlenkamp, 2014; Posner, Brodsky, Yershova, 
Buchanan & Mann, 2014; Silverman et al., 2007a, b). A central point of contention concerns 
whether SA and NSSI are one or two constructs (Kapur, Cooper, O’Connor & Hawton, 
2013). In Part I, we attempted to move this debate forwards by directly testing whether SA 
and NSSI are perceived as distinct phenomena and by exploring whether different cognitions 
characterise SA and NSSI. We presented several lines of evidence to indicate that SA and 
NSSI are perceived as similar but ultimately separate phenomena, which justified the 
development of two separate scales. Intriguingly, we found that SA and NSSI are 
characterised by some very similar beliefs and some beliefs that are specific to either SA or 
NSSI.  
This article describes the psychometric properties of the SABS and NSIBS and 
presents further evidence regarding the similarities and differences between SA and NSSI 
beliefs. We examine the test retest reliabilities of the SABS and NSIBS over 2-4 weeks to see 
whether these instruments might be understood as measures of beliefs (relatively enduring 
personal meanings for SA and NSSI that confer vulnerability across situations but which also 
potentially fluctuate or change due to a range of factors; Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979). 
Our examination of the internal consistency of the SABS and NSIBS subscales and total 
scores will be instructive in clarifying whether these instruments measure relatively narrow or 
relatively broad facets of SA and NSSI beliefs.  
It will be informative to see how strongly the subscales of the SABS and NSIBS 
correlate; that is, how closely related cognitions about SA are to cognitions about NSSI. 
These analyses are especially important given that five subscales (Self-punishment, Escape, 
Dependence, Belonging and Stigma) convey such a similar theme in the SABS and NSIBS 
that they were assigned the same label. Anything other than strong correlations between the 
SABS and NSIBS would provide further evidence that SA and NSSI beliefs need to be 
considered separate, justifying the need for separate measures of SA and NSSI beliefs. 
We were very keen to provide stringent tests of the need for the SABS and NSIBS. 
We therefore examine the convergent, discriminant, criterion, and incremental validity of the 
SABS and NSIBS against (i) purportedly similar, existing constructs (the reasons for SA and 
NSSI, reasons to live, current suicidal thinking, and perceptions of unlovability, 
unbearability, burdensomeness, and thwarted belongingness); (ii) related clinical constructs 
(depressive symptoms, anxiety symptoms, symptoms of BPD, experiential avoidance, 
perceived stress, difficulties in regulating positive and negative emotions, emotional 
reactivity); and (iii) several measures of well-being (optimism, perceived social support, 
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satisfaction with life, and subjective happiness and vitality), which would be expected to 
share less variance with other predictors in statistical models.  
5.3. Method 
5.3.1. Participants and Procedure 
The SABS and NSIBS were developed across six independent samples that were 
collected online. Detailed information regarding recruitment and participant characteristics is 
presented in the companion article (Part I). Participants in four samples (Samples 3-610) 
completed the SABS, NSIBS, and a range of other measures, as detailed next.  
5.3.2. Measures 
Self-Injurious Thoughts and Behavior. All participants were asked questions about 
the presence, lifetime frequency, and recency of NSSI thoughts and behavior, suicidal 
thoughts and behavior, and whether they had experienced thoughts about SA and NSSI at the 
same time or in relation to one-another (see Part I). 
Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS; Siddaway et al., in submission). The SABS 
measures beliefs about attempting suicide. It consists of 26 items and 7 factors (described 
above). Participants are asked to report how much they currently agree with each belief about 
attempting suicide using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly disagree to Strongly 
agree. In an attempt to minimize misinterpretation, a definition of “attempting suicide” is 
provided (“intentionally physically injuring yourself because you want and expect to kill 
yourself”) and several behaviors that are not considered a SA, including NSSI, are defined. 
There is space to record “any other thoughts or beliefs you have about attempting suicide” 
after the NSIBS items. 
Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS; Siddaway et al., in submission). 
The NSIBS measures beliefs about engaging in NSSI. It consists of 39 items and 10 factors 
(described above). Participants are asked to report how much they currently agree with each 
belief about NSSI using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly disagree to Strongly 
agree. In an attempt to minimize misinterpretation, a definition of “NSSI” is provided 
(“intentionally physically injuring yourself, but with no desire or intention of killing yourself 
or being dead”) and several behaviors that are not considered NSSI, including SAs, are 
defined. There is space to record “any other thoughts or beliefs you have about NSSI” after 
the NSIBS items.  
5.3.3. Measures Completed by Sample 3 
                                                          
10 Samples 1 and 2 were purely used to develop the SABS and NSIBS 
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Inventory of Depression and Anxiety Symptoms (IDAS) – Dysphoria subscale 
(IDAS-Dysphoria; Watson et al., 2007). This 10 item subscale assesses the nonspecific 
emotional and cognitive symptoms shared by depression and various anxiety problems. It 
contains single items assessing depressed mood, anhedonia, worry, worthlessness, guilt, and 
hopelessness, as well as two items apiece tapping psychomotor disturbance (one reflecting 
retardation, the other agitation) and cognitive problems. Participants indicate the extent to 
which they have experienced each symptom “during the past 2 weeks, including today” on a 
5-point scale ranging from Not at all to Extremely. A mean subscale score of 3 or higher is 
indicative of significant psychological problems and mean item responses of diagnosable 
cases generally range from 2.5 to 3.5 (Watson et al., 2007, 2008). In Sample 3, the IDAS-
Dysphoria had an α of .89.  
Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-8; Spitzer, Kroenke & Williams, 1999). The 
PHQ-9 assesses to what extent the presence of nine depressive symptoms have bothered an 
individual over the last two weeks. Item 9 assesses the presence of suicidal thoughts and was 
not administered here. Each item is rated on a 4-point Likert scale that ranges from Not at all 
to Nearly every day. The scale has good psychometric properties (Kroenke et al., 2001; 
2010). In Sample 3, the PHQ-8 had an α of .86.  
Generalised Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7; Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams & Lowe, 
2006). The GAD-7 assesses to what extent the presence of seven anxiety problem symptoms 
have bothered an individual over the last two weeks. Each item is rated on a 4-point Likert 
scale that ranges from Not at all to Nearly every day. Although the GAD-7 was developed to 
measure Generalised Anxiety Disorder, it has been shown to provide reasonable sensitivity 
and specificity as a screen for panic disorder, social anxiety disorder, and posttraumatic stress 
disorder (Kroenke et al., 2007). The scale has strong psychometric properties (Kroenke et al., 
2010; Spitzer et al., 2006). In Sample 3, the GAD-7 had an α of .89.  
Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994). The 
LOT-R is a 6-item scale of generalized expectations of optimism/pessimism; 3 items are 
framed in relation to optimism and 3 in relation to pessimism and the latter items are reverse 
scored. Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from I disagree a lot to I agree a 
lot. The LOT-R has good psychometric properties (Scheier et al., 1994). In Sample 3, the 
LOT-R had an α of .85.  
5.3.4. Measures Completed by Sample 4 
Inventory of Statements about Self-Injury (ISAS; Klonsky & Glenn, 2009). The 
ISAS includes 39 items that measure 13 functions of NSSI. Each item is rated from 0 (Not 
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relevant) to 2 (Very relevant) and an average score is created for each function. The scale has 
some published psychometric properties (Klonsky & Glenn, 2009). The ISAS’ subscales 
demonstrated the following alpha coefficients in Sample 4: Affect Regulation (α = .73), 
Interpersonal Boundaries (α = .80), Self-Punishment (α = .80), Self-Care (α = .76), Anti-
Dissociation (α = .83), Anti-Suicide (α = .85), Sensation-Seeking (α = .58), Peer-Bonding (α 
= .66),  Interpersonal Influence (α = .68), Toughness (α = .79), Marking Distress (α = .71), 
Revenge (α = .82), Autonomy (α = .77). 
Inventory of Motivations for Suicide Attempts (IMSA; Ma & Klonsky, 2013). 
The IMSA consists of 54 items that measure 11 functions of SA in relation to the 
respondent’s most recent SA. Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Not at 
all important to Most important and an average score is created for each function. The scale 
has some published psychometric properties (Ma & Klonsky, 2013). The IMSA’s subscales 
demonstrated the following alpha coefficients in Sample 4: Hopelessness (α = .81), 
Psychache/unbearability (α = .87), Escape (α = .82), Problem solving (α = .69), Impulsivity 
(α = .78), Burdensomeness (α = .87), Belongingness (α = .78), Fearlessness/capability (α = 
.78), Influencing others (α = .89), Help seeking (α = .77). The IMSA “Other” subscale was 
not included in our analyses because its items were only weakly intercorrelated (α = .47). 
5.3.5. Measures Completed by Sample 5 
Beck Scale for Suicide Ideation (BSS; Beck & Steer, 1991). The BSS is a widely 
used 21-item self-report measure of passive suicide desire, active suicide desire, perceived 
capability to make a SA, and specific plans and preparations for a SA. The BSS contains two 
optional items (20 and 21) that assess previous suicide attempts; these items were not 
administered here as this content was assessed by questions measuring Self-Injurious 
Thoughts and Behavior (above). The BSS has strong psychometric properties (Beck & Steer, 
1991; Brown, 2001). Although a total score is often computed, factor analytic results 
generally support a two factor solution where one factor (Suicidal Desire and Ideation) 
measures a desire for death, frequency of suicidal ideation, and lacking deterrents for suicide, 
and a second factor (Resolved Plans and Preparations) measures specific plans and suicidal 
intent (see Holden & DeLisle, 2005; Witte et al., 2006). However, as there is no consensus on 
the exact composition of the two factors, we determined the best fitting measurement model 
for our sample by conducting a Maximum Likelihood Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
with Promax rotation, specifying a two factor solution. Our results were similar to those 
observed in previous research (see Holden & DeLisle, 2005; Witte et al., 2006). In Sample 5, 
the Suicidal Desire and Ideation factor (items 1-9) had an α of .92 and the Resolved Plans and 
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Preparations factor (items 12-14 and 16-18) had an α of .75. Items 10, 11, 15, and 19 were 
not analysed because they demonstrated weak factor loadings (> .32) or cross-loaded (< .32 
on both factors).  
Suicide Cognitions Scale (SCS; Rudd et al., in preparation). The SCS is an 18 
item self-report measure of suicidal beliefs. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from Strongly disagree to Strongly agree. Although the scale is unpublished, two studies 
have demonstrated that it has good psychometric properties, although there has been debate 
regarding whether a two- or three-factor structure is optimal (Bryan et al., 2014; Ellis & 
Ruffiano, 2015). A two-factor solution fit our data best (see Supplementary material for 
Chapter 5). The Unlovability factor (items 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 14-16, 18) had an α of .92 and the 
Unbearability factor (items 3, 5, 8, 11-13) had an α of .93. Items 10 and 17 were not analysed 
because they cross-loaded on both factors.   
Interpersonal Needs Questionnaire (INQ; Van Orden et al., 2012). The INQ is a 
15-item measure of the belief that other people would be better off without the respondent 
(Perceived burdensomeness) and a perception of a lack of interpersonal connections 
(Thwarted belongingness). Items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from Not at all 
true for me to Very true for me. The INQ has good psychometric properties (Hill et al., 2015; 
Van Orden et al., 2012). In Sample 5, the Perceived burdensomeness factor had an α of .93 
and the Thwarted belongingness factor had an α of .89.   
Mclean Screening Instrument for Borderline Personality Disorder (MSI-BPD; 
Zanarini et al., 2003). The MSI-BPD is a 10-item self-report measure which identifies 
individuals who are likely to meet the diagnostic criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder.  
Each DSM-IV BPD criterion is assessed with one item on the MSI-BPD, except for the 
paranoid ideation/dissociative symptoms criterion that is measured with two items on the 
MSI-BPD. Each item is rated on a Yes/No basis and a total score is computed. The scale has 
some demonstrated psychometric properties and a cutoff of 7 or more yielded good 
sensitivity (.81) and specificity (.85) for the diagnosis of DSM-IV BPD (Zanarini et al., 
2003). Item 2 assesses intentional physical injury with and without suicidal intent; this item 
was omitted to avoid confounding results. In Sample 5, the MSI-BPD had an α of .74.  
Brief Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (BEAQ; Gamez et al., 2014). The 
BEAQ is a 15-item measure of experiential avoidance, which can be defined as an 
unwillingness to remain in contact with distressing emotions, thoughts, memories, and 
physical sensations, even when doing so creates harm in the long run (Hayes, Strosahl, & 
Wilson, 1999). Items are rated on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly disagree to 
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Strongly agree. The scale has reasonable psychometric properties (Gamez et al., 2014). In 
Sample 5, the BEAQ had an α of .86.  
Short Form Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-4; Cohen et al., 1983). The PSS-4 is a 4-
item self-report measure of the subjective experience of stress, rated for the past month. 
Respondents use a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Never to Very often. The scale has good 
psychometric properties (Cohen et al., 1983; Warttig et al, 2013). In Sample 5, the PSS-4 had 
an α of .80.  
Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS; Zimet, Dahlem, 
Zimet & Farley, 1988). The MSPSS is a 12-item self-report instrument designed to assess 
perceived social support from family, friends, and significant others. Items are rated on a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from Very strongly disagree to Very strongly agree and a total 
score is computed (Osman et al., 2014). The scale has good psychometric properties (Zimet 
et al., 1990). In Sample 5, the MSPSS had an α of .90. 
5.3.6. Measures Completed by Sample 6 
Depressive Symptom Inventory-Suicidality Subscale (DSI-SS; Metalsky & 
Joiner, 1997). The DSI-SS is a 4-item self-report questionnaire designed to identify the 
frequency and intensity of suicidal ideation and impulses in the past two weeks, rated on a 4-
point scale. The scale has been shown to have reasonable psychometric properties (Joiner, 
Pfaff & Acres, 2002). The DSI-SS had an α of .89 in Sample 6. 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The 
DERS is a 36-item self-report measure of difficulties regulating various dimensions of 
negative emotion. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Almost never to 
Almost always. Factor analytic studies to date have produced mixed results, although the 
majority of studies support a six factor model (Fowler et al., 2014). The DERS’ subscales 
demonstrated the following alpha coefficients in Sample 6: Nonacceptance of emotional 
responses (α = .90), Difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior when experiencing 
negative emotions (α = .86), Impulse control difficulties when experiencing negative 
emotions (α = .81), Lack of emotional awareness (α = .84), Limited access to emotion 
regulation strategies (α = .87), and Lack of emotional clarity (α = .87). 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale-Positive (DERS-Positive; Weiss, Gratz 
& Lavender, 2015). The DERS-Positive is a 13-item self-report measure of difficulties 
regulating various dimensions of positive emotion. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from Almost never to Almost always. The DERS-Positive’s subscales demonstrated 
the following alpha coefficients in Sample 6: Nonacceptance of Positive Emotions (α = .87), 
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Difficulties engaging in goal-directed behavior when experiencing positive emotions (α = 
.93), and Difficulties controlling behaviors when experiencing positive emotions (α = .93). 
Emotion Reactivity Scale (ERS; Nock, Wedig, Holmberg & Hooley, 2008). The 
ERS is a 21-item self-report measure of the sensitivity, intensity, and duration of emotions, 
rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Not at all like me to Completely like me. The 
scale has some demonstrated psychometric properties that were based on a single, small 
sample (Nock et al., 2008). The ERS had an α of .91 in Sample 6.  
Brief Reasons for Living Scale (BRFLS; Ivanoff, Jang, Smyth & Linehan, 1994). 
The BRFLS is a short measure of reasons for living. There are six subscales and items are 
rated on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from Not at all important to Extremely important. The 
scale has good psychometric properties and is widely used (Ivanoff et al., 1994). The RFL’s 
subscales demonstrated the following alpha coefficients in Sample 6: Survival and coping 
beliefs (α = .49), Responsibility to family (α = .79), Child-related concerns (α = .95), Fear of 
suicide (α = .70), Fear of social disapproval (α = .81), and Moral objections (α = .75).  
Current mood. Participants were asked to select which of eight moods 
(energetic/alert, enthusiastic/euphoric, peaceful/serene, relaxed/calm, tired/sluggish, 
sad/down, tense/upset, anxious/jittery) best described how they “currently feel, right now.” 
The eight affective states used were adapted from the 12-Point Affect Circumplex Scales 
(Yik, Russell & Steiger., 2011) and were used to compute four mutually exclusive 
combinations of valence (positive/negative) and arousal (activated/deactivated). 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen & Griffin, 1985). 
The SWLS is a 5-item measure of participants’ global assessments of how satisfied they are 
with their lives. Items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly disagree to 
Strongly agree. The SWLS had an α of .86 in Sample 6. 
Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999). The SHS 
contains 4 items that are assessed on a 7-point Likert scale. 2 items ask respondents to 
characterize their happiness using absolute ratings and ratings relative to peers; 2 items offer 
brief descriptions of happy and unhappy individuals and ask respondents the extent to which 
each characterization describes them. Responses to the 4 items are combined. The SHS has 
reasonably good published psychometric properties (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999). 
However, Item 4, which is reverse-scored, performed quite oddly in Sample 6; the 
distribution of responses to items 1-3 demonstrated a fairly neat positive skew, whereas the 
distribution of responses to item 4 resembled an inverted U, suggesting that respondents 
found this item unclear. Item 4 demonstrated an almost zero correlation with items 1-3 and 
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drastically impacted α. This item was therefore omitted from analyses; items 1-3 
demonstrated an α of .90. 
Subjective Vitality Scale (SVS; Ryan & Frederick, 1997). The SVS consists of 6 
items and taps perceptions of being full of energy and alive rated on a 1 (Not at all true) to 7 
(Very true) scale (Bostic, Rubio & Hood., 2000; Ryan & Frederick, 1997). The SVS has good 
psychometric properties (Bostic et al., 2000; Ryan & Frederick, 1997). The SVS had an α of 
.88 in Sample 6. 
Missing Data 
There was relatively small amounts of missing data in several samples (>8%, 
although the ISAS and IMSA were missing 23% and 44% of data; see Supplementary 
material for Chapter 5), which was not missing completely at random (MCAR). We multiply 
imputed missing data on all variables at the item level (Gottschall, West & Enders, 2012) 
using SPSS version 21.0 (IBM Corp, 2012). Predictive mean matching imputation was used 
because the data were somewhat skewed (White, Royston & Wood, 2011) and the number of 
imputations was matched to the percentage of missing information (Bodner, 2008; Graham, 
Olchowski & Gilreath, 2007; White et al., 2011). Multiple imputation is increasingly 
advocated as the optimal approach for dealing with missing data (Graham, 2009; Schafer & 
Graham, 2002; Shrive, Stuart, Quan & Ghali, 2006) and there is evidence that MI performs 
well across different circumstances, such as small samples, very large multiple regressions, 
and when there are large amounts of missing data (Graham & Schafer, 1999).  
5.4. Results 
5.4.1. Internal Consistency and Test-Retest Reliability 
Table 1 presents internal consistency reliabilities (coefficient alphas) and average 
interitem correlations (AICs) for the SABS and NSIBS across four samples. The alpha 
reliabilities are consistently strong. They range from .75 to .89. Eight of the 76 coefficients 
fall below α = .80, and every subscale reaches or exceeds α = .80 in at least two samples. We 
also computed AICs because they provide a straightforward measure of internal consistency 
that is not affected by the number of items and because coefficient alpha underestimates true 
reliability (Novick & Lewis, 1967; Sijtsma, 2009). AICs of around .15 measure relatively 
broad constructs and AICs of around .50 measure relatively narrow constructs (Briggs & 
Cheek, 1986; Clark & Watson, 1995). The subscales of the SABS and NSIBS demonstrate 
high AICs, indicating that each subscale measures a relatively narrow and specific dimension 
of SICs. The AICs for the total score on each scale provides evidence that the SABS and the 
NSIBS tap a range of moderately related content. 
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Table 1 also presents the test retest reliabilities of the SABS and NSIBS over 2-4 
weeks (M = 18 days, Median = 17 days for Samples 5 and 6). The ICC statistics indicate 
“moderate” to “excellent” agreement over time (Fleiss, 1986; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
The NSIBS subscales and total score tend to demonstrate higher test retest reliability than the 
SABS subscales and total score.  
5.4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
SABS and NSIBS Subscale Means and Standard Deviations. Table 1 presents the 
means and standard deviations for the SABS and NSIBS in four samples. Our samples 
endorsed the SABS Stigma (M = 4.79), Self-punishment (M = 4.68), and Escape (M = 4.09) 
subscales most strongly and the Belonging (M = 1.82) and Revenge (M = 2.37) subscales the 
least. They endorsed the NSIBS Self-punishment (M = 5.34), Escape (M = 5.32), and Stigma 
(M = 5.17) subscales most strongly and the Belonging (M = 1.93) and Interpersonal influence 
(M = 2.44) subscales the least. On average, the NSIBS subscales were endorsed more 
strongly (M = 4.28) than the SABS subscales (M = 3.44).  
Relationships between demographic characteristics and the subscales of the SABS 
and NSIBS were explored in a series of analyses in Samples 5 and 6, our two largest samples. 
All post-hoc comparisons were exploratory. Tables presenting these results are displayed in 
the Supplementary material for Chapter 5 and the main findings are discussed below. 
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Table 1. Means, Internal Consistency Reliabilities (Coefficient Alphas), Average Interitem Correlations (AICs), and Test Retest Reliabilities for 
the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) and Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS) 
 Sample 3 (N = 484) Sample 4 (N = 380)1 Sample 5 (N = 664; 1302) Sample 6 (N = 650; 1352) 
Subscales (Number of Items) M SD α AIC M SD α M SD α AIC ICC M SD α AIC ICC 
SABS (26)                  
Self-punishment (3) 4.83 1.75 .80 .58 4.59 1.98 .84 4.64 2.01 .87 .69 .73 4.65 2.01 .86 .68 .82 
Escape (4) 4.20 1.58 .77 .46 4.17 1.80 .82 3.98 1.80 .82 .54 .67 4.01 1.75 .82 .53 .63 
Dependence (5) 2.91 1.45 .81 .47 3.15 1.55 .81 2.96 1.48 .80 .44 .54 3.00 1.47 .80 .45 .63 
Belonging (3) 1.88 1.13 .80 .57 1.93 1.32 .85 1.75 1.16 .84 .64 .49 1.73 1.11 .83 .64 .58 
Revenge (4) 2.48 1.48 .81 .51 2.51 1.57 .81 2.27 1.46 .82 .54 .64 2.21 1.40 .81 .52 .69 
Stigma (4) 5.08 1.39 .75 .43 4.55 1.70 .78 4.79 1.67 .82 .53 .67 4.73 1.73 .83 .55 .71 
Eliciting help (3) 3.66 1.69 .78 .55 3.17 1.70 .77 3.29 1.71 .81 .59 .71 3.19 1.71 .81 .60 .66 
Total score (range = 26-182) 92.68 24.44 .88 .22 89.74 53.15 .91 88.03 29.71 .92 .30 .70 87.48 29.36 .92 .30 .71 
NSIBS (39)                  
Self-punishment (4) 5.50 1.65 .89 .67 5.08 1.72 .85 5.38 1.56 .86 .60 .68 5.39 1.57 .87 .63 .84 
Dependence (4) 3.97 1.65 .81 .62 3.89 1.74 .83 4.10 1.65 .82 .53 .79 4.11 1.60 .82 .54 .81 
Escape (4) 5.38 1.55 .85 .58 5.26 1.64 .87 5.37 1.50 .83 .55 .75 5.26 1.54 .83 .55 .74 
Anti-dissociation (3) 5.15 1.71 .84 .63 4.78 1.78 .81 5.02 1.68 .83 .62 .73 4.91 1.72 .84 .64 .80 
Problematic (5) 4.92 1.31 .76 .39 4.77 1.46 .80 4.95 1.38 .78 .42 .85 4.92 1.40 .81 .46 .83 
Anti-suicide (3) 4.90 1.84 .86 .66 4.76 1.89 .86 4.92 1.85 .87 .70 .75 4.85 1.89 .89 .73 .82 
Enjoyable (4) 4.09 1.67 .83 .54 3.70 1.68 .81 4.09 1.63 .81 .51 .71 4.09 1.62 .82 .53 .78 
Belonging (3) 1.91 1.21 .81 .59 2.07 1.43 .83 1.90 1.26 .84 .65 .62 1.83 1.19 .83 .63 .69 
Stigma (4) 5.33 1.40 .80 .51 4.83 1.61 .79 5.29 1.48 .83 .55 .76 5.21 1.50 .83 .54 .77 
Interpersonal influence (5) 2.47 1.40 .84 .51 2.74 1.37 .87 2.32 1.32 .83 .51 .63 2.21 1.26 .83 .50 .82 
Total score (range = 39-273) 169.91 36.28 .92 .22 162.10 78.07 .94 168.83 37.47 .93 .24 .77 166.66 36.25 .92 .22 .88 
Note. ICC = Single Measure Two-Way Mixed Absolute Agreement Intraclass Correlation Coefficient of Test Retest Reliability. 1It was not 
possible to compute an AIC for Sample 4 using multiply imputed data; 2Denotes Time 2 sample sizes. 
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Age. Correlations between age and the subscales of the SABS and NSIBS were 
consistently “small” (Cohen, 1998) and negative. Correlations between age and the subscales 
of the SABS ranged from r = .00 to r = -.15, with most scores ~r = .07. About half of these 
correlations were statistically significant. Eliciting help demonstrated the largest correlations 
with age (r = -.12, -.15) and was the only SABS subscale to demonstrate a statistically 
significant negative correlation with age in both samples. Correlations between age and the 
subscales of the NSIBS ranged from r = -.03 to r = -.23 (most scores ~r = .12) and were 
generally statistically significant. Self-punishment, Dependence, Anti-dissociation, 
Problematic, Anti-suicide, and Stigma all demonstrated statistically significant negative 
correlations with age in both samples.  
Gender. There were relatively few statistically significant main effects for gender 
across the subscales of the SABS and NSIBS. The SABS Stigma and NSIBS Anti-
dissociation and Belonging subscales demonstrated statistically significant post-hoc 
differences, although there was no particular pattern to these differences, with males, for 
example, sometimes demonstrating higher average scores on a particular subscale and 
sometimes demonstrating lower average scores on another subscale. None of the SABS or 
NSIBS subscales demonstrated statistically significant main effects for gender across both 
samples.  
Ethnicity. There were relatively few statistically significant main effects for ethnicity 
across the subscales of the SABS and NSIBS. The SABS Stigma subscale was the only 
subscale to demonstrate statistically significant post-hoc differences; people reporting a 
Mixed/Multiple ethnic group ethnicity, on average,  scored higher than people reporting an 
Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese) ethnicity. None of the SABS or NSIBS 
subscales demonstrated statistically significant main effects for ethnicity in both samples. 
Marital Status. Seven of the 17 SABS/NSIBS subscales demonstrated statistically 
significant main effects for marital status. There was a pattern across five of the subscales 
(SABS Self-punishment, NSIBS Anti-dissociation, Problematic, Escape, and Belonging) for 
single people to score higher on particular subscales, on average, than married people. None 
of the SABS or NSIBS subscales demonstrated statistically significant main effects for 
marital status in both samples. 
Employment Status. Statistically significant main effects were observed in about 
half of the SABS and NSIBS subscales for employment status. Unemployed people tended, 
on average, to score higher on SABS and NSIBS subscales than people who were employed, 
self-employed, or a student. Students tended, on average, to score higher on SABS and 
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NSIBS subscales than people who were employed or self-employed, although post-hoc 
differences were not always statistically significant. The SABS Dependence and NSIBS 
Interpersonal influence and Anti-suicide subscales demonstrated statistically significant main 
effects for employment status across both samples.  
Level of Education. Statistically significant main effects were observed in five of the 
seven SABS subscales and none of the ten NSIBS subscales for level of education. Post hoc 
comparisons indicated that people with a Master’s degree tended, on average to score 
statistically significantly lower on SABS and NSIBS subscales than people with higher or 
lower levels of education. There were no other consistent post hoc group differences across 
levels of education. The SABS Stigma, Self-punishment, and Escape subscales and NSIBS 
Anti-dissociation, Dependence, Anti-suicide, Enjoyable, and Belonging subscales all 
demonstrated statistically significant main effects for employment status in both samples.  
Annual Income. Statistically significant main effects were observed for one of the 
seven SABS subscales and eight of the ten NSIBS subscales for annual income. Very few of 
the post hoc comparisons were statistically significant. There appeared to be a trend for 
scores to be lower in the higher income categories than the lower income categories but these 
post hoc comparisons were rarely statistically significant. None of the SABS or NSIBS 
subscales demonstrated statistically significant main effects for income in both samples.  
Current Mood. We also examined whether responses to the SABS and NSIBS are 
influenced by current mood. Statistically significant relationships were found between current 
mood and the SABS Self-punishment (F(3,646) = 5.81, p < .001) and Dependence (F(3,646) 
= 5.14, p < .01) subscales. Posthoc comparisons indicated that, for both subscales, 
participants experiencing a deactivated positive current mood (peaceful/serene, relaxed/calm) 
reported statistically significantly lower scores on these subscales than participants 
experiencing an activated negative current mood (tense/upset, anxious/jittery) or a 
deactivated negative current mood (tired/sluggish, sad/down).  
Statistically significant relationships were found between current mood and the 
NSIBS Escape (F(3,646) = 4.49, p < .01), Self-punishment (F(3,646) = 6.42, p < .001), Anti-
dissociation (F(3,646) = 3.34, p < .05), Stigma (F(3,646) = 3.35, p < .05), Dependence 
(F(3,646) = 9.92, p < .001), and Anti-suicide (F(3,646) = 2.67, p < .05) subscales. Again, 
participants reporting a deactivated positive current mood reported statistically significantly 
lower scores on these subscales than participants reporting an activated or deactivated 
negative current mood.  
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Overall, these results indicate that being in a deactivated positive current mood 
(feeling peaceful/serene, relaxed/calm) is associated with a lower likelihood of endorsing 
some subscales of the SABS and NSIBS than being in an activated negative current mood 
(tense/upset, anxious/jittery) or a deactivated negative current mood (tired/sluggish, 
sad/down). Interestingly, participants reporting an activated positive current mood 
(energetic/alert, enthusiastic/euphoric) did not differ significantly from those reporting other 
moods. 
5.4.3. Internal Structure of the SABS and NSIBS 
Subscale Correlations. For ease of presentation, and because means, standard 
deviations, and correlations do not meaningfully differ for Samples 5 and 6 (participants were 
randomly assigned to either study during data collection), we combined both samples to 
examine the correlations among the subscales of the SABS and the NSIBS (see Tables 2 and 
3). The SABS and NSIBS show good discriminant validity, with correlations generally in the 
moderate range. These data demonstrate that specific facets of SICs can be clearly 
distinguished from one another. The strongest correlations amongst the SABS subscales were 
observed between the Revenge and Belonging subscales (r = .59 and .63). The strongest 
correlations amongst the NSIBS subscales were observed between the Interpersonal 
influence and Belonging subscales (r = .62 and .70); the strength of these latter correlations 
indicates that these subscales are closely related, which is consistent with the fact that items 
from these scales merged to form one factor (Eliciting help) during the development of the 
SABS. 
Table 4 presents correlations between the SABS and NSIBS. These analyses provide 
important information regarding how closely related cognitions about SA are to cognitions 
about NSSI. These analyses are especially important given that five subscales (Self-
punishment, Escape, Dependence, Belonging and Stigma) convey such a similar theme in the 
SABS and NSIBS that these subscales were assigned the same label. The correlations 
presented in Table 4 show that the SABS is generally moderately correlated with the NSIBS. 
Many of the SABS subscales demonstrate virtually no correlation with the NSIBS subscales. 
It is particularly noteworthy that the subscales with identical labels (e.g., Self-punishment) 
exhibit “moderate” to “large” correlations (rs range from .22 to .61). Of the scales that carry 
identical labels, the Self-punishment subscales were most strongly correlated (rs = .53, .59, 
.61) and the Escape subscales were least strongly correlated (rs = .22, .35, .37). These results 
provide further evidence to support the discriminant validity of the subscales that make up the 
SABS and NSIBS.  
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Table 2 Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) Subscale Correlations 
 Self-
punishment 
Escape Dependence Belonging Stigma 
Eliciting 
help 
Revenge 
Self-
punishment 
 .56** .49** .13** .51** .28** .10 
Escape .60**  .59** .22** .51** .37** .23** 
Dependence .55** .61**  .40** .36** .35** .37** 
Belonging  .16** .26** .37**  .19** .46** .63** 
Stigma .60** .54** .39** .13**  .37** .23** 
Eliciting help .38** .40** .37** .47** .38**  .56** 
Revenge .22** .28** .39** .59** .21** .57**  
Note. Correlations for Samples 5 and 6 combined are shown below the diagonal (N = 1,314); 
correlations for Sample 4 are presented above the diagonal (N = 380). ** = p < .01 (2-tailed). 
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Table 3 Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS) Subscale Correlations 
 
Self-
punishment 
Dependence Escape 
Anti-
dissociation 
Problematic 
Anti-
suicide 
Enjoyable Belonging Stigma 
Interpersonal 
influence 
Self-
punishment 
 .50** .52** .51** .45** .51** .43** .13** .52** .30** 
Dependence .50**  .51** .48** .29** .54** .51** .29** .44** .47** 
Escape .45** .54**  .69** .35** .49** .58** .12** .48** .20** 
Anti-
dissociation 
.42** .46** .59**  .30** .47** .56** .17** .45** .23** 
Problematic  .36** .16** .19** .26**  .34** .19** .12** .50** .23** 
Anti-suicide .48** .53** .45** .47** .24**  .37** .20** .43** .33** 
Enjoyable .31** .45** .63** .50** -.03 .29**  .32** .39** .33** 
Belonging .09** .21** .16** .16** -.02 .12** .28**  .19** .70** 
Stigma .47** .45** .44** .42** .44** .44** .30** .10**  .29** 
Interpersonal 
influence  
.15** .20** .16** .15** .09** .19** .22** .62** .15**  
Note. Correlations for Samples 5 and 6 combined are shown below the diagonal (N = 1,314); correlations for Sample 4 are presented above the 
diagonal (N = 380). ** = p < .01 (2-tailed).
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Table 4 Correlations between the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) and Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS) 
 NSIBS subscales 
SABS 
subscales 
Self-
punishment 
Dependence Escape 
Anti-
dissociation 
Problematic 
Anti-
suicide 
Enjoyable Belonging Stigma 
Interpersonal 
influence 
Sample 4 (N = 380) 
Self-
punishment 
.53*** .38*** .25*** .25*** .20*** .33*** .25*** .07 .33*** .14* 
Escape .19*** .30*** .22*** .20*** .13* .25*** .21*** .14*** .18*** .18*** 
Dependence .20*** .41*** .11* .11* .00 .24*** .16*** .22*** .16*** .26*** 
Belonging  .08 .16*** .01 .04 .07 .09 .12* .51*** .13* .43*** 
Stigma .23*** .22*** .17*** .16*** .25*** .26*** .20*** .15*** .44*** .13* 
Eliciting help .17*** .22*** .09 .07 .15*** .20*** .12* .36*** .21*** .50*** 
Revenge .05 .12* -.04 -.06 .07 .12* .11* .44*** .11 .50*** 
Sample 5 (N = 664) 
Self-
punishment 
.61*** .46*** .28*** .30*** .18*** .47*** .20*** .13*** .38*** .19*** 
Escape .32*** .40*** .37*** .35*** .13*** .44*** .28*** .23*** .33*** .21*** 
Dependence .35*** .53*** .27*** .26*** .02 .34*** .28*** .28*** .23*** .26*** 
Belonging  .16*** .18*** .14*** .13*** .07 .16*** .20*** .60*** .10* .46*** 
Stigma .30*** .33*** .20*** .27*** .24*** .39*** .13*** .12*** .52*** .15*** 
Eliciting help .28*** .23*** .19*** .18*** .13*** .27*** .19*** .32*** .24*** .55*** 
Revenge .17*** .16*** .12*** .05 .05 .16*** .17*** .42*** .15*** .60*** 
Sample 6 (N = 650) 
Self-
punishment 
.59** .42** .33** .31** .20** .41** .20** .09* .43** .07 
Escape .27** .32** .35** .33** .12** .37** .25** .17** .27** .18** 
Dependence .26** .46** .22** .24** .02 .31** .24** .25** .23** .21** 
Belonging  .07 .12** .07 .09* .00 .11** .13** .57** .04 .49** 
Stigma .25** .26** .21** .25** .25** .29** .10* .07 .48** .11** 
Eliciting help .14** .21** .18** .16** .06 .20** .12** .38** .13** .57** 
Revenge .10** .14** .09* .09* -.01 .09* .18** .43** .10* .58** 
Note. * = p < .05 (2-tailed); *** = p < .001 (2-tailed). 
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Table 5 Correlations Between the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) and Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS) and Measures of 
Depressive Symptoms, Anxiety Symptoms, and Optimism 
  Subscales that are apparent in the SABS and the NSIBS Other SABS 
subscales 
Other NSIBS Subscales 
Scale Self-
punishment 
Escape Dependence Belonging Stigma Revenge 
Eliciting 
help 
Anti-
dissociation 
Problematic 
Anti-
suicide 
Enjoyable 
Interpersonal 
influence 
PHQ-8 
SABS .38*** .24*** .29*** .04 .32*** .01 .04      
NSIBS .24*** .12** .40*** .06 .18***   .18** .04 .33** .12** .02 
GAD-7 
SABS .35*** .23** .26*** .01 .34*** .00 .03      
NSIBS .23*** .18*** .40*** .03 .24***   .21** .07 .31** .15** .00 
IDAS-
Dysphoria 
SABS .47*** .23*** .29*** .03 .32*** .02 .06      
NSIBS .32*** .16*** .44*** .05 .23***   .21** .06 .36** .16** .04 
LOT-R 
SABS -.45*** -.19*** -.24*** .02 -.23*** -.04 -.04      
NSIBS -.31*** -.19*** -.40*** -.02 -.23***   -.19** -.02 -.33** -.15** -.05 
Note. Correlations in bold are statistically significantly larger than the corresponding coefficient for the similarly themed SABS or NSIBS 
subscale. * = p < .05 (2-tailed); *** = p < .001 (2-tailed). PHQ-8 = Patient Health Questionnaire; GAD-7 = Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7; 
IDAS-Dysphoria = Inventory of Depression and Anxiety Symptoms – Dysphoria subscale; LOT-R = Life Orientation Test-Revised. 
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5.4.4. Convergent and Discriminant Validity 
We now examine the convergent and discriminant validity of the SABS and NSIBS in 
relation to a range of other clinical and well-being measures (see Tables 5 to 8). Each Table is 
presented so as to allow easy comparison of the strength of correlations between the 
identically labelled SABS and NSIBS subscales. For example, comparing the strength of the 
correlation between the SABS Self-punishment subscale and the PHQ-8 with the strength of 
the NSIBS Self-punishment subscale and the PHQ-8. We tested whether subscales that are 
apparent in the SABS and the NSIBS had statistically significantly different correlations with 
other variables using Steiger’s (1980) modification of the Hotelling test for two correlations 
involving a common variable. 
Correlations with Depressive Symptoms, Anxiety Problems, and Optimism. 
Table 5 provides evidence that the SABS and NSIBS demonstrate negligible (e.g., r = .01) to 
large (e.g., r = .47) positive correlations with several measures of depressive symptoms and 
anxiety problems. Most of these correlations were “small” to “moderate” in size (Cohen, 
1998). The Self-punishment and Dependence subscales generally demonstrated the strongest 
correlations with depressive symptoms and anxiety problems. The Belonging, Revenge, 
Eliciting help, Problematic, and Interpersonal influence subscales demonstrated the weakest 
correlations with depressive symptoms. The SABS and NSIBS were negatively correlated 
with optimism and correlations were generally “small” to “moderate” in size (Cohen, 1998). 
Overall, Table 5 provides evidence to support the convergent and divergent validity of the 
SABS and NSIBS. 
Correlations with Existing Measures of the Reasons for SA and NSSI. Table 6 
presents the correlations between the SABS and NSIBS and the IMSA and the ISAS. The 
most obvious point to note is that the SABS and NSIBS and IMSA and ISAS are generally 
only weakly associated. Many of the correlations are trivial (≤r = .05). As would be expected, 
the SABS subscales were often more strongly associated with the IMSA subscales than the 
NSIBS subscales and the opposite was apparent for the NSIBS subscales in relation to the 
ISAS. These results indicate that measures pertaining to either SA or NSSI are somewhat 
more closely associated. However, these correlations were generally only modest in size.  
Some of the IMSA and ISAS subscales carry the same labels (Self-punishment, 
Escape, Anti-dissociation, Anti-suicide, Interpersonal influence, Revenge) or very similar 
labels (Belongingness, Influencing others) as SABS and NSIBS subscales and might 
therefore be thought to measure the same constructs. It is therefore noteworthy that the 
strongest correlation observed between identically named subscales was only r = .55. A 
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correlation of this magnitude is some distance away from indicating equivalence (Clark & 
Watson, 1995). Overall, the results presented in Table 6 indicate that the SABS and NSIBS 
are only somewhat related to existing measures that might be assumed to tap identical 
content.  
Correlations with Measures of Current Suicidal Ideation. Tables 7 and 8 present 
correlations between the SABS and NSIBS and the BSS and DSI-SS, two measures of 
current suicidal thinking. “Small” to “moderate” correlations (Cohen, 1998) were generally 
observed between the SABS and NSIBS and current suicidal thinking. The Self-punishment 
and Dependence subscales demonstrated “large” correlations (Cohen, 1998). When 
identically named SABS/NSIBS subscales were compared, SABS subscales tended to be 
more strongly positively correlated with current suicidal thinking than NSIBS subscales, 
although the difference between correlations tended to be fairly small. Eliciting help and 
Problematic were the only SABS/NSIBS subscales to demonstrate a stronger relationship 
with the BSS Plans and preparations factor than the Desire and ideation factor. These results 
indicate that the SABS and NSIBS were somewhat related to current suicidal thinking, 
particularly suicidal desire and ideation. As would be expected, the SABS was more closely 
related to current suicidal thinking than the NSIBS. 
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Table 6 Correlations Between the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) and Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS) and Existing 
Measures of the Reasons for Attempting Suicide and Engaging in Nonsuicidal Self-Injury 
  Subscales that are apparent in the SABS and the NSIBS Other SABS 
subscales 
Other NSIBS Subscales 
Scale/Subscale Self-
punishment 
Escape Dependence Belonging Stigma Revenge 
Eliciting 
help 
Anti-
dissociation 
Problematic 
Anti-
suicide 
Enjoyable 
Interpersonal 
influence 
IMSA             
Hopelessness 
SABS .25*** .20*** .11 -.16* .25*** -.15* .01      
NSIBS .14* .19*** .07 -.03 .15*   .16*** .05 .14* .10 -.10 
Psychache/ 
Unbearability 
SABS .26*** .26*** .12 -.18*** .25*** -.18*** .05      
NSIBS .11*** .18*** .11 -.06 .11   .18*** .03 .14* .11 -.08 
Escape 
SABS .36*** .21*** .15* -.11 .21*** -.07 .05      
NSIBS .30*** .23*** .16*** -.02 .21***   .19*** .11 .17*** .13* .01 
Problem 
solving 
SABS .07 .07 .14* .10 .11 .15* .10      
NSIBS .04 .05 .04 .11 .09   .00 -.01 .01 .07 .09 
Impulsivity 
SABS -.15* -.10 -.01 .17*** -.09 .25*** .08      
NSIBS -.02 -.01 -.01 .12 .00   .01 .01 -.02 .03 .18*** 
Burdensome-
ness 
SABS .30*** .12 .13* -.07 .19*** -.07 -.01      
NSIBS .20*** .15* .14* -.04 .21***   .10 .06 .15* .09 .00 
Belonging-
ness 
SABS .15* .06 .13 .04 .12 .08 .04      
NSIBS .16*** .11 .10 .07 .18***   .08 .03 .12 .07 .06 
Fearlessness/ 
Capability 
SABS .11 .13 .13 -.01 .14 .02 .03      
NSIBS .08 .09 .18*** .04 .14*   .13* .09 .13* .09 .07 
Influencing 
others 
SABS -.23*** -.20*** -.02 .29*** -.20*** .39*** .14*      
NSIBS -.07 -.12* -.04 .23*** -.05   -.15*** -.01 -.07 -.03 .24*** 
Help seeking 
SABS -.08 -.05 .06 .24*** -.12 .25*** .30***      
NSIBS .01 -.04 .05 .21*** .00   -.05 .01 .00 .02 .34*** 
ISAS             
Affect 
regulation 
SABS .23*** .17*** .08 -.10 .07 -.14* -.03      
NSIBS .25*** .47*** .27* -.07 .25***   .39*** .11 .23*** .31*** -.05 
Interpersonal 
boundaries 
SABS .07 .08 .16*** .25*** .09 .27*** .15*      
NSIBS .02 -.12 .09 .29*** .00   -.03 -.06 .00 .13 .24*** 
Self-
punishment 
SABS .38*** .16*** .08 -.03 .18*** -.05 .09      
NSIBS .54*** .26*** .25* -.07 .28***   .26*** .18*** .23*** .22*** .04 
Self-care 
SABS .11 .11 .07 .12* .08 .10 .11      
NSIBS .15* .15* .21* .16*** .17***   .20*** .03 .14* .22*** .20*** 
Anti-
dissociation 
SABS .27*** .27*** .12* -.01 .18*** -.05 .05      
NSIBS .25*** .35*** .29* .02 .24***   .55*** .11 .26*** .29*** .07 
Anti-suicide 
SABS .26*** .26*** .21*** -.01 .23*** -.01 .13*      
NSIBS .22*** .29*** .32*** .04 .21***   .32*** .16*** .61*** .19*** .06 
SABS -.02 .05 .13* .22*** .01 .30*** .13*      
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Sensation-
seeking 
NSIBS -.05 -.11 .07 .28*** -.04   -.02 -.08 -.02 .18*** .23*** 
Peer-bonding 
SABS -.05 -.04 .01 .20*** -.01 .23*** .10      
NSIBS -.07 -.19* -.03 .22*** -.06   -.14* -.10 -.04 .05 .17* 
Interpersonal 
influence 
SABS -.07 -.01 .06 .20*** -.03 .31*** .31***      
NSIBS .00 -.12 .05 .34* .02   -.07 -.02 .08 .03 .47*** 
Toughness 
SABS .10 .13* .15* .19*** .13* .30*** .18***      
NSIBS .10 -.03 .15*** .22*** .07   .06 -.01 .13* .25*** .24*** 
Marking 
distress 
SABS .20*** .17*** .17*** .14* .12* .23*** .30***      
NSIBS .23*** .10 .23*** .13* .25*   .15* .02 .23*** .19*** .25*** 
Revenge 
SABS -.06 -.01 .07 .26*** -.03 .40*** .18***      
NSIBS -.02 -.17* .04 .34*** -.04   -.14* -.06 -.02 .01 .42*** 
Autonomy 
SABS .04 .12 .16*** .21*** .08 .25*** .12*      
NSIBS .01 -.10 .05 .20*** -.04   .01 -.10 .02 .15* .15* 
Note. Correlations in bold are statistically significantly larger than the corresponding coefficient for the similarly themed SABS or NSIBS 
subscale. * = p < .05 (2-tailed); *** = p < .001 (2-tailed). IMSA = Inventory of Motivations for Suicide Attempts; ISAS = Inventory of 
Statements about Self-Injury. 
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Table 7 Correlations Between the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) and Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS) and Clinical and 
Well-Being Variables in Sample 5 
  Subscales that are apparent in the SABS and the NSIBS Other SABS 
subscales 
Other NSIBS Subscales 
Scale/Subscale Self-
punishment 
Escape Dependence Belonging Stigma Revenge 
Eliciting 
help 
Anti-
dissociation 
Problematic 
Anti-
suicide 
Enjoyable 
Interpersonal 
influence 
BSS             
Desire and 
ideation 
SABS .46** .32** .48** .04 .27** .07 .08*      
NSIBS .30** .16** .49** .04 .18**   .14** -.03 .36** .13** .03 
Plans and 
preparations 
SABS .33** .27** .31** .00 .25** .02 .09*      
NSIBS .13** .07 .33** .02 .10*   .07 -.08* .27** .11** -.01 
SCS             
Unlovability 
SABS .50** .33** .48** .10* .27** .10* .13**      
NSIBS .42** .21** .52** .10* .24**   .20** .05 .34** .16** .11** 
Unbearability 
SABS .40** .32** .40** .09* .31** .10* .15**      
NSIBS .27** .20** .48** .07 .24**   .22** .12** .32** .11** .12** 
INQ             
Perceived 
burdensomeness 
SABS .48** .28** .42** .07 .28** .11** .10**      
NSIBS .38** .19** .49** .08* .24**   .24** .09* .34** .14** .07 
Thwarted 
belongingness 
SABS .28** .18** .32** -.01 .21** .10** .04      
NSIBS .23** .10* .38** .03 .17**   .11** .02 .22** .10** .01 
              
MSI-BPD 
SABS .25** .21** .28** .15** .22** .21** .14**      
NSIBS .26** .21** .35** .16** .23**   .26** .14** .21** .19** .21** 
BEAQ 
SABS .35** .29** .33** .09* .24** .13** .16**      
NSIBS .34** .28** .41** .05 .24**   .29** .13** .27** .16** .14** 
PSS-4 
SABS .00 .02 -.03 .04 .05 .01 -.01      
NSIBS .04 .01 .02 -.04 .07   .04 .12** .03 .03 .00 
MSPSS 
SABS -.18** -.10** -.25** .03 -.12** -.04 .04      
NSIBS -.08* .03 -.20** .03 -.05   .01 .05 -.09* .00 .08* 
Note. Correlations in bold are statistically significantly larger than the corresponding coefficient for the similarly themed SABS or NSIBS 
subscale. * = p < .05 (2-tailed); ** = p < .01 (2-tailed). Desire and ideation = Beck Scale for Suicide Ideation - Suicidal Desire and Ideation 
subscale; Plans and preparations = Beck Scale for Suicide Ideation - Resolved Plans and Preparations subscale; Unlovability = Suicide 
Cognitions Scale – Unlovability subscale; Unbearability = Suicide Cognitions Scale – Unbearability subscale; Perceived burdensomeness = 
Interpersonal Needs Questionnaire - Perceived burdensomeness subscale; Thwarted belongingness = Interpersonal Needs Questionnaire - 
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Thwarted belongingness subscale; MSI-BPD = Mclean Screening Instrument for Borderline Personality Disorder; BEAQ = Brief Experiential 
Avoidance Questionnaire; PSS-4 = Short Form Perceived Stress Scale; MSPSS = Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support.  
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Table 8 Correlations Between the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) and Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS) and Clinical and 
Well-Being Variables in Sample 6 
  Subscales that are apparent in the SABS and the NSIBS Other SABS 
subscales 
Other NSIBS Subscales 
Scale/Subscale Self-
punishment 
Escape Dependence Belonging Stigma Revenge 
Eliciting 
help 
Anti-
dissociation 
Problematic 
Anti-
suicide 
Enjoyable 
Interpersonal 
influence 
DERS             
Nonacceptance 
SABS .30*** .12*** .09* -.03 .21*** -.04 -.02      
NSIBS .38*** .19*** .29*** -.04 .32***   .29*** .28*** .27*** .10* -.04 
Goals 
SABS .10* .08 .08* .03 .13*** .05 .12***      
NSIBS .20*** .13*** .19*** -.03 .18***   .13*** .18*** .16*** .03 .05 
Impulse 
SABS .30*** .27*** .30*** .08* .27*** .11*** .15***      
NSIBS .32*** .24*** .36*** .06 .29***   .28** .22*** .29*** .15*** .12*** 
Awareness 
SABS .22*** .08 .14*** .00 .16*** .01 .03      
NSIBS .17*** .16*** .23*** .01 .13***   .13*** .06 .08* .18** -.01 
Strategies 
SABS .35*** .22*** .27*** .00 .25*** .05 .12***      
NSIBS .41*** .27*** .42*** .01 .28***   .32*** .21*** .33*** .18*** .05 
Clarity 
SABS .24*** .17*** .18*** .02 .25*** .04 .12***      
NSIBS .19*** .21*** .30*** .04 .22***   .28*** .17*** .16*** .21*** .03 
DERS-P             
NonacceptanceP 
SABS .37*** .28*** .27*** .08* .25*** .08* .10*      
NSIBS .32*** .23*** .39*** .06 .25***   .25*** .11*** .26*** .17*** .00 
GoalsP 
SABS .11*** .15*** .18*** .06 .13*** .07 .07      
NSIBS .09* .13*** .17*** .07 .11***   .13*** .05 .16*** .10* .06 
ImpulseP 
SABS .19*** .24*** .21** .11*** .17*** .10* .10*      
NSIBS .16*** .20*** .24*** .11*** .12***   .20*** .08 .20*** .17*** .08 
BRFLS             
Survival 
SABS -.18*** -.09* -.22*** .14*** -.12*** .08* .05      
NSIBS -.06 -.09* -.26*** .07 -.10***   -.04 .06 -.12*** -.12*** .12*** 
Responsibility 
SABS -.08* -.07 -.17*** -.03 -.03 -.11*** -.03      
NSIBS .00 .03 -.10* -.07 .01   -.02 .12*** .01 -.09* -.02 
Children 
SABS -.05 -.07 -.05 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.09*      
NSIBS -.02 -.01 -.09* .02 -.01   -.03 .00 -.04 -.03 .01 
Fear 
SABS -.14*** -.11*** -.12*** .09* -.13*** .14*** .14***      
NSIBS -.02 -.04 -.10*** .09* -.06   -.05 .05 -.08* -.05 .16*** 
Stigma 
SABS -.04 -.03 .00 .14*** .03 .08* .04      
NSIBS .11*** .00 -.01 .10* .06   .05 .16** .01 .02 .11*** 
Morality 
SABS -.18*** -.09* -.22*** .14*** -.12*** .08* .05      
NSIBS -.06 -.09* -.26*** .07 -.10***   -.04 .06 -.12*** -.12*** .12*** 
              
DSI-SS SABS .34*** .22*** .38*** .00 .29*** .02 .12***      
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NSIBS .21*** .13*** .40*** .05 .19***   .16*** .07 .33*** .09* .02 
ERS 
SABS .26*** .19** .19*** .09* .22*** .12** .16***      
NSIBS .33*** .23*** .35*** .08* .26***   .26*** .17*** .26*** .16*** .15*** 
SWLS 
SABS -.26*** -.18*** -.23*** .01 -.17*** .01 -.01      
NSIBS -.18*** -.14*** -.24*** -.01 -.16***   -.12*** -.02 -.17*** -.07 .02 
SHS 
SABS -.31*** -.13*** -.20*** .05 -.22*** .04 -.07      
NSIBS -.28*** -.16*** -.37*** .03 -.22***   -.15*** -.07 -.18*** -.09* .06 
SVS 
SABS -.26*** -.11*** -.20*** .06 -.19*** .04 -.05      
NSIBS -.20*** -.16*** -.33*** .03 -.19***   -.13*** -.01 -.15*** -.07 .05 
Note. Correlations in bold are statistically significantly larger than the corresponding coefficient for the similarly themed SABS or NSIBS 
subscale. * = p < .05 (2-tailed); *** = p < .001 (2-tailed). Nonacceptance = Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS) - Nonacceptance of 
emotional responses subscale; Goals = DERS - Difficulty engaging in goal-directed behavior when experiencing negative emotions subscale; 
Impulse = DERS - Impulse control difficulties when experiencing negative emotions subscale; Awareness = DERS - Lack of emotional 
awareness subscale; Strategies = DERS - Limited access to emotion regulation strategies subscale; Clarity = DERS - Lack of emotional clarity 
subscale; NonacceptanceP = Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale-Positive (DERS-P) - Nonacceptance of positive emotions subscale; 
GoalsP = DERS-P - Difficulties engaging in goal-directed behavior subscale; ImpulseP = DERS-P – Impulse control difficulties subscale; 
Survival = Brief Reasons for Living Scale (BRFLS) - Survival and coping beliefs subscale; Responsibility = BRFLS - Responsibility to family 
subscale; Children = BRFLS - Child-related concerns subscale; Fear = BRFLS - Fear of suicide subscale; Stigma = BRFLS - Fear of social 
disapproval subscale; Morality = BRFLS - Moral objections subscale; DSI-SS = Depressive Symptom Inventory-Suicidality Subscale; ERS = 
Emotion Reactivity Scale; SWLS = Satisfaction with Life Scale; SHS = Subjective Happiness scale; SVS = Subjective Vitality Scale. 
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Correlations with Existing Measures of Suicidal Cognitions. Tables 7 and 8 
present correlations between the SABS and NSIBS and the SCS, INQ, and BRFLS, which 
measure perceptions that are thought to underlie suicidal thoughts and/or SA (Beck et al. 
1974; Rudd et al., in submission; Van Orden et al., 2008), and, in the case of the BRFLS, 
reasons to live. The SABS and NSIBS subscales were generally moderately positively 
correlated with perceptions of unlovability and unbearability, burdensomeness, and thwarted 
belongingness and neither scale evidenced consistently stronger associations with the SCS or 
INQ. The Self-punishment and Dependence subscales demonstrated stronger positive 
correlations with the SCS and INQ, a few of which were “large” correlations (Cohen, 1998). 
These results indicate that the SABS and NSIBS measure content that is not currently tapped 
by existing measures of suicidal cognitions. 
The SABS and NSIBS generally evidenced “small” negative correlations (Cohen, 
1998) with the BRFLS and the subscales of the BRFLS tended to be more strongly associated 
with the SABS than the NSIBS. These results are surprising, as they indicate that beliefs 
about SA and NSSI are barely correlated with reasons to live. 
Correlations with Related Clinical Constructs. Tables 7 and 8 present correlations 
between the SABS and NSIBS and symptoms of BPD, experiential avoidance, perceived 
stress, difficulties in regulation positive and negative emotions, and emotional reactivity. 
These associations were generally “small” to “moderate” in magnitude (Cohen, 1998) and the 
SABS and NSIBS generally evidenced equally strong associations with other variables. 
Interestingly, the SABS and NSIBS are almost completely uncorrelated with perceived stress.     
Correlations with Measures of Well-Being. Tables 7 and 8 present correlations 
between the SABS and NSIBS and several measures of well-being, including perceived 
social support (Table 7), satisfaction with life, and subjective happiness and vitality (Table 8). 
Again, these associations were generally “small” to “moderate” in magnitude (Cohen, 1998).  
5.4.5. Group Validity 
We explored whether the SABS and NSIBS could discriminate between theoretically 
relevant subgroups in a series of analyses that are reported in Table 9.  
History of Self-Injurious Thoughts and Behavior. Cognitive theory predicts that 
the strength of SA cognitions is associated with greater risk of SA (e.g., Rudd, 2000, 2006) 
and some previous research suggests that multiple attempters should be treated as distinct 
from single attempters and individuals with ideation but no previous attempts (Rudd, Joiner, 
& Rajab, 1996). We therefore explored whether the SABS could discriminate between four 
groups: (1) Individuals who had never experienced suicidal thoughts, (2) individuals who had 
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experienced suicidal thoughts but not taken action, (3) individuals who had made one SA, 
and (4) individuals who had made two or more SAs (see Table 9). Across two samples, we 
found statistically significant main effects for five of the seven SABS subscales and a fairly 
clear trend of participant’s increasingly endorsing the subscales of the SABS the more they 
had moved along the continuum from thoughts to making multiple SAs. The Belonging and 
Revenge subscales did not evidence statistically significant main effects.  
We are not aware of a cognitive theory that links NSSI cognitions to NSSI behavior in 
the manner specified by cognitive theories of SA but we see no reason to suspect that greater 
endorsement of NSSI cognitions would not be associated with an increased risk of NSSI. We 
explored whether the NSIBS could discriminate between three groups: (1) Individuals who 
had never experienced NSSI thoughts, (2) individuals who had experienced NSSI thoughts 
but not taken action, (3) individuals who had engaged in NSSI on two or more occasions 
(Table 9). Very few people (Sample 5: N = 1; Sample 6: N = 6) had engaged in NSSI once, so 
this category was therefore omitted. Across two samples, we found statistically significant 
main effects for eight of the ten NSIBS subscales. Again, there was a fairly clear trend that 
participants’ increasingly endorsed the subscales of the NSIBS the more they had moved 
along the continuum from thoughts to engaging in NSSI multiple times. The Belonging and 
Interpersonal influence subscales did not evidence statistically significant main effects in 
Sample 5 and, interestingly, participants’ endorsed the Belonging subscale less as they 
progressed along the continuum towards multiple NSSI episodes. Overall, these results 
indicate that SA and NSSI beliefs, as measured by the SABS and NSIBS, are closely 
associated with SA and NSSI behavior for most of the subscales of the SABS and NSIBS.  
Recency of Self-Injurious Behavior. If the SABS and NSIBS are important drivers 
of SA and NSSI behavior, more recent SA and NSSI behavior is likely to be associated with 
increased endorsement of the SABS and NSIBS. We tested this prediction by examining 
whether the SABS and NSIBS could discriminate between four groups who had engaged in 
SA or NSSI in the (1) past month, (2) past year, (3) 1-2 years ago, or (4) 2+ years ago (Table 
9). We found statistically significant main effects for three of the seven SABS subscales in 
both samples (Self-punishment, Escape, Dependence). Participants’ who made a SA 2+ years 
ago demonstrated statistically significantly lower scores on these subscales and there was a 
general, although not always statistically significant, trend for participants’ to endorse these 
subscales less with the passage of time.  
All of the NSIBS subscales demonstrated at least one statistically significant main 
effect for recency in one of the two samples. Seven of the ten NSIBS subscales demonstrated 
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a statistically significant main effect for recency in both samples. Post hoc comparisons 
indicated a fairly consistent trend over time wherein each increment of time was associated 
with statistically significantly lower NSIBS scores. Overall, these results indicate that people 
endorse the NSIBS more strongly the more recently they engaged in NSSI and people 
endorse some subscales of the SABS (especially Self-punishment, Escape, Dependence) more 
strongly the more recently they engaged in SA. 
Sensitivity analyses. We conducted a series of sensitivity analyses, re-running these 
analyses whilst controlling for NSSI history in the SA analyses and SA history in the NSSI 
analyses. All results for history and recency of self-injurious thoughts and behavior were 
unchanged. 
Probable BPD diagnosis. We explored the association between a likely BPD 
diagnosis and scores on the SABS and NSIBS (Table 9) because SA and NSSI are often 
assumed to be synonymous with BPD and both behaviors are symptoms of a BPD diagnosis. 
With one exception (NSIBS Problematic subscale), we found that the subscales of the SABS 
and NSIBS were statistically significantly more strongly endorsed by individuals who exceed 
the cutoff for a likely diagnosis of BPD (7/10 on the MSI-BPD) than those who scored under 
this cutoff. (As discussed in the Measures section, one item that assesses intentional physical 
injury with and without suicidal intent was omitted to avoid confounding results, making the 
cutoff of 7 more stringent). 
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Table 9 Self-Injurious Thoughts and Behavior History and Recency Group Differences for the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) and 
Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS) 
 History of Self-Injurious Thoughts and Behavior Recency of Self-Injurious Behavior Probable BPD diagnosis 
  Sample 5 (N = 664) Sample 6 (N = 650)  Sample 5 (N = 427) Sample 6 (N = 650) Sample 5 (N = 664) 
Subscale Group M SD F-
statistic 
M SD F-statistic Group M SD F-
statistic 
M SD F-
statistic 
Group M SD 
SABS   52.60***   50.92***    9.93***   5.57***    
Self-
punishment 
None 2.07a,b,f 1.58  2.26a,b,f 1.74  Past month 5.72a 1.51  5.83a 1.62  Under cutoff 3.78 2.06 
Thoughts 3.64c,d,f 1.99  3.71c,d,f 2.09  Past year 5.52b 1.69  5.56b 1.50    
Attempt 4.66a,c,e 1.96  4.63a,c,e 1.80  1-2 years 
ago 
5.74c 1.46  5.22 1.66  Over cutoff 4.82*** 1.96 
Multiple 5.39b,d,e 1.66  5.43b,d,e 1.60  2+ years 
ago 
4.74a,b,c 1.82  4.91 a,b 1.74    
    36.36***   37.94***    4.28*   9.31***    
Escape None 2.08a,b 1.65  2.19a,b 1.62  Past month 4.70a 1.43  5.18a 1.39  Under cutoff 3.35 1.88 
 Thoughts 3.21c,d 1.76  3.28c,d 1.75  Past year 4.60 1.68  4.72b 1.52    
 Attempt 3.97a,c,e 1.72  3.92a,c,e 1.59  1-2 years 
ago 
4.82b 1.48  4.62c 1.45  Over cutoff 4.11*** 1.75 
 Multiple 4.56b,d,e 1.59  4.62b,d,e 1.53  2+ years 
ago 
4.13a,b 1.67  4.01a,b, 
c 
1.59    
    20.54***   21.21****    14.76***   25.22***    
Dependence None 1.77a,b 1.12  1.83a 1.24  Past month 4.06a,b 1.42  4.44a,b,c 1.36  Under cutoff 2.31 1.23 
 Thoughts 2.49c 1.35  2.60b 1.34  Past year 3.42a,c 1.51  3.68a,d,e 1.44    
 Attempt 2.82a,d,e 1.34  2.66c 1.45  1-2 years 
ago 
3.42d 1.50  3.16b,d,f 1.26  Over cutoff 3.10*** 1.49 
 Multiple 3.35b,c,e 1.49  3.41a,b,c 1.44  2+ years 
ago 
2.78b,c,d 1.29  2.66c,e, f 1.33    
    1.55   1.06    1.60   4.19*    
Belonging None 1.73 1.10  1.57 1.14  Past month 1.89 1.29  1.89 1.29  Under cutoff 1.48 .95 
 Thoughts 1.88 1.25  1.83 1.22  Past year 1.73 1.17  1.84a 1.11    
 Attempt 1.79 1.09  1.63 0.98  1-2 years 
ago 
1.76 1.17  1.76 1.13  Over cutoff 1.81*** 1.19 
 Multiple 1.67 1.12  1.70 1.07  2+ years 
ago 
1.57 0.97  1.45a 0.83    
    1.89   1.35    1.09   2.39    
Revenge None 1.78 1.17  1.92 1.46  Past month 2.46 1.51  2.47 1.45  Under cutoff 1.89 1.28 
 Thoughts 2.37 1.51  2.31 1.50  Past year 2.33 1.60  2.17 1.32    
 Attempt 2.47 1.40  1.98 1.23  1-2 years 
ago 
2.13 1.34  2.34 1.38  Over cutoff 2.35*** 1.48 
 Multiple 2.18 1.45  2.21 1.37  2+ years 
ago 
2.13 1.33  1.97 1.29    
    41.23***   64.68***    1.32   2.21    
Stigma None 2.37a,b,e 1.79  2.33a,b,f 1.91  Past month 5.37 1.18  5.51 1.22  Under cutoff 4.17 1.83 
 Thoughts 4.08c,d,e 1.89  3.84c,d,f 1.84  Past year 5.37 1.30  5.51 1.19    
 Attempt 5.07a,c 1.20  4.80a,c,e 1.47  1-2 years 
ago 
5.28 1.20  5.25 1.36  Over cutoff 4.92*** 1.61 
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 Multiple 5.29b,d 1.33  5.44b,d,e 1.24  2+ years 
ago 
5.10 1.38  5.14 1.39    
    5.23*   7.07***    1.42   3.78*    
Eliciting 
help 
None 2.04a,b 1.44  2.09a 1.70  Past month 3.63 1.83  3.71 1.51  Under cutoff 2.92 1.74 
Thoughts 3.09 1.69  2.90b 1.75  Past year 3.62 1.69  3.53 1.64    
 Attempt 3.66a 1.77  3.28 1.48  1-2 years 
ago 
3.37 1.68  3.67a 1.71  Over cutoff 3.37* 1.70 
 Multiple 3.38b 1.70  3.43a,b 1.68  2+ years 
ago 
3.26 1.69  3.06a 1.60    
NSIBS   49.24***   30.90***    12.92***   8.77***    
Self-
punishment 
None 3.11a 2.09  3.14a,b 1.65  Past month 5.79a,b,c 1.29  5.74a 1.36  Under cutoff 4.86 1.85 
Thoughts 3.29b 1.53  4.72a 1.91  Past year 5.38a,d 1.43  5.44b 1.48    
 Multiple 5.52a,b 1.42  5.51b 1.48  1-2 years 
ago 
5.23b 1.41  5.17 1.72  Over cutoff 5.49*** 1.60 
        2+ years 
ago 
4.68c,d 1.73  4.81a,b 1.67    
    18.98***   15.83***    62.11***   67.00***    
Dependence None 2.52a 1.82  2.66a 1.57  Past month 4.83a,b,c 1.39  4.82a,b,c 1.29  Under cutoff 3.24 1.65 
 Thoughts 2.71b 1.60  3.13b 1.54  Past year 3.87a,d,e 1.45  3.99a,d,e 1.50    
 Multiple 4.20a,b 1.60  4.21a,b 1.57  1-2 years 
ago 
2.86b,d 1.35  3.28b,d,f 1.39  Over cutoff 4.29*** 1.72 
        2+ years 
ago 
2.89c,e 1.45  2.48c,e,f 1.30    
    56.64***   39.44***    12.68***   13.06***    
Escape None 3.19a 2.18  3.00a 1.63  Past month 5.77a,b,c 1.18  5.62a 1.28  Under cutoff 4.82 1.78 
 Thoughts 2.96b 1.85  4.01b 1.66  Past year 5.43a 1.34  5.41b 1.49    
 Multiple 5.52a,b 1.33  5.39a,b 1.44  1-2 years 
ago 
4.98b 1.33  5.01 1.53  Over cutoff 5.49*** 1.53 
        2+ years 
ago 
4.88c 1.74  4.51a,b 1.62    
    29.72***   20.33***    9.45***   9.25***    
Anti-
dissociation 
None 3.03a 2.20  2.89a,b 1.52  Past month 5.40a,b 1.43  5.31a,b 1.51  Under cutoff 4.35 1.96 
Thoughts 3.31b 1.94  4.26a 1.77  Past year 5.05 1.60  4.83a 1.75    
 Multiple 5.15a,b 1.58  5.01b 1.67  1-2 years 
ago 
4.67a 1.61  4.63 1.76  Over cutoff 5.17*** 1.72 
        2+ years 
ago 
4.43b 1.94  4.31b 1.84    
    25.46***   17.23***    2.69*   .51    
Problematic None 3.24a 2.22  3.47a 1.71  Past month 5.06 1.26  5.04 1.30  Under cutoff 4.76 1.53 
 Thoughts 4.11 1.95  4.26 1.73  Past year 4.83 1.30  4.94 1.35    
 Multiple 5.04a 1.27  5.01a 1.34  1-2 years 
ago 
5.19 1.19  4.86 1.73  Over cutoff 4.99 1.46 
        2+ years 
ago 
5.32 1.29  5.10 1.19    
    34.19***   16.03***    12.35***   6.84***    
Anti-suicide None 2.36a 1.82  2.99a 1.64  Past month 5.39a,b,c 1.61  5.19a 1.75  Under cutoff 4.39 2.25 
Thoughts 3.48b 1.86  3.91 1.98  Past year 4.88a,d 1.78  4.91b 1.82    
 Multiple 5.06a,b 1.76  4.96a 1.85  1-2 years 
ago 
4.65b 1.85  4.74 2.02  Over cutoff 5.04*** 1.89 
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        2+ years 
ago 
4.08c,d 1.94  4.11a,b 2.03    
    16.78***   10.34***    7.02***   7.68***    
Enjoyable None 2.71a 1.93  2.79a 1.45  Past month 4.36a,c 1.53  4.31a 1.56  Under cutoff 3.69 1.78 
 Thoughts 2.63b 1.91  3.44 1.80  Past year 4.23b 1.57  4.20b 1.61    
 Multiple 4.18a,b 1.57  4.16a 1.60  1-2 years 
ago 
3.64a,b 1.47  4.21c 1.54  Exceeds 
cutoff 
4.18* 1.72 
        2+ years 
ago 
3.59c 1.65  3.31a,b,c 1.55    
    .71   9.43***    2.73*   .51    
Belonging None 2.05 1.54  2.67a 1.54  Past month 1.94a 1.29  1.78 1.12  Under cutoff 1.68 1.21 
 Thoughts 2.24 1.59  2.41 1.41  Past year 1.93b 1.20  1.82 1.21    
 Multiple 1.89 1.24  1.77a 1.15  1-2 years 
ago 
1.93c 1.16  1.76 1.24  Over cutoff 1.95* 1.36 
        2+ years 
ago 
1.44a,b,c 1.06  1.62 1.11    
    46.67***   32.95***    3.47*   2.29    
Stigma None 3.13a 2.17  3.10a,c 1.53  Past month 5.57a 1.27  5.43 1.37  Under cutoff 4.92 1.71 
 Thoughts 3.45b 1.74  4.27b,c 1.67  Past year 5.18a 1.39  5.27 1.36    
 Multiple 5.42a,b 1.34  5.33a,b 1.41  1-2 years 
ago 
5.27 1.42  5.38 1.61  Over cutoff 5.36* 1.54 
        2+ years 
ago 
5.38 1.41  4.95 1.59    
    .38   6.60***    3.57*   3.09*    
Interpersonal 
influence 
None 2.23 1.49  2.97a 1.52  Past month 2.40a 1.37  2.09 1.15  Under cutoff 1.97 1.25 
Thoughts 2.60 1.56  2.71 1.37  Past year 2.36b 1.32  2.33 1.27    
 Multiple 2.31 1.31  2.16a 1.23  1-2 years 
ago 
2.15 1.10  2.41 1.58  Over cutoff 2.39*** 1.43 
        2+ years 
ago 
1.83a,b 1.04  1.91 1.17    
Note. BPD = Borderline Personality Disorder. For each subscale, values that share superscripts within each column statistically significantly 
differ from one-another (p < .05, 1-tailed). * = p < .05 (1-tailed); *** = p < .001 (1-tailed); all post-hoc analyses applied the Games-Howell post-
hoc test, which does not assume equal group sizes or homogeneous variances. Sample sizes for History of Self-Injurious Thoughts and Behavior: 
Sample 5 SABS None = 15, Thoughts = 222, Attempt = 84, Multiple = 343; NSIBS None = 26, Thoughts = 14, Multiple = 624; Sample 6 SABS 
None = 18, Thoughts = 222, Attempt = 81, Multiple = 329; NSIBS None = 24, Thoughts = 22, Multiple = 604. Sample sizes for Recency of 
Self-Injurious Behavior: Sample 5 SABS Past month = 65, Past year = 124, 1-2 years ago = 58, 2+ years ago = 180 (total = 427); NSIBS Past 
month = 340, Past year = 162, 1-2 years ago = 65, 2+ years ago = 57 (total = 624); Sample 6 SABS Past month = 44, Past year = 123, 1-2 years 
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ago = 89, 2+ years ago = 154 (total = 410); NSIBS Past month = 320, Past year = 171, 1-2 years ago = 45, 2+ years ago = 68 (total = 604); 
Sample sizes for Probable BPD diagnosis: 116 under cutoff, 548 over cutoff. 
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5.4.6. Incremental Validity 
The incremental validity of the SABS was explored in several hierarchical regressions 
involving a range of variables. Given that the subscales of the SABS are significantly 
correlated and, therefore, not completely independent, these analyses allowed us to identify 
which subscales showed unique, incremental power. Statistically significant univariate 
predictors were included in our multivariate models11.  
Depression, Anxiety Problems, and Optimism. We tested the incremental validity 
of the SABS in predicting lifetime SA thoughts and behavior above and beyond depressive 
symptoms (PHQ-8, IDAS-Dysphoria), anxiety problems (GAD-7), and optimism (LOT-R). 
Fully standardized coefficients are reported for logistic models (βstdXY) to enable the relative 
magnitude of effects to be examined (Menard, 2011). These analyses (see Supplementary 
material for Chapter 5) demonstrated that the Stigma (βstdXY = .96, p < .05, OR = 2.60) and 
Revenge (βstdXY = -.81, p < .05, OR = .45) subscales statistically significantly predicted 
lifetime suicidal thoughts, and that the SABS Belonging (βstdXY = -.39, p < .05, OR = .68), 
Stigma (βstdXY = .37, p < .05, OR = 1.44, Self-punishment (βstdXY = .63, p < .001, OR = 1.88), 
and Revenge (βstdXY = -.52, p < .05, OR = .59) subscales statistically significantly predicted 
lifetime suicidal behavior. When controlling for the NSIBS, the Stigma subscale statistically 
significantly predicted lifetime suicidal thoughts (βstdXY = 1.36, p < .05, OR = 3.88), and the 
Belonging (βstdXY = -.66, p < .05, OR = .52), Self-punishment (βstdXY = .88, p < .001, OR = 
2.40), and Revenge (βstdXY = -.53, p < .05, OR = .59) subscales statistically significantly 
predicted lifetime suicidal behavior. 
It was not possible to test the incremental validity of the NSIBS in similar analyses 
because the PHQ-8, IDAS-Dysphoria, GAD-7, and LOT-R were all non-significant 
univariate predictors and were therefore excluded from our multivariate models. These results 
do usefully demonstrate, though, that depressive symptoms, anxiety problems, and optimism 
are relatively more specific to SA than NSSI. 
Current Suicidal Thinking. We also explored whether the SABS provided 
incremental validity in predicting current suicidal thinking over and above a range of 
existing, theoretically important clinical constructs, and markers of well-being (Table 10). 
These analyses were conducted using two different measures of current suicidal thinking in 
                                                          
11 Because there is some debate as to whether it is useful to exclude nonsignificant univariate predictors from 
multivariate models, the multivariate regressions were rerun using the excluded variables. The nonsignificant 
predictors did not demonstrate statistically significant unique associations, change the significance of variables 
already in the model, or meaningfully increase R2.   
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Samples 5 and 6. Although we did not have theoretical reasons for examining demographic 
variables as predictors, we considered these for inclusion in the multivariate regressions in 
order to further clarify substantive relationships between demographic variables and our 
newly developed scales. Demographic variables were entered at Step 1, clinical and well-
being variables at Step 2, and the SABS subscales were entered at Step 3. 
The first of our linear regressions revealed that the SABS demonstrated a statistically 
significant ΔR2 of .04 in predicting total scores on the BSS when controlling for demographic 
variables, clinical variables (perceptions of unlovability, unbearability, burdensomeness, 
thwarted belongingness, symptoms of BPD, experiential avoidance, perceived stress), and 
social support. The Belonging (β = -.71, p < .05), Self-punishment (β = .84, p < .05), and 
Dependence (β = 1.44, p < .001) subscales statistically significantly predicted current suicidal 
thoughts.  
In the second linear regression, the SABS demonstrated a statistically significant ΔR2 
of .07 in predicting total scores on the DSI-SS when controlling for demographic variables, 
clinical variables (difficulties in regulating negative and positive emotions, reasons for living, 
emotional reactivity, current mood), and well-being variables (satisfaction with life, 
subjective happiness, subjective vitality). The Stigma (β = .36, p < .05), Escape (β = -.35, p < 
.05), and Dependence (β = .92, p < .001) subscales statistically significantly predicted current 
suicidal thoughts.  
Taken together, these analyses reveal that the SABS demonstrates incremental 
validity in predicting lifetime suicidal thoughts and behavior and current suicidal thoughts 
above and beyond a wide range of demographic, clinical, and well-being variables. Our linear 
regressions provided a robust test of incremental validity because they employed a 
continuous variable (which will have improved power; cf. MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher & 
Rucker, 2002) and included several theoretically important clinical covariates (e.g., 
perceptions of unlovability, unbearability, burdensomeness, thwarted belongingness, 
symptoms of BPD, experiential avoidance, difficulties in regulating negative and positive 
emotions, reasons for living, emotional reactivity). Our analyses demonstrate that the SABS 
could explain an additional 4% and 7% of variance in current suicidal thoughts when 
controlling for a wide range of demographic, clinical, and well-being variables. These figures 
exceed what might be hoped for in typical tests of incremental validity (Hunsley & Meyer, 
2003). 
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Table 10 Hierarchical Multivariate Linear Regressions Comparing the Incremental Validity of the Suicide Attempt Beliefs Scale (SABS) and 
Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Beliefs Scale (NSIBS) Against Demographic Variables, Established Clinical Predictors, and Well-Being Variables 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Variables B SE B β ΔR2 B SE B β ΔR2 B SE B β ΔR2 
Beck Scale for Suicide Ideation Total Score (Sample 5) 
    .04***    .44***    .04*** 
Constant 37.39*** .98 .01          
Level of education -.47 .33 -.07          
Income -.88** .30 -.13          
Marital status -.81 .43 -.08          
Constant     28.09*** 3.14 .00      
Level of education     -.02 .26 -.00      
Income     -.19 .24 -.03      
Marital status     -.13 .34 -.01      
SCS: Unlovability     .19*** .04 .32      
SCS: Unbearability     .10* .05 .11      
INQ: Burdensomeness     .22*** .04 .27      
INQ: Belongingness     -.05 .04 -.06      
BPD symptoms     -.09 .15 -.02      
Experiential avoidance     -.01 .03 -.03      
Perceived social support     -.10*** .02 -.19      
Constant         27.19*** 3.06 -.00  
Level of education         -.07 .26 -.01  
Income         -.25 .23 -.04  
Marital status         -.22 .33 -.02  
SCS: Unlovability         .15*** .04 .25  
SCS: Unbearability         .08 .05 .09  
INQ: Burdensomeness         .18*** .04 .22  
INQ: Belongingness         .04 .04 -.05  
BPD symptoms         -.06 .15 -.01  
Experiential avoidance         -.02 .03 -.05  
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Perceived social support         -.08*** .02 -.16  
SABS: Belonging         -.61* .31 -.09  
SABS: Stigma         .21 .21 .04  
SABS: Self-punishment         .42* .20 .10  
SABS: Eliciting help         -.29 .21 -.06  
SABS: Escape         .08 .21 .02  
SABS: Dependence         .97*** .26 .17  
SABS: Revenge         -.24 .26 -.04  
Depressive Symptom Inventory-Suicidality Subscale Total Score (Sample 6) 
    .05***    .27***    .07*** 
Constant 8.71*** .57 -.01          
Age -.01 .02 -.05          
Employment status .17 .12 .08          
Education level -.34** .13 -.13          
Income .01 .13 -.00          
Marital status -.29* .15 -.09          
Constant     8.84*** 1.33 -.01      
Age     -.01 .01 -.05      
Employment status     .10 .11 .05      
Education level     -.10 .12 -.04      
Income     .08 .11 .03      
Marital status     -.19 .13 -.06      
DERS: Nonacceptance     -.01 .02 -.03      
DERS: Goals     -.03 .03 -.04      
DERS: Impulse     .06* .03 .14      
DERS: Awareness     -.02 .02 -.03      
DERS: Strategies     .04 .03 .09      
DERS: Clarity     .03 .03 .05      
DERS-P: Nonacceptance     .06 .03 .09      
DERS-P: Goals     .00 .03 .00      
DERS-P: Impulse     .00 .03 .01      
BRFLS: Responsibility     -.06 .04 -.07      
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BRFLS: Children     -.03 .03 -.04      
BRFLS: Fear     -.01 .04 -.01      
BRFLS: Morality     -.21*** .05 -.19      
Emotion reactivity     .00 .01 -.01      
Current mood     .29 .17 .08      
Satisfaction with life     -.04* .02 -.10      
Subjective happiness     -.01 .00 -.08      
Subjective vitality     -.03 .02 -.08      
Constant         7.53*** 1.30 .00  
Age         -.02 .01 -.07  
Employment status         .06 .10 .03  
Education level         -.04 .11 -.01  
Income         .05 .11 .02  
Marital status         -.22 .13 -.07  
DERS: Nonacceptance         -.01 .02 -.02  
DERS: Goals         .00 .03 .01  
DERS: Impulse         .03 .03 .07  
DERS: Awareness         -.02 .02 -.04  
DERS: Strategies         .01 .03 .03  
DERS: Clarity         .02 .03 .04  
DERS-P: Nonacceptance         .04 .03 .06  
DERS-P: Goals         -.02 .03 -.04  
DERS-P: Impulse         .01 .03 .02  
BRFL: Responsibility         -.05 .04 -.06  
BRFL: Children         -.03 .03 -.05  
BRFL: Fear         .01 .04 .01  
BRFL: Morality         -.17* .05 -.15  
Emotion reactivity         .00 .01 .01  
Current mood         .32* .16 .09  
Satisfaction with life         -.03 .02 -.08  
Subjective happiness         -.01 .00 -.08  
Subjective vitality         -.03 .02 -.08  
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SABS: Belonging         -.16 .13 -.06  
SABS: Stigma         .21* .09 .12  
SABS: Self-punishment         -.02 .08 -.01  
SABS: Eliciting help         .03 .09 .02  
SABS: Escape         -.20* .09 -.12  
SABS: Dependence         .63*** .11 .31  
SABS: Revenge         -.08 .11 -.04  
Note. SCS = Suicide Cognitions Scale; INQ = Interpersonal Needs Questionnaire; BPD symptoms = Mclean Screening Instrument for 
Borderline Personality Disorder; Experiential Avoidance = Brief Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire; Perceived social support = 
Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support; DERS = Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale; DERS-P = Difficulties in Emotion 
Regulation Scale-Positive; BRFLS = Brief Reasons for Living Scale; Emotion reactivity = Emotion Reactivity Scale; Satisfaction with life = 
Satisfaction with Life Scale; Subjective happiness = Subjective Happiness Scale; Subjective vitality = Subjective Vitality Scale.  
The BRFL Survival subscale was excluded from the regression. * = p < .05 (2-tailed); ** = p < .01 (2-tailed); *** = p < .001 (2-tailed) 
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5.5. Discussion 
The SABS and NSIBS represent a significant advance in that they display very 
promising psychometric properties and appear to measure content beyond what is contained 
within existing instruments. These analyses also further demonstrate that the SABS and 
NSIBS need to be understood as related but separate measures: that beliefs about SA and 
NSSI are similar but separate. Both instruments demonstrated “moderate” to “excellent” test 
retest reliability over 2-4 weeks, consistent with our aim to measure beliefs (relatively 
enduring personal meanings for SA and NSSI that confer vulnerability across situations but 
which also potentially fluctuate or change due to a range of factors; Beck et al., 1979).  
Both instruments also demonstrated strong internal consistency. The AICs provided 
particularly useful information. They indicated that the subscales of the SABS and NSIBS 
measure relatively specific domains of SICs and that each instrument as a whole taps a range 
of distinct, moderately related content. We were particularly interested to find that many of 
the SABS subscales demonstrated virtually no relationship with the NSIBS subscales, and 
that even subscales that have identical labels across both instruments only evidence 
“moderate” to “large” correlations (Cohen, 1998). These results corroborate the structural 
analyses presented in Part I and further evidence that the SABS and NSIBS each measure 
separate constructs and are best understood as separate measures.  
We also presented a large range of correlations to support the convergent and 
divergent validity of the SABS and NSIBS. Three general findings emerged. First, the SABS 
and NSIBS each demonstrated “small” to “moderate” (Cohen, 1998) positive correlations 
with a range of clinical variables (depressive symptoms, anxiety symptoms, symptoms of 
BPD, experiential avoidance, perceived stress, difficulties in regulating positive and negative 
emotions, emotional reactivity) and “small” to “moderate” (Cohen, 1998) negative 
correlations with several measures of well-being (optimism, perceived social support, 
satisfaction with life, and subjective happiness and vitality). Second, correlations between the 
subscales of the SABS and NSIBS and other variables were sometimes similar in magnitude 
and sometimes differed by up to r = ~.15. This evidence further supports the notion that the 
SABS and NSIBS measure similar but separate content.   
Third, an important step in the development of any new instrument involves exploring 
associations between the newly developed instrument and existing, similar measures. The 
SABS and NSIBS both demonstrated “small” to “moderate” (Cohen, 1998) correlations with 
purportedly similar, existing constructs, including the reasons for SA and NSSI, reasons to 
live, current suicidal thinking, and perceptions of unlovability, unbearability, 
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burdensomeness, and thwarted belongingness. Critically, these results indicate that beliefs 
about SA and NSSI appear to be different to these existing constructs, at least in terms of the 
measures we used here. In contrast, the IMSA (May & Klonsky, 2013), for example, 
demonstrated large correlations with other measures of the reasons for SA, some of which 
were sufficiently large to indicate equivalence (<.75; Clark & Watson, 1995).  
We also found that the SABS significantly incrementally predicts previous and 
current self-injurious cognitions and behavior over and above demographic characteristics 
and the  clinical and well-being variables just discussed. Taken together, these findings 
further evidence that our scales relate in expected ways to a range of variables and suggest 
that the SABS and NSIBS represent a significant advance in that each measures content that 
is not currently within the measurement spotlight.  
Finally, we found that participants’ increasingly endorsed the SABS and NSIBS the 
more they had progressed from thoughts to taking action to engaging in multiple episodes of 
SA or NSSI, and the more recently they had made a SA or engaged in NSSI. These findings 
are consistent with cognitive theories that link the strength of SA cognitions to greater risk of 
SA (e.g., Rudd, 2000, 2006). They indicate that the SABS and NSIBS may be sensitive to 
changes over time and potentially implicate beliefs about SA and NSSI in the development 
and repetition of SA and NSSI, although a direct test of this hypothesis is of course required 
before any firm conclusions can be drawn. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
SA and NSSI beliefs convey what SA and NSSI means to each individual. They 
contrast with variables such as gender, age, or life events, which cannot be modified. In Part 
I, we proposed that strong endorsement of SICs may be a specific, defining, and time-varying 
feature of SA and NSSI, and may potentially explain why some people, at some times, 
engage in these behaviors specifically, rather than choosing to use an alternative self-
regulatory strategy (e.g., listen to music; go for a walk; problem-solve; ruminate; get drunk) 
in response to a particular internal or external trigger (e.g., emotional distress; social 
exclusion). This hypothesis is grounded in Beck’s (1976) concept of cognitive content 
specificity: the idea that the presence of particular cognitions differentially and uniquely 
predicts the development and maintenance of specific psychological problems. For example, 
the cognitions that characterise depression have been found to be different from those that 
characterise posttraumatic stress disorder (Ehring, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2008). We see SA 
and NSSI beliefs as being a central component of a relatively transient mode of mind that 
becomes strongly activated for short periods of time. This state of mind probably involves 
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corresponding information-processing biases and links between cognition, emotion, and 
behavior (cf. Beck & Haigh, 2014).  
From a cognitive-behavioral perspective (Beck, 2011; Powers, 2005; Young, Klosko 
& Weishaar, 2003), SIB is viewed as a response to the presence and activation of SA and 
NSSI beliefs. It follows that (i) whether or not a (relatively transient) intention to self-injure 
is formed; (ii) the specific, idiosyncratic details of each SIB episode (e.g., trigger, method, 
when to stop, function, onset, repetition); and (iii) whether each episode involves suicidal or 
nonsuicidal intent, would all be expected to be linked to or driven by activation of 
idiosyncratic SA and NSSI beliefs – which the SABS and NSIBS measure.  
Whilst we believe that these hypotheses seem plausible, they are untested. The 
starting point for investigating such questions was developing the SABS and NSIBS; further 
research is now needed to test whether, under what circumstances, and for whom, SA and 
NSSI beliefs cause or drive (future) SIB, and to pit the predictive ability of the SABS and 
NSIBS against other measures (e.g., defeat/entrapment; Siddaway, Taylor, Wood & Schulz, 
2015). Establishing the incidence of SA and NSSI beliefs (rather than the presence/absence of 
suicidal thoughts or behavior) would extend current epidemiological research.  
We were surprised that the SABS and NSIBS generally evidenced “small” negative 
correlations (Cohen, 1998) with the BRFLS. It is possible that these results occurred because 
the BRFLS has just two items per subscale, or because the items of the BRFLS appear to 
measure reasons to live (e.g., “I believe I can find a purpose in life, a reason to live”) and 
reasons for not making a SA (e.g., “I do not want to die”), which may have clouded 
relationships. Correlations between the SABS and NSIBS and reasons to live need replicating 
using the full-length Reasons for Living Inventory (Linehan, Goodstein, Nielsen, & Chiles, 
1983), although this scale also appears to contain items that tap a mixture of reasons to live 
and reasons not to die (which may be different to one-another). We presented a large number 
of correlations without any correcting for chance and it is therefore possible that some of our 
significance results may not replicate.  
It is important to know what predicts the deactivation and replacement of SA and 
NSSI beliefs. We found that being in a deactivated positive mood (feeling peaceful/serene, 
relaxed/calm) was associated with a lower risk of endorsing some subscales of the SABS and 
NSIBS. This result provides tentative evidence for the potentially protective role of calmness 
in deactivating SICs (see Siddaway, Taylor & Wood, in press) but further research, 
particularly ecological momentary assessment, is now needed to explicate the presumably 
dynamic relationship between mood changes and the activation and deactivation of SICs. 
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Further research on the incremental validity of our scales is urgently needed, 
particularly for the NSIBS as its incremental validity is currently untested. Such analyses 
would preferably use continuous variables to improve power. The specificity of the SABS 
and NSIBS might be examined by administering these instruments to theoretically-distinct 
groups. For example, it would be particularly interesting to compare endorsement of the 
SABS and NSIBS in individuals who have thought about or engaged in SA and/or NSSI with 
individuals who have thought about or engaged in (i) behaviors which immediately but 
unintentionally result in physical injury (e.g., drink driving; skin picking; nail biting; hair-
pulling), and (ii) behaviors in which physical injury may sometimes be a delayed or 
unanticipated side-effect (e.g., smoking, over-eating, binge drinking, or unprotected sex). 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
6. General Discussion 
6.1. Overview 
This thesis consists of four core chapters. Each chapter is a manuscript that has either 
been published (Chapters 2 and 3) or submitted for publication (Chapters 4 and 5) to a peer-
reviewed psychology journal. This thesis sought to test the two central hypotheses of PCP, 
that most psychological constructs are bipolar, consisting of a positive pole and a negative 
pole, and that positive constructs provide important unshared explanatory power in relation to 
psychological problems (Johnson & Wood, 2017; Joseph & Wood, 2010; Wood & Johnson, 
2016; Wood & Tarrier, 2010). It also aimed to make a contribution in its own right by 
clarifying PCP’s core messages and making them more explicit, as PCP has not always been 
explicit or consistent in stating and discussing its core predictions (Held, 2016). 
6.2.Summary of Thesis Results and Their Implications for Positive Clinical 
Psychology 
6.2.1. Chapters 2 and 3 
Chapters 2 and 3 examined whether two popular measures of depressive symptoms 
and anxiety problems – the CES-D and STAI – could be reconceptualised, respectively, as 
measures of a depression-well-being continuum and an anxiety-calmness continuum (Joseph 
& Wood, 2010; Tarrier & Wood, 2010). The CES-D and STAI each contain a mixture of 
negatively worded items (which, respectively, measure the presence of depressive and 
anxiety symptoms) and positively worded items (which, respectively, measure the presence 
of well-being and calmness). It was this key feature of each scale that allowed them to be re-
examined as bipolar continua.  
Chapters 2 and 3 provide evidence that depression needs to be understood as one pole 
of a depression-well-being continuum and anxiety problems need to be understood as one 
pole of an anxiety-calmness continuum. These findings have important implications for the 
structure and definition of depression and anxiety, as they go against the view that depressive 
and anxiety symptoms range from zero to intense.  
In this respect, the CES-D and STAI offer measurement properties beyond scales that 
do not contain a mixture of positively and negatively worded items. For example, scores on 
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) have a potential range of 0 to 63, 
with higher scores indicating greater depression. This scale does not contain any positively 
worded items that need to be reverse-scored, as is customary in many scales. A score of zero 
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on the BDI-II therefore indicates the absence of depressive experiences, but it does not 
indicate the presence of the opposite of depression. However, for two people scoring zero on 
the BDI-II, one could be high on well-being, the other low (Joseph & Wood, 2010). Scales 
that measure depression or well-being, or anxiety or calmness, but which do not contain a 
mixture of positively and negatively worded items, are presumably measuring half of the 
depression-well-being continuum or the anxiety-calmness continuum.  
PCP has suggested that most psychological constructs are bipolar, consisting of a 
positive pole and a negative pole. However, there is little direct evidence to support this claim 
and the authors placed a large amount of importance (Joseph & Wood, 2010; Wood & 
Tarrier, 2010) on two studies they conducted (Joseph & Lewis, 1998; Wood, Taylor & 
Joseph, 2010), which demonstrated that depression can be understood as forming a 
continuum with well-being. Joseph and Wood (2010) also made a theoretical argument that 
anxiety forms a continuum with calmness in order to support the notion that most 
psychological constructs are bipolar. However, no direct evidence was provided to support 
this claim. Chapters 2 and 3 therefore provide much-needed, important evidence regarding 
whether bipolar continua exist and are consistent with the hypothesis that most psychological 
constructs are bipolar.  
Chapters 2 and 3 also separately explored the (linear or nonlinear) form of the 
relationship between the depression-well-being continuum and other psychiatric variables 
and the anxiety-calmness continuum and other psychiatric variables for the first time. 
Baseline levels on each continuum were (separately) found to have a near linear relationship 
with psychiatric outcome variables measured at the same time and one and two years later. 
These results indicate that there is no intrinsic way to demarcate problematic degrees of 
depressive or anxiety symptoms (or beneficial degrees of well-being or calmness) based on 
how the facets of each continuum are related to other psychiatric variables. That these results 
were apparent over time suggests that moving along each continuum toward high well-being 
and high calmness provides continuous and long-term protection against other psychological 
problems. 
These results point to the joint importance and usefulness of treating depressive and 
anxiety symptoms and promoting well-being and calmness. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
these results also point to the usefulness of early intervention and prevention (when people 
begin to move away from high well-being and high calmness) and instilling resilience (by 
providing interventions to move people toward high well-being and high calmness). Fostering 
high levels of well-being and calmness would mean that individuals have further to go before 
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they reach high levels of depressive and anxiety symptoms. Psychiatric and psychological 
interventions that are grounded in a continuum conceptualization would logically be stopped 
when an individual reports high well-being or calmness. However, it must be explicitly noted 
that none of these predictions were tested directly. For example, in a clinical trial, or by using 
ecological momentary assessment to monitor changes in well-being or calmness over time 
and how those changes relate to changes in other psychological problems. Chapters 2 and 3 
call for a direct test of these questions. 
In exploring the (linear or nonlinear) form of the relationship between the depression-
well-being continuum and other psychiatric variables and the anxiety-calmness continuum 
and other psychiatric variables, Chapters 2 and 3 provide much needed evidence to extend 
and test the very minimal discussion provided by PCP regarding the (linear or nonlinear) 
form of bipolar continua (Joseph & Wood, 2010; Wood & Tarrier, 2010). The findings 
presented in these chapters raise the possibility that all bipolar continua will demonstrate near 
linear relationships with other variables. This possibility needs empirically testing.  
6.2.2. Chapters 4 and 5 
Chapters 4 and 5 reported the development and validation of the SABS and NSIBS, 
two new self-report measures of beliefs about SA and NSSI. The evidence presented in these 
chapters support the use of separate terminology and definitions for SA and NSSI, and 
indicate that SA and NSSI need to be separated in research designs. This is important because 
for over 50 years, many researchers, particularly those in the UK, have been treating SA and 
NSSI as one and the same construct.  
Item generation was guided by the broad hypothesis that SICs are characterised by 
positive and negative SICs. “Positive SICs” were hypothesised to be cognitions about the 
individual and interpersonal perceived advantages of SA and NSSI (e.g., “Attempting suicide 
changes the way that I am thinking” [individual]; “NSSI helps me fit in with other people” 
[interpersonal]). “Negative SICs” were hypothesised to be cognitions about the individual 
and interpersonal perceived disadvantages of SIB (e.g., “NSSI makes my problems worse” 
[individual]; “People think that my suicide attempt(s) are selfish” [interpersonal]). 
As described in Chapter 4, the majority of the subscales of the SABS and NSIBS 
appear to measure positive SICs (cognitions about the perceived advantages of SIB) and few 
of the subscales appear to measure negative SICs (cognitions about the perceived 
disadvantages of SIB). CFA analyses revealed that the SABS and NSIBS are each most 
appropriately understood as a series of correlated but separate subscales/factors (separate 
facets of each individual’s mental representation of SIB). 
190 
 
Although the prediction that SICs are characterised by positive and negative SICs 
seemed relatively straightforward, in practice, the process of scale development revealed the 
complexities involved in measuring and understanding SICs. For this reason, as described in 
Chapter 4, the author deliberately refrained from claiming that particular SABS or NSIBS 
subscales measure either positive or negative SICs. It seemed conceivable, for instance, that 
some respondents may perceive that a particular SABS or NSIBS item describes an 
advantage of SIB for them whilst other respondents describe the same item as conferring a 
disadvantage of SIB for them. It also seemed possible that some subscales contain positive 
and negative SICs. As discussed in Chapter 4, further research is needed to make sense of the 
function of particular items, and to explore whether people interpret certain items differently. 
This might be achieved, for example, by asking each individual whether specific items 
represent an advantage or a disadvantage of SA or NSSI for them, or by testing how the 
activation of particular items increases or decreases risk for SA or NSSI by linking activation 
of particular SABS and NSIBS items to changes in the strength of SA and/or NSSI urges, 
desire, or intent.  
Chapter 5 provides some evidence in relation to PCP’s second prediction, that 
“positive” constructs provide important unshared explanatory power in relation to 
psychological problems (Johnson & Wood, 2017; Joseph & Wood, 2010; Wood & Johnson, 
2016; Wood & Tarrier, 2010). During the process of validating the SABS and NSIBS, several 
measures of well-being were collected (optimism, perceived social support, satisfaction with 
life, and subjective happiness and vitality). These were included in tests of the incremental 
validity of the SABS, predicting current suicidal thinking. In (separate) multivariate analyses, 
optimism, perceived social support, and satisfaction with life all demonstrated statistically 
significant, unique predictive relationships with current suicidal thinking when controlling for 
a range of theoretically relevant, negative constructs. These results are consistent with PCP’s 
claim that variables that particularly characterise well-being, and which have been 
particularly studied by positive psychology, will provide incremental validity in predicting 
psychological problems. PCP recognises that this would be the case because these variables 
are different to variables studied by mental health researchers and therefore share less 
variance (Johnson & Wood, 2017).  
Chapters 4 and 5 did not directly test whether SA and NSSI cognitions have an 
opposite pole, being part of a bipolar continuum (Johnson & Wood, 2017; Joseph & Wood, 
2010; Wood & Johnson, 2016; Wood & Tarrier, 2010). The reason for this is that there does 
not seem to be a construct that might theoretically be the opposite of SA and NSSI 
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cognitions. Put differently, SA and NSSI cognitions seem to be unipolar rather than bipolar. 
The absence of SA and NSSI cognitions is measured by the SABS and NSIBS (respondent’s 
select “Strongly disagree” to items and obtain a low score). Rephrasing SABS and NSIBS 
items (e.g., “I attempt suicide because I deserve to suffer” “NSSI helps me escape negative 
emotions”) would not measure the presence of the opposite of cognitions about SA and 
NSSI. For example, the item “I attempt suicide because I deserve to suffer” could be 
rephrased to become “I attempt suicide because I do not deserve to suffer” and “I do not 
attempt suicide because I deserve to suffer.” These two new items convey entirely different, 
nonsensical meanings, and neither item would create a bipolar measure of deserving to suffer 
in relation to SA, for example.  
The SABS and NSIBS generally evidenced “small” negative correlations (Cohen, 
1998) with reasons for living, which goes against the idea that the SABS and NSIBS measure 
the opposite of reasons for living (very large, negative correlations would be expected). The 
SABS and NSIBS measure beliefs about SA and NSSI, which are related to but separate but 
from reasons for living. The SABS and NSIBS were not hypothesised to be opposites to 
reasons for living, although this possibility might arise in some reader’s minds. 
6.3. Are Positive and Negative Constructs Different Facets of the Same Variables? 
The evidence presented in this thesis is consistent with PCP’s prediction that most 
psychological constructs are bipolar, consisting of a positive pole and a negative pole. This 
thesis demonstrated that some constructs have bipolar opposite whilst other constructs do not.  
Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that variables that particularly characterise well-being 
(“positive constructs;” in this case well-being and calmness) can form a continuum with 
variables that particularly characterise psychological problems (“negative constructs;” in this 
case depressive and anxiety symptoms). Depressive and anxiety symptoms have fairly 
intuitive and logical theoretical opposites. To illustrate, most diagnostic criteria for 
depression involve high negative affect, low positive affect (anhedonia), lack of engagement, 
poor sleep, impaired appetite, and poor social relationships (Wood & Johnson, 2016). Each of 
these symptoms is clearly on continua that range from positive to negative, respectively low 
negative affect, high positive affect, engagement, good sleep, appropriate eating, and good 
social relationships (Wood & Johnson, 2016).  
Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate that variables that particularly characterise 
psychological problems (“negative constructs;” SA and NSSI cognitions) are sometimes 
unipolar. There is no obvious opposite to SA and NSSI cognitions. Whether or not bipolar 
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continua characterise most psychological constructs, as PCP predicts, remains an empirical 
question. 
6.3.1. Accounting for Complexity 
These mixed findings illustrate the complexities involved in integrating variables that 
particularly characterise well-being (“positive constructs”) with variables that particularly 
characterise psychological problems (“negative constructs”) to explain psychological 
problems. The different studies reported here illustrate the fact that any test of PCP’s 
hypothesis of bipolarity will be entwined with semantics (phrasing of items), the scale used 
(e.g., whether a scale contains a mixture of positively-worded and negatively-worded items 
that load on separate factors), theory and the construct in question (any empirical test of 
bipolarity must be underpinned by a theoretical prediction and rationale regarding how 
particular “positive” and “negative” constructs are opposite poles of the same variable), and 
measurement considerations (whether a particular bipolar construct can be measured). 
Including positively and negatively worded items in a single scale allowed plausible positive-
negative continua for depression and anxiety problems to be tested using CFA in Chapters 2 
and 3, but this is only one means of examining bipolarity and a consensus picture is needed to 
firmly establish evidence of bipolarity for particular constructs.  
6.3.2. A Revision to Positive Clinical Psychology’s Central Hypothesis? 
The different findings presented in this thesis lead to the following conclusion: Some 
psychological constructs are bipolar whilst other constructs are unipolar. The following two 
predictions appear to explain the varied findings presented, and extend PCP’s central 
prediction: 
(1). Psychological constructs that are common in the general population – such as depressive 
symptoms, anxiety symptoms, well-being symptoms, and calmness symptoms – appear to 
be bipolar, having a positive and a negative pole; 
(2). Psychological constructs that are rare in the general population and which specifically 
characterise psychological problems (rather than being an extreme manifestation of a 
common psychological experience) – such as SA and NSSI cognitions – appear to be 
unipolar. 
The second prediction might be broadened by not specifying unipolarity only in 
relation to certain psychological problems and instead stipulating that psychological 
constructs that are rare in the general population appear to be unipolar. For example, 
Maslow (1943) predicted that “self-actualisation” is relatively rare in the general population 
and is the final level of psychological development that can be achieved when all basic and 
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psychological needs are fulfilled and the "actualization" of an individual’s full personal 
potential has occurred. However, this thesis is concerned with psychological problems 
(“negative constructs” or variables that particularly characterise psychological problems), 
hence the phrasing of prediction two.  
6.4. Future Directions for Positive Psychology and Positive Clinical Psychology 
PCP and positive psychology are both relatively new literatures. Both make 
predictions regarding the relationship between variables that particularly characterise well-
being (“positive” constructs) and those that particularly characterise psychological problems 
(“negative” constructs). Positive psychology attempted to carve out a niche through 
separatism, arguing that the constructs it examined (“positive” constructs) had been generally 
neglected by existing research and indeed are distinct from “negative” constructs. PCP also 
attempted to create its own niche but through calling for positive psychology research to be 
integrated with research on mental health problems. PCP argued that “positive” and 
“negative” constructs are often the same variable, viewed through different lenses. The 
relationship between “positive” and “negative” forms the core of both literatures and has 
implications for measurement, research designs, and interventions. It is therefore surprising 
that such a central issue has received relatively little research attention.  
It is an empirical question whether, how, for whom, and under what circumstances, 
variables that particularly characterise well-being (“positive constructs”) do or do not form 
bipolar continua with variables that particularly characterise psychological problems 
(“negative constructs). Several authors have asserted that “positive constructs” are separate 
from “negative constructs” (e.g., Duckworth et al., 2005; Wong, 2011) whereas PCP asserts 
that these constructs form bipolar continua. This thesis looked at a few of these questions and 
the findings suggest that some constructs are bipolar and others are unipolar.  
Of course, when positive and negative constructs are separate, correlated facets of a 
single higher-order construct, this raises the possibility that any associations found between 
each construct and other variables may be attributable to the opposing (positive or negative) 
construct. In this context, interaction effects need to be considered between positive and 
negative constructs because, statistically, main effects cannot be interpreted in the presence of 
an interaction (Wood & Johnson, 2016). This was found to be the case by Kelly et al. (2011) 
in relation Bipolar Disorder, for example, where positive and negative appraisals of the same 
mood states interact such that the effects of positive appraisals are very different when 
negative appraisals are also considered.  
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One possibility may be that all constructs are bipolar at a particular level of 
abstraction, as Joseph and Wood (2010) discuss in some depth. For example, as discussed 
above, SA and NSSI cognitions do not have an obvious opposite construct. However, the 
constructs predicted to underlie SA cognitions do have intuitive opposite constructs. For 
example, hopelessness is strongly linked with the development of SA cognitions by several 
theories of SA (e.g., Rudd, 2000; Rudd et al., in preparation; Wenzel et al., 2009) and has an 
obvious opposite – hopefulness – hope. A similar construct to hope, optimism, is already 
understood as being a bipolar optimism/pessimism construct (Carver et al., 2010), as 
measured by the Life-Orientation Test Revised (Scheier et al., 1994). As Carver et al. (2010) 
note “People range from very optimistic to very pessimistic, with most being somewhere 
between” (p. 880). 
As the replication crisis literature illustrates, any one finding using one research 
design cannot definitively support a particular conclusion. Much more research is therefore 
needed in order to create a consensus of evidence on the relationship between positive and 
negative constructs, and to clarify which constructs are bipolar. The depression-well-being 
and anxiety-calmness continua need to be demonstrated using other measures and research 
designs to those used here, as do other hypothesised bipolar continua. 
Joseph and Wood (2010) highlight how it may be possible to reinterpret existing 
measures of well-being or psychological problems if those measures happen to contain a 
mixture of positively and negatively worded items and positively and negatively worded 
items load on separate, correlated factors. However, it will probably be necessary to develop 
new measures in order to test whether most psychological constructs are bipolar. Since the 
personality and social psychology literature has long-debated the uni- versus bipolarity of 
affect (see Chapter 2), it will be important to consult that literature and transfer advances and 
key research methods to the literature investigating the potential bipolarity of psychological 
problems. Some simple but critical recommendations from that literature, for instance, are to 
take into account semantics when testing for bipolarity and to ensure that each pole of a 
continuum is measured by an equal numbers of items (Barrett & Russell, 1998). Bringing 
these factors together, one might develop and validate a scale that measures a particular 
hypothetical continuum using equal number of items that are semantic opposites and 
opposites in terms of valence (positive versus negative).    
It might be the case that particular constructs are bipolar but that this fact has yet to be 
recognised in existing research because the complexity of human life and human 
psychological problems has clouded this issue. PCP argues that the bipolarity of positive and 
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negative constructs has implications for prediction and interventions (Johnson & Wood, 
2017; Joseph & Wood, 2010; Wood & Johnson, 2016; Wood & Tarrier, 2010). These are 
useful suggestions. However, there are obvious practical barriers to overcome. For example, 
it is generally only practical to administer a set number of measures in a clinical trial and it is 
obviously most informative to measure what one theoretically intends to change. Most 
commonly, this will be the reduction of psychological problems, as measured by so-called 
“negative constructs.” It may be the case that getting rid of psychological problems does lead 
to the presence of well-being, but only for particular people or problems, or under particular 
conditions, and these possibilities need testing.  
The above discussion and this thesis has generally focused on the uni- versus 
bipolarity of “positive” and “negative” constructs. This discussion rests on the assumption 
that “positive” and “negative” constructs can be meaningfully distinguished. Held (2016, 
2017) has provided thoughtful critiques of this assumption and its implications and raised 
issues that will need to be addressed if PCP and positive psychology are to continue to 
evolve. She points out that positive psychology and PCP have both made the a prior 
assumption that “positive” constructs are adaptive and desirable whereas “negative” 
constructs are maladaptive and undesirable; she points out that this assumption is simplistic, 
inaccurate, and, in fact, potentially undermines the entire foundation for positive psychology 
and PCP (Held, 2016, 2017). She goes on to provide an extended argument to illustrate that 
the language of “positive” and “negative” is arbitrary and dependent on one’s perspective and 
context, particularly focusing on the problems associated with assuming that “negative” 
variables have no useful role to play (garnering attention only in order to be reduced or 
eliminated).  
She states: “Whether any one emotion is positive or negative will…vary both within 
and between persons, depending on the goals in play in relation to a particular circumstance 
in any given moment. For example, if one seeks to end a relationship experienced as 
destructive, then anger may be consistent with that evaluation and thus aid in attaining that 
goal (and so may feel pleasant). Therefore, we cannot say whether any emotion is positive or 
negative prior to knowing a person’s particular circumstances, especially the challenges that 
are faced in relation to needs, goals, and values in any given life situation” (Held, 2017, p. 
10).  
Another example might be guilt, an aversive emotion, but one which actually serves 
to motivate people to make up for their mistakes in order to repair meaningful bonds and 
maintain social relationships (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994). Baumeister, 
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Stillwell and Heatherton (1995) present two studies which demonstrate that feeling guilty is 
associated with higher rates of learning lessons, changing subsequent behaviour, apologizing, 
confessing, and recognizing how a relationship partner's standards and expectations differ 
from one's own. Inducing guilt was found to be a costly but effective way of influencing the 
behavior of relationship partners. These two examples (and many others could be offered) 
illustrate that supposedly “negative” moods actually confer highly useful and functional 
value, depending on the context. In fact, a large literature supports the notion that emotions of 
any kind are not inherently good or bad; evidencing that positive and negative emotions are 
equally functional as they both provide important information that can be used to guide 
behaviour and respond effectively to the environment (see Baumeister et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, a book entitled The Positive Side of Negative Emotions presents three decades 
of research demonstrating how various “negative” emotions such as sadness, anxiety, 
jealousy, and guilt and “negative” coping styles such as defensive pessimism, can be 
functional/adaptive.  
Held’s (2016, 2017) concerns regarding whether “positive” and “negative” constructs 
can be meaningfully distinguished and what language is most useful in accounting for context 
seem valid concerns. However, it is not clear whether her concerns are stated too strongly as 
PCP does, at times, recognise the importance of considering that the functional value of 
“negative” characteristics. For example, Wood and Tarrier (2010) wrote that “any 
designation of a characteristic as positive or negative is simplistic and inaccurate, as any trait 
or emotion can be ‘positive or negative’ depending on the situation and concomitant goals 
and motivations” (p. 827). Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis did not explicitly focus on the 
potential advantages that being anxious or depressed may offer. The adaptiveness of anxiety 
is well-known and intuitive as a survival mechanism.  
The adaptiveness of depression is less immediately apparent but has been discussed 
by several authors. For example, according to social rank theories, depression arises as an 
evolutionarily adaptive, short-term threat-defence response in situations where an individual 
perceives that they are unable to escape from a state of being defeated (Sloman, 2000; 
Sloman, Gilbert & Hasey, 2003). The symptoms of depression (e.g., low positive affect, 
negative self-referent cognitions, behavioural inhibition) are thought to function as a damage 
limitation strategy in order to avoid pursuing goals that cannot be obtained or would decrease 
the ability to survive and reproduce if they were pursued regardless of the danger or cost 
(Gilbert, 1998). Social rank theories suggest that psychological problems can emerge from 
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the malfunction of the usually evolutionarily adaptive threat-defence response (e.g., Gilbert, 
1998; Sloman et al., 2003).  
Held (2016, 2017) and McNulty and Fincham (2012) both advocate abandoning the 
false dichotomy of “positive” and “negative” labelling of variables and assert that the 
function and adaptiveness of a construct depends on a complex array of factors (context). 
Held (2016) prefers the terms “constructive” and “destructive” (or “adaptive” and 
“maladaptive”) because they hint at the necessity to consider each person in their context.  
McNulty and Fincham (2012) highlight that “the psychological characteristics that 
benefit people experiencing optimal circumstances may not only fail to help people 
experiencing suboptimal circumstances, but may harm them” (p. 106). They demonstrate 
empirically how forgiveness, optimism, benevolent attributions, and kindness – favourite 
“positives” of positive psychologists – can diminish adaptive functioning.  
Held (2016) discusses the importance of context in relation to “positive interventions” 
(discussed further below) and argues that if the distinction between positive and negative 
characteristics is arbitrary, simplistic, and inaccurate, then it follows that the distinction 
between “positive” and “negative” interventions is also arbitrary, simplistic, and inaccurate.  
“Positive” and “negative” interventions are cast as two distinct kinds of interventions by 
positive psychology and, at times, by PCP; however, this conceptualization may be more 
apparent than real (Held, 2016, 2017). For example, Wood, Perunovic, and Lee (2009) report 
evidence that repeating positive self-statements (a “positive” intervention) such as “I accept 
myself completely” or focusing on ways in which the statement was true caused those with 
low self-esteem to feel worse and boosted those with high self-esteem only mildly.  
A final concern Held (2016, 2017) raises against PCP is that PCP does not clarify how 
positive and negative constructs may be properly “balanced” in the service of optimal 
functioning, even though they repeatedly call for a “balance” of “positive” and “negative” 
constructs. For positive psychology or PCP to continue to evolve, these potential concerns 
will need to be fully addressed.  
6.5. “Positive Interventions” 
PCP argues positive constructs can be fostered to treat psychological problems 
because these constructs are different to those already in common use in relation to 
psychological problems. Johnson and Wood (2017) and Wood and Johnson (2016) provide 
useful summarises of applying “positive constructs” to treat psychological problems. These 
have been termed “positive interventions” to denote the idea that these interventions have 
differed in their focus from existing mental health treatments. A few observations can be 
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made that extend the discussion presented by Johnson and Wood (2017) and Wood and 
Johnson (2016).  
First, it may that “positive” constructs (variables that particularly characterise well-
being and which especially been studied by positive psychology) can be used to alleviate 
“negative” constructs, either because the variables are different (e.g., gratitude and 
depression), or because interventions that increase the positive pole of a bipolar trait can be 
used to reduce the negative pole of that trait because both poles are different facets of the 
same variable. It is an empirical question whether particular “positive interventions” or 
mental health treatments are respectively more effective in promoting “positive” constructs or 
reducing “negative” constructs.  
A burgeoning body of research suggests that “positive interventions” can enhance 
positive mood and well-being. For example, a meta-analysis by Bolier et al. (2013) examined 
whether “positive interventions” enhanced well-being and reduced depressive symptoms and 
found a small effect size for each. The finding that enhancing well-being reduces depressive 
symptoms seems relatively unsurprising, given that decades of research by David Watson and 
others have documented that depression is particularly characterised by low well-being (high 
negative affect and low positive affect; see Mineka, Watson & Clark, 1998; Watson, 2009). 
This meta-analysis indicates, however, that “positive interventions are less effective than 
existing, well-established treatments for depression. For example, a review of meta-analyses 
found that large effect sizes are evident in trials of CBT for depression (Butler, Chapman, 
Forman & Beck 2006). 
As discussed in the Introduction, cognitive therapy for depression, for example, 
includes specific components such as behavioural activation that aim to bolster well-being 
and other components that aim to reduce depression (Beck et al., 1979). Cognitive therapy for 
anxiety problems (Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985) includes specific components that aim to 
reduce anxiety symptoms such as relaxation and find more realistic and helpful alternative 
cognitions to anxious predictions to promote confidence and self-efficacy. Cognitive therapy 
for low self-esteem includes components that specifically attempt to reduce self-criticism and 
components that specifically attempt to bolster engagement in meaningful relationships and 
mastery experiences as part of discovering and elaborating alternative, more compassionate 
ways to understand one’s self and the world (i.e. positive constructs) (Fennell, 1997).  
These examples (countless others are available) illustrate that existing, well-
established (see Butler et al., 2006) interventions for psychological problems often already 
jointly aim to reduce negative constructs and increase positive constructs. Chapters 2 and 3 
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indicated that total CES-D and STAI scores provide an indication of depressive and anxiety 
severity that is based on a combination of the presence/absence of depressive symptoms or 
anxiety problems and the presence/absence of well-being or calmness. These findings 
indicate that interventions which measured change using the CES-D or STAI are already 
measuring the amelioration of depressive and anxiety symptoms by simultaneously reducing 
negative constructs and increasing positive constructs.   
The second of PCP’s predictions, that positive constructs provide important unshared 
explanatory power in relation to psychological problems (Johnson & Wood, 2017; Joseph & 
Wood, 2010; Wood & Johnson, 2016; Wood & Tarrier, 2010), does not seem particularly 
novel when considered beyond positive psychology in the broader context of psychological 
science. An easy illustration that this prediction is already well-established comes from the 
literature on stress, for example. Cohen and Wills’ (1985) buffering hypothesis (now cited 
almost 14,000 times) posited that perceived social support buffers people against stress, 
reducing the negative consequences of stress. Probably hundreds of thousands of studies in 
the mental health field have examined the moderating and mediating role of a vast range of 
variables, including well-being variables.  
PCP seems to be correct in asserting that some fields, such as positive psychology and 
mental health research, tend to have focused on particular variables and to have adopted 
particular zeitgeists. There certainly seems to be potential within both fields to more explicitly 
focus on exploring variables that have been understudied in that particular field, but these 
changes would appear to represent a shift in emphasis rather than something totally new. For 
this reason, it seems unlikely that PCP and “positive interventions” will revolutionise mental 
health treatments, somehow vastly improving on what decades of research, hundreds of 
therapy models, and billions of dollars of funding have attempted to achieve. However, 
PCP’s call for integration may well serve to bring advances from disparate literatures 
together to the benefit of all.  
Third, the PCP and positive psychology literatures need to be held to the same high 
standards as the existing treatment literature for psychological problems. For example, active 
treatments need to be pitted against one-another, comparing so-called “positive interventions” 
against psychological interventions that have an established evidence-base. Others have 
discussed this issue. For example, Wood et al. (2010) raised concerns about the control 
groups used in trials of gratitude interventions (a “positive” intervention), such as that in one 
study (Seligman et al., 2005), participants were recruited partially via a book detailing why 
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this intervention should work (potentially creating biased and overly positive self-reporting of 
outcome in the gratitude condition). 
Finally, in their discussion of the potential value of “positive interventions” to the 
mental health field, Johnson and Wood (2017) state that these interventions “are usually ‘skill 
building’ treatments. As such, positive psychology interventions differ qualitatively from 
traditional interventions” (p. 341). However, one of the central purposes of many 
psychological therapies, such as cognitive behavioural therapy (Beck, 2011), dialectical 
behavioural therapy (Linehan, 1993), and schema therapy (numerous other therapies could be 
listed), is skilled building. For example, Beck (2011) stated “to effectively solve their 
problems, patients may need to learn new skills” (p. 296). Thus, overall, although PCP has 
made a valuable contribution by drawing attention to the need to integrate positive 
psychology with the existing mental health research literature, some of its more subsidiary 
statements may seem somewhat overstated.  
6.6. Replication 
Although this thesis was predominantly contextualised by PCP, it was also, to a lesser 
extent, contextualised by the methodological need for scientific findings to replicate. 
Chapters 2 and 3 provided direct replications of existing studies, which can be interpreted as 
evidence against the replication crisis. As discussed in the Introduction, “Exact” or “direct” 
replications are replications that operationalize both the independent and the dependent 
variable(s) in exactly the same way as the original study. The purpose of such replication 
attempts is to verify the original findings (Stroebe & Strack, 2014). 
Chapters 4 and 5 described the development of the SABS and NSIBS; I demonstrated 
that important findings replicated here as well. The structural results observed in Samples 1 
and 2 did not provide a definitive indication of the factor structure of cognitions about SA or 
cognitions about NSSI. This issue was addressed by collecting additional independent 
samples. EFA was conducted on each separate sample to locate the best fitting factor 
structure. The same factor structure emerged across Samples 3, 4, and 5, indicating that 
robust and replicable factor structures characterize SA and NSSI cognitions.  
It is possible, although highly unlikely that the same EFA structural results emerged 
across Samples 3, 4, and 5 because of particular idiosyncrasies (e.g., random error) of these 
datasets and that findings may not generalise to other datasets (Brown, 2015). Without 
evidence of replication, it is possible that items may intercorrelate less strongly in a new 
sample or that the factor structure will vary as a function of sample differences (Smith & 
McCarthy, 1995). I therefore conducted a CFA on an independent sample (Sample 6). The 
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series of EFAs and a CFA across six independent, large samples meant that in the end I was 
able to hone in on a factor structure for the SABS and NSIBS that seem fairly robust and 
generalizable.  
Replication also featured strongly during the validation of the SABS and NSIBS in 
that all of the psychometric analyses were conducted on at least two independent samples. 
Conclusions were then drawn based on the consensus of results across different samples, 
which again, provided some confidence that results are relatively robust and generalizable.  
Revisiting the criteria required for a solid replication, power was adequate in each of 
the studies and the replications were conducted on samples from very different areas of the 
world. However, a downside of the replication presented in Chapter 2 is that it was conducted 
by the same research team (Wood and Taylor authored the 2010 paper on the CES-D that was 
replicated here).  
6.6.1. The Replication Crisis 
It is important for contemporary PhD theses to demonstrate an awareness of the 
replication crisis because this so-called “crisis” is a major topical debate currently facing all 
of psychological science. Moreover, Everett and Earp (2015) have argued that the PhD thesis 
is the ideal opportunity to contribute replication attempts to the field. The Introduction 
section (Chapter 1) provided an overview of the key tenants of replicability and the 
replication crisis in order to demonstrate my awareness of this literature.  
Replication has historically been encouraged by some journals such as the Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, although it has often taken the form of excluding counter-
explanations for results, rather than using different samples or research designs to test the 
same research question in different ways.  
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APPENDIX 
Factor Loadings for Chapter 2 Confirmatory Factor Analyses  
 
Table A1. Factor Loadings for ML CFA using Hawai‘i sample, Single Factor Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    dep_1             0.502    0.014   36.009    0.000    0.502    0.573 
    dep_2             0.363    0.014   26.846    0.000    0.363    0.445 
    dep_3             0.699    0.014   49.943    0.000    0.699    0.739 
    dep_4             0.316    0.019   17.061    0.000    0.316    0.292 
    dep_5             0.556    0.016   33.797    0.000    0.556    0.544 
    dep_6             0.822    0.014   57.082    0.000    0.822    0.810 
    dep_7             0.042    0.018    2.340    0.019    0.042    0.041 
    dep_8             0.259    0.018   14.350    0.000    0.259    0.247 
    dep_9             0.532    0.012   43.579    0.000    0.532    0.668 
    dep_10            0.456    0.012   36.741    0.000    0.456    0.583 
    dep_11            0.497    0.016   31.161    0.000    0.497    0.507 
    dep_12            0.534    0.015   35.598    0.000    0.534    0.568 
    dep_13            0.393    0.015   26.794    0.000    0.393    0.444 
    dep_14            0.706    0.014   49.424    0.000    0.706    0.733 
    dep_15            0.325    0.012   26.418    0.000    0.325    0.439 
    dep_16            0.554    0.016   34.046    0.000    0.554    0.547 
    dep_17            0.509    0.012   41.769    0.000    0.509    0.646 
    dep_18            0.758    0.013   57.436    0.000    0.758    0.813 
    dep_19            0.518    0.013   39.192    0.000    0.518    0.614 
    dep_20            0.588    0.014   41.512    0.000    0.588    0.643 
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Table A2. Factor Loadings for ML CFA using Hawai‘i sample, Two Factor Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  depression =~                                                          
    dep_1             0.505    0.014   36.197    0.000    0.505    0.576 
    dep_2             0.364    0.014   26.910    0.000    0.364    0.446 
    dep_3             0.699    0.014   49.959    0.000    0.699    0.739 
    dep_5             0.559    0.016   34.029    0.000    0.559    0.548 
    dep_6             0.822    0.014   57.107    0.000    0.822    0.810 
    dep_7             0.060    0.018    3.374    0.001    0.060    0.059 
    dep_9             0.528    0.012   43.129    0.000    0.528    0.663 
    dep_10            0.458    0.012   36.975    0.000    0.458    0.587 
    dep_11            0.497    0.016   31.167    0.000    0.497    0.508 
    dep_13            0.398    0.015   27.139    0.000    0.398    0.450 
    dep_14            0.711    0.014   49.817    0.000    0.711    0.738 
    dep_15            0.328    0.012   26.610    0.000    0.328    0.442 
    dep_17            0.514    0.012   42.188    0.000    0.514    0.652 
    dep_18            0.762    0.013   57.900    0.000    0.762    0.818 
    dep_19            0.520    0.013   39.373    0.000    0.520    0.617 
    dep_20            0.590    0.014   41.634    0.000    0.590    0.645 
  wellbeing =~                                                           
    dep_4             0.469    0.019   24.735    0.000    0.469    0.434 
    dep_8             0.500    0.018   27.475    0.000    0.500    0.476 
    dep_12            0.763    0.015   51.763    0.000    0.763    0.812 
    dep_16            0.829    0.016   52.273    0.000    0.829    0.818 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  depression ~~                                                          
    wellbeing         0.622    0.013   47.483    0.000    0.622    0.622 
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Table A3. Factor Loadings for ML CFA using Hawai‘i sample, Single Factor, Method 
Variance Factor 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    dep_1             0.505    0.014   36.215    0.000    0.505    0.577 
    dep_2             0.364    0.014   26.929    0.000    0.364    0.447 
    dep_3             0.699    0.014   49.943    0.000    0.699    0.739 
    dep_4             0.276    0.019   14.771    0.000    0.276    0.255 
    dep_5             0.560    0.016   34.065    0.000    0.560    0.548 
    dep_6             0.823    0.014   57.147    0.000    0.823    0.811 
    dep_7             0.064    0.018    3.583    0.000    0.064    0.063 
    dep_8             0.211    0.018   11.551    0.000    0.211    0.201 
    dep_9             0.528    0.012   43.065    0.000    0.528    0.662 
    dep_10            0.458    0.012   36.986    0.000    0.458    0.587 
    dep_11            0.498    0.016   31.189    0.000    0.498    0.508 
    dep_12            0.501    0.015   32.940    0.000    0.501    0.533 
    dep_13            0.398    0.015   27.130    0.000    0.398    0.450 
    dep_14            0.711    0.014   49.812    0.000    0.711    0.738 
    dep_15            0.328    0.012   26.631    0.000    0.328    0.442 
    dep_16            0.516    0.017   31.217    0.000    0.516    0.509 
    dep_17            0.514    0.012   42.177    0.000    0.514    0.652 
    dep_18            0.762    0.013   57.888    0.000    0.762    0.818 
    dep_19            0.520    0.013   39.328    0.000    0.520    0.617 
    dep_20            0.590    0.014   41.676    0.000    0.590    0.646 
  method =~                                                              
    dep_4             0.407    0.020   19.946    0.000    0.407    0.376 
    dep_8             0.516    0.020   26.275    0.000    0.516    0.492 
    dep_12            0.551    0.016   35.262    0.000    0.551    0.586 
    dep_16            0.651    0.017   37.565    0.000    0.651    0.642 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 ~~                                                                  
    method            0.000                               0.000    0.000  
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Table A4. Factor Loadings for WLSMV CFA using Hawai‘i sample, Single Factor Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    dep94_1           0.608    0.019   31.452    0.000    0.608    0.608 
    dep94_2           0.540    0.023   23.899    0.000    0.540    0.540 
    dep94_3           0.816    0.012   66.042    0.000    0.816    0.816 
    dep94_4           0.367    0.023   15.810    0.000    0.367    0.367 
    dep94_5           0.612    0.017   35.454    0.000    0.612    0.612 
    dep94_6           0.877    0.008  105.027    0.000    0.877    0.877 
    dep94_7           0.011    0.027    0.399    0.690    0.011    0.011 
    dep94_8           0.398    0.022   17.802    0.000    0.398    0.398 
    dep94_9           0.793    0.016   48.986    0.000    0.793    0.793 
    dep94_10          0.665    0.021   32.082    0.000    0.665    0.665 
    dep94_11          0.603    0.019   31.035    0.000    0.603    0.603 
    dep94_12          0.745    0.013   56.654    0.000    0.745    0.745 
    dep94_13          0.526    0.021   24.616    0.000    0.526    0.526 
    dep94_14          0.808    0.013   63.957    0.000    0.808    0.808 
    dep94_15          0.618    0.023   27.285    0.000    0.618    0.618 
    dep94_16          0.731    0.014   51.711    0.000    0.731    0.731 
    dep94_17          0.727    0.019   38.858    0.000    0.727    0.727 
    dep94_18          0.862    0.009   94.082    0.000    0.862    0.862 
    dep94_19          0.764    0.015   49.311    0.000    0.764    0.764 
    dep94_20          0.707    0.016   43.303    0.000    0.707    0.707 
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Table A5. Factor Loadings for WLSMV CFA using Hawai‘i sample, Two Factor Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  depression =~                                                          
    dep94_1           0.618    0.019   31.846    0.000    0.618    0.618 
    dep94_2           0.550    0.023   24.068    0.000    0.550    0.550 
    dep94_3           0.826    0.012   67.312    0.000    0.826    0.826 
    dep94_5           0.625    0.017   36.012    0.000    0.625    0.625 
    dep94_6           0.889    0.008  106.256    0.000    0.889    0.889 
    dep94_7           0.023    0.028    0.816    0.415    0.023    0.023 
    dep94_9           0.805    0.016   49.258    0.000    0.805    0.805 
    dep94_10          0.676    0.021   32.645    0.000    0.676    0.676 
    dep94_11          0.614    0.020   31.389    0.000    0.614    0.614 
    dep94_13          0.537    0.022   24.979    0.000    0.537    0.537 
    dep94_14          0.818    0.013   64.949    0.000    0.818    0.818 
    dep94_15          0.629    0.023   27.534    0.000    0.629    0.629 
    dep94_17          0.737    0.019   39.363    0.000    0.737    0.737 
    dep94_18          0.870    0.009   96.026    0.000    0.870    0.870 
    dep94_19          0.775    0.016   49.925    0.000    0.775    0.775 
    dep94_20          0.719    0.016   44.037    0.000    0.719    0.719 
  wellbeing =~                                                           
    dep94_4           0.489    0.024   20.261    0.000    0.489    0.489 
    dep94_8           0.525    0.023   22.937    0.000    0.525    0.525 
    dep94_12          0.898    0.013   67.454    0.000    0.898    0.898 
    dep94_16          0.876    0.014   63.462    0.000    0.876    0.876 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  depression ~~                                                          
    wellbeing         0.660    0.017   38.111    0.000    0.660    0.660 
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Table A6. Factor Loadings for WLSMV CFA using Hawai‘i sample, Single Factor, Method 
Variance Factor 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    dep94_1           0.620    0.019   31.991    0.000    0.620    0.620 
    dep94_2           0.550    0.023   24.077    0.000    0.550    0.550 
    dep94_3           0.826    0.012   67.448    0.000    0.826    0.826 
    dep94_4           0.242    0.026    9.277    0.000    0.242    0.242 
    dep94_5           0.626    0.017   36.140    0.000    0.626    0.626 
    dep94_6           0.887    0.008  106.250    0.000    0.887    0.887 
    dep94_7           0.030    0.028    1.096    0.273    0.030    0.030 
    dep94_8           0.266    0.026   10.352    0.000    0.266    0.266 
    dep94_9           0.803    0.016   49.212    0.000    0.803    0.803 
    dep94_10          0.676    0.021   32.735    0.000    0.676    0.676 
    dep94_11          0.615    0.020   31.473    0.000    0.615    0.615 
    dep94_12          0.632    0.018   35.956    0.000    0.632    0.632 
    dep94_13          0.538    0.022   24.978    0.000    0.538    0.538 
    dep94_14          0.818    0.013   65.110    0.000    0.818    0.818 
    dep94_15          0.630    0.023   27.593    0.000    0.630    0.630 
    dep94_16          0.610    0.019   32.786    0.000    0.610    0.610 
    dep94_17          0.737    0.019   39.458    0.000    0.737    0.737 
    dep94_18          0.870    0.009   95.835    0.000    0.870    0.870 
    dep94_19          0.774    0.016   49.918    0.000    0.774    0.774 
    dep94_20          0.719    0.016   44.105    0.000    0.719    0.719 
  method =~                                                              
    dep94_4           0.603    0.022   27.094    0.000    0.603    0.603 
    dep94_8           0.632    0.021   30.053    0.000    0.632    0.632 
    dep94_12          0.558    0.020   28.562    0.000    0.558    0.558 
    dep94_16          0.593    0.019   30.912    0.000    0.593    0.593 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 ~~                                                                  
    method            0.000                               0.000    0.000  
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Table A7. Factor Loadings for ML CFA using Hawai‘i sample, Trait items, Two Factor 
Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  calmness =~                                                            
    trait1            0.648    0.012   52.172    0.000    0.648    0.782 
    trait6            0.573    0.014   40.130    0.000    0.573    0.644 
    trait7            0.660    0.013   50.447    0.000    0.660    0.764 
    trait10           0.678    0.013   52.825    0.000    0.678    0.788 
    trait13           0.679    0.013   50.561    0.000    0.679    0.765 
    trait16           0.534    0.015   35.189    0.000    0.534    0.580 
    trait19           0.571    0.013   43.267    0.000    0.571    0.683 
  anxiety =~                                                             
    trait2            0.379    0.014   26.674    0.000    0.379    0.457 
    trait3            0.501    0.013   39.761    0.000    0.501    0.639 
    trait4            0.658    0.016   41.435    0.000    0.658    0.660 
    trait5            0.477    0.014   34.128    0.000    0.477    0.565 
    trait8            0.595    0.014   43.455    0.000    0.595    0.684 
    trait9            0.618    0.015   42.560    0.000    0.618    0.674 
    trait11           0.527    0.015   35.471    0.000    0.527    0.583 
    trait12           0.506    0.014   35.136    0.000    0.506    0.579 
    trait14           0.183    0.017   10.621    0.000    0.183    0.191 
    trait15           0.535    0.012   42.977    0.000    0.535    0.679 
    trait17           0.591    0.014   41.951    0.000    0.591    0.666 
    trait18           0.568    0.015   38.414    0.000    0.568    0.622 
    trait20           0.687    0.015   45.593    0.000    0.687    0.709 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  calmness ~~                                                            
    anxiety           0.498    0.015   33.007    0.000    0.498    0.498 
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Table A8. Factor Loadings for ML CFA using Hawai‘i sample, Trait items, Single Factor 
Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    trait1            0.499    0.013   37.091    0.000    0.499    0.602 
    trait2            0.357    0.014   25.164    0.000    0.357    0.431 
    trait3            0.491    0.013   38.960    0.000    0.491    0.626 
    trait4            0.644    0.016   40.576    0.000    0.644    0.646 
    trait5            0.439    0.014   31.143    0.000    0.439    0.520 
    trait6            0.443    0.015   29.660    0.000    0.443    0.499 
    trait7            0.499    0.014   35.216    0.000    0.499    0.577 
    trait8            0.556    0.014   40.015    0.000    0.556    0.639 
    trait9            0.550    0.015   36.902    0.000    0.550    0.599 
    trait10           0.557    0.014   40.626    0.000    0.557    0.647 
    trait11           0.441    0.015   28.912    0.000    0.441    0.488 
    trait12           0.509    0.014   35.660    0.000    0.509    0.583 
    trait13           0.524    0.014   36.194    0.000    0.524    0.590 
    trait14           0.098    0.017    5.680    0.000    0.098    0.102 
    trait15           0.527    0.012   42.299    0.000    0.527    0.668 
    trait16           0.364    0.016   22.834    0.000    0.364    0.395 
    trait17           0.520    0.014   35.860    0.000    0.520    0.586 
    trait18           0.492    0.015   32.454    0.000    0.492    0.539 
    trait19           0.413    0.014   29.350    0.000    0.413    0.494 
    trait20           0.624    0.015   40.443    0.000    0.624    0.645 
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Table A9. Factor Loadings for ML CFA using Hawai‘i sample, Trait items, Single Factor, 
Method Variance Factor 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    trait1            0.330    0.014   22.880    0.000    0.330    0.398 
    trait2            0.378    0.014   26.627    0.000    0.378    0.456 
    trait3            0.502    0.013   39.843    0.000    0.502    0.640 
    trait4            0.657    0.016   41.401    0.000    0.657    0.659 
    trait5            0.477    0.014   34.108    0.000    0.477    0.565 
    trait6            0.284    0.016   18.083    0.000    0.284    0.320 
    trait7            0.320    0.015   21.125    0.000    0.320    0.370 
    trait8            0.596    0.014   43.602    0.000    0.596    0.686 
    trait9            0.618    0.015   42.542    0.000    0.618    0.673 
    trait10           0.393    0.015   26.656    0.000    0.393    0.457 
    trait11           0.526    0.015   35.415    0.000    0.526    0.582 
    trait12           0.505    0.014   35.120    0.000    0.505    0.578 
    trait13           0.342    0.015   22.066    0.000    0.342    0.385 
    trait14           0.183    0.017   10.639    0.000    0.183    0.191 
    trait15           0.537    0.012   43.176    0.000    0.537    0.681 
    trait16           0.188    0.017   11.333    0.000    0.188    0.204 
    trait17           0.591    0.014   41.916    0.000    0.591    0.666 
    trait18           0.568    0.015   38.362    0.000    0.568    0.621 
    trait19           0.242    0.015   16.305    0.000    0.242    0.290 
    trait20           0.685    0.015   45.493    0.000    0.685    0.708 
  method =~                                                              
    trait1            0.555    0.012   45.200    0.000    0.555    0.669 
    trait6            0.498    0.014   34.628    0.000    0.498    0.560 
    trait7            0.579    0.013   44.488    0.000    0.579    0.669 
    trait10           0.550    0.012   44.067    0.000    0.550    0.639 
    trait13           0.587    0.013   44.182    0.000    0.587    0.662 
    trait16           0.518    0.015   33.516    0.000    0.518    0.562 
    trait19           0.525    0.013   39.519    0.000    0.525    0.628 
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Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 ~~                                                                  
    method            0.000                               0.000    0.000 
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Table A10. Factor Loadings for ML CFA using Hawai‘i sample, State items, Two Factor 
Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  calmness =~                                                            
    state1            0.630    0.013   48.687    0.000    0.630    0.723 
    state2            0.691    0.013   52.399    0.000    0.691    0.762 
    state5            0.721    0.015   49.442    0.000    0.721    0.732 
    state8            0.616    0.016   39.442    0.000    0.616    0.616 
    state10           0.773    0.014   56.171    0.000    0.773    0.799 
    state11           0.709    0.014   50.204    0.000    0.709    0.740 
    state15           0.820    0.014   59.369    0.000    0.820    0.829 
    state16           0.639    0.016   40.271    0.000    0.639    0.626 
    state19           0.742    0.015   48.783    0.000    0.742    0.724 
    state20           0.770    0.014   54.392    0.000    0.770    0.782 
  anxiety =~                                                             
    state3            0.610    0.014   43.206    0.000    0.610    0.678 
    state4            0.547    0.015   35.757    0.000    0.547    0.583 
    state6            0.572    0.013   44.266    0.000    0.572    0.690 
    state7            0.639    0.016   38.885    0.000    0.639    0.624 
    state9            0.352    0.017   20.446    0.000    0.352    0.356 
    state12           0.579    0.013   44.757    0.000    0.579    0.696 
    state13           0.506    0.012   43.819    0.000    0.506    0.685 
    state14           0.312    0.014   21.595    0.000    0.312    0.374 
    state17           0.696    0.015   47.494    0.000    0.696    0.727 
    state18           0.384    0.014   26.915    0.000    0.384    0.457 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  calmness ~~                                                            
    anxiety           0.481    0.015   32.290    0.000    0.481    0.481 
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Table A11. Factor Loadings for ML CFA using Hawai‘i sample, State items, Single Factor 
Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    state1            0.628    0.013   48.571    0.000    0.628    0.721 
    state2            0.686    0.013   51.950    0.000    0.686    0.757 
    state3            0.422    0.015   28.642    0.000    0.422    0.469 
    state4            0.386    0.016   24.817    0.000    0.386    0.412 
    state5            0.714    0.015   48.932    0.000    0.714    0.725 
    state6            0.435    0.013   32.612    0.000    0.435    0.525 
    state7            0.450    0.017   26.622    0.000    0.450    0.440 
    state8            0.604    0.016   38.578    0.000    0.604    0.604 
    state9           -0.005    0.017   -0.286    0.775   -0.005   -0.005 
    state10           0.762    0.014   55.119    0.000    0.762    0.788 
    state11           0.695    0.014   48.889    0.000    0.695    0.725 
    state12           0.302    0.014   21.588    0.000    0.302    0.363 
    state13           0.259    0.012   20.804    0.000    0.259    0.350 
    state14           0.055    0.014    3.813    0.000    0.055    0.066 
    state15           0.820    0.014   59.565    0.000    0.820    0.830 
    state16           0.620    0.016   38.850    0.000    0.620    0.608 
    state17           0.486    0.015   31.372    0.000    0.486    0.508 
    state18           0.073    0.015    5.008    0.000    0.073    0.087 
    state19           0.719    0.015   46.872    0.000    0.719    0.703 
    state20           0.751    0.014   52.614    0.000    0.751    0.763 
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Table A12. Factor Loadings for ML CFA using Hawai‘i sample, State items, Single Factor, 
Method Variance Factor 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    state1            0.360    0.015   24.051    0.000    0.360    0.414 
    state2            0.363    0.016   23.251    0.000    0.363    0.401 
    state3            0.610    0.014   43.169    0.000    0.610    0.677 
    state4            0.540    0.015   35.268    0.000    0.540    0.577 
    state5            0.371    0.017   21.722    0.000    0.371    0.377 
    state6            0.568    0.013   43.898    0.000    0.568    0.686 
    state7            0.629    0.016   38.157    0.000    0.629    0.615 
    state8            0.265    0.018   14.950    0.000    0.265    0.265 
    state9            0.361    0.017   20.967    0.000    0.361    0.364 
    state10           0.368    0.017   21.947    0.000    0.368    0.380 
    state11           0.307    0.017   18.223    0.000    0.307    0.320 
    state12           0.584    0.013   45.342    0.000    0.584    0.703 
    state13           0.511    0.011   44.466    0.000    0.511    0.692 
    state14           0.318    0.014   22.095    0.000    0.318    0.382 
    state15           0.463    0.017   27.611    0.000    0.463    0.468 
    state16           0.242    0.018   13.322    0.000    0.242    0.237 
    state17           0.689    0.015   46.820    0.000    0.689    0.719 
    state18           0.394    0.014   27.775    0.000    0.394    0.470 
    state19           0.259    0.018   14.257    0.000    0.259    0.253 
    state20           0.315    0.017   18.257    0.000    0.315    0.320 
  method =~                                                              
    state1            0.514    0.013   40.319    0.000    0.514    0.590 
    state2            0.583    0.013   44.896    0.000    0.583    0.644 
    state5            0.613    0.014   42.443    0.000    0.613    0.623 
    state8            0.557    0.016   35.295    0.000    0.557    0.557 
    state10           0.679    0.014   50.186    0.000    0.679    0.703 
    state11           0.643    0.014   45.629    0.000    0.643    0.670 
    state15           0.678    0.013   51.198    0.000    0.678    0.686 
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    state16           0.598    0.016   37.315    0.000    0.598    0.587 
    state19           0.716    0.015   47.153    0.000    0.716    0.699 
    state20           0.714    0.014   51.034    0.000    0.714    0.726 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 ~~                                                                  
    method            0.000                               0.000    0.000 
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Table A13. Factor Loadings for ML CFA using British sample, Trait items, Two Factor 
Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  calmness =~                                                            
    ac1               1.012    0.030   33.246    0.000    1.012    0.700 
    ac6               0.949    0.031   30.641    0.000    0.949    0.658 
    ac7               1.088    0.028   38.435    0.000    1.088    0.777 
    ac10              0.773    0.023   34.092    0.000    0.773    0.713 
    ac13              1.096    0.030   37.075    0.000    1.096    0.758 
    ac16              1.065    0.029   36.748    0.000    1.065    0.753 
    ac19              1.168    0.032   35.989    0.000    1.168    0.742 
  anxiety =~                                                             
    ac2               0.589    0.026   22.633    0.000    0.589    0.505 
    ac3               0.959    0.027   35.604    0.000    0.959    0.727 
    ac4               1.164    0.036   32.224    0.000    1.164    0.674 
    ac5               1.297    0.033   39.297    0.000    1.297    0.779 
    ac8               1.226    0.028   43.494    0.000    1.226    0.833 
    ac9               1.029    0.026   38.947    0.000    1.029    0.774 
    ac11              1.091    0.029   38.270    0.000    1.091    0.765 
    ac12              1.069    0.028   37.788    0.000    1.069    0.758 
    ac14              1.088    0.031   35.384    0.000    1.088    0.723 
    ac15              0.865    0.024   36.214    0.000    0.865    0.736 
    ac17              1.146    0.026   43.456    0.000    1.146    0.833 
    ac18              1.291    0.030   43.772    0.000    1.291    0.837 
    ac20              1.190    0.027   43.916    0.000    1.190    0.838 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  calmness ~~                                                            
    anxiety           0.877    0.008  114.179    0.000    0.877    0.877 
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Table A14. Factor Loadings for ML CFA using British sample, Trait items, Single Factor 
Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    ac1               0.914    0.031   29.733    0.000    0.914    0.632 
    ac2               0.595    0.026   22.947    0.000    0.595    0.510 
    ac3               0.955    0.027   35.479    0.000    0.955    0.724 
    ac4               1.151    0.036   31.834    0.000    1.151    0.667 
    ac5               1.286    0.033   38.905    0.000    1.286    0.773 
    ac6               0.934    0.030   30.660    0.000    0.934    0.648 
    ac7               1.040    0.028   36.756    0.000    1.040    0.742 
    ac8               1.222    0.028   43.317    0.000    1.222    0.830 
    ac9               1.013    0.027   38.165    0.000    1.013    0.762 
    ac10              0.694    0.023   30.224    0.000    0.694    0.641 
    ac11              1.074    0.029   37.482    0.000    1.074    0.753 
    ac12              1.069    0.028   37.880    0.000    1.069    0.758 
    ac13              1.007    0.030   33.671    0.000    1.007    0.696 
    ac14              1.077    0.031   34.965    0.000    1.077    0.716 
    ac15              0.875    0.024   36.858    0.000    0.875    0.744 
    ac16              0.966    0.029   32.845    0.000    0.966    0.683 
    ac17              1.136    0.026   42.964    0.000    1.136    0.826 
    ac18              1.276    0.030   43.062    0.000    1.276    0.827 
    ac19              1.076    0.033   32.867    0.000    1.076    0.684 
    ac20              1.171    0.027   42.937    0.000    1.171    0.825 
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Table A15. Factor Loadings for ML CFA using British sample, Trait items, Single Factor, 
Method Variance Factor 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    ac1               0.857    0.031   27.362    0.000    0.857    0.593 
    ac2               0.591    0.026   22.745    0.000    0.591    0.507 
    ac3               0.961    0.027   35.701    0.000    0.961    0.728 
    ac4               1.164    0.036   32.239    0.000    1.164    0.675 
    ac5               1.300    0.033   39.419    0.000    1.300    0.781 
    ac6               0.912    0.031   29.626    0.000    0.912    0.632 
    ac7               1.004    0.029   34.921    0.000    1.004    0.717 
    ac8               1.228    0.028   43.569    0.000    1.228    0.834 
    ac9               1.027    0.026   38.879    0.000    1.027    0.773 
    ac10              0.646    0.023   27.541    0.000    0.646    0.596 
    ac11              1.090    0.029   38.228    0.000    1.090    0.764 
    ac12              1.068    0.028   37.763    0.000    1.068    0.758 
    ac13              0.948    0.031   31.014    0.000    0.948    0.655 
    ac14              1.088    0.031   35.386    0.000    1.088    0.723 
    ac15              0.863    0.024   36.091    0.000    0.863    0.734 
    ac16              0.905    0.030   30.087    0.000    0.905    0.640 
    ac17              1.146    0.026   43.463    0.000    1.146    0.833 
    ac18              1.291    0.029   43.766    0.000    1.291    0.837 
    ac19              1.019    0.033   30.544    0.000    1.019    0.648 
    ac20              1.187    0.027   43.800    0.000    1.187    0.837 
  method =~                                                              
    ac1               0.536    0.033   16.026    0.000    0.536    0.371 
    ac6               0.220    0.033    6.583    0.000    0.220    0.152 
    ac7               0.353    0.029   12.276    0.000    0.353    0.252 
    ac10              0.469    0.025   18.911    0.000    0.469    0.433 
    ac13              0.604    0.031   19.395    0.000    0.604    0.418 
    ac16              0.625    0.031   20.207    0.000    0.625    0.442 
    ac19              0.566    0.035   16.392    0.000    0.566    0.360 
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Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 ~~                                                                  
    method            0.000                               0.000    0.000 
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Table A16. Factor Loadings for ML CFA using British sample, State items, Two Factor 
Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  calmness =~                                                            
    cseq1             1.133    0.027   41.793    0.000    1.133    0.882 
    cseq2             1.163    0.030   38.483    0.000    1.163    0.838 
    cseq5             1.158    0.031   37.428    0.000    1.158    0.823 
    cseq8             1.105    0.031   35.364    0.000    1.105    0.793 
    cseq10            1.119    0.031   36.089    0.000    1.119    0.803 
    cseq11            1.126    0.033   34.582    0.000    1.126    0.781 
    cseq15            1.185    0.030   39.551    0.000    1.185    0.852 
    cseq16            1.218    0.032   38.188    0.000    1.218    0.834 
    cseq19            1.154    0.031   37.692    0.000    1.154    0.827 
    cseq20            1.179    0.029   40.397    0.000    1.179    0.864 
  anxiety =~                                                             
    cseq3             1.181    0.032   36.848    0.000    1.181    0.817 
    cseq4             1.132    0.032   35.940    0.000    1.132    0.803 
    cseq6             1.207    0.044   27.182    0.000    1.207    0.656 
    cseq7             1.195    0.033   36.264    0.000    1.195    0.808 
    cseq9             1.183    0.034   34.500    0.000    1.183    0.781 
    cseq12            1.112    0.033   34.024    0.000    1.112    0.774 
    cseq13            1.290    0.032   40.120    0.000    1.290    0.862 
    cseq14            1.293    0.038   34.226    0.000    1.293    0.777 
    cseq17            1.230    0.037   33.638    0.000    1.230    0.768 
    cseq18            1.212    0.035   34.295    0.000    1.212    0.778 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  calmness ~~                                                            
    anxiety           0.900    0.007  136.703    0.000    0.900    0.900 
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Table A17. Factor Loadings for ML CFA using British sample, State items, Single Factor 
Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    cseq1             1.134    0.027   42.006    0.000    1.134    0.883 
    cseq2             1.162    0.030   38.541    0.000    1.162    0.837 
    cseq3             1.174    0.032   36.760    0.000    1.174    0.812 
    cseq4             1.138    0.031   36.468    0.000    1.138    0.807 
    cseq5             1.141    0.031   36.723    0.000    1.141    0.811 
    cseq6             1.201    0.044   27.202    0.000    1.201    0.653 
    cseq7             1.155    0.033   34.746    0.000    1.155    0.781 
    cseq8             1.079    0.032   34.241    0.000    1.079    0.774 
    cseq9             1.128    0.035   32.440    0.000    1.128    0.745 
    cseq10            1.095    0.031   35.064    0.000    1.095    0.786 
    cseq11            1.112    0.033   34.063    0.000    1.112    0.771 
    cseq12            1.033    0.033   30.892    0.000    1.033    0.719 
    cseq13            1.216    0.033   36.797    0.000    1.216    0.812 
    cseq14            1.228    0.038   32.043    0.000    1.228    0.738 
    cseq15            1.169    0.030   38.814    0.000    1.169    0.841 
    cseq16            1.198    0.032   37.327    0.000    1.198    0.820 
    cseq17            1.174    0.037   31.728    0.000    1.174    0.733 
    cseq18            1.140    0.036   31.638    0.000    1.140    0.731 
    cseq19            1.111    0.031   35.673    0.000    1.111    0.796 
    cseq20            1.132    0.030   37.970    0.000    1.132    0.829 
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Table A18. Factor Loadings for ML CFA using British sample, State items, Single Factor, 
Method Variance Factor 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    cseq1             1.091    0.028   39.181    0.000    1.091    0.849 
    cseq2             1.111    0.031   35.736    0.000    1.111    0.800 
    cseq3             1.184    0.032   37.059    0.000    1.184    0.819 
    cseq4             1.133    0.031   36.008    0.000    1.133    0.803 
    cseq5             1.064    0.032   32.890    0.000    1.064    0.756 
    cseq6             1.209    0.044   27.278    0.000    1.209    0.657 
    cseq7             1.192    0.033   36.206    0.000    1.192    0.806 
    cseq8             0.988    0.033   30.038    0.000    0.988    0.708 
    cseq9             1.184    0.034   34.559    0.000    1.184    0.782 
    cseq10            1.002    0.033   30.656    0.000    1.002    0.719 
    cseq11            1.040    0.034   30.745    0.000    1.040    0.720 
    cseq12            1.110    0.033   33.986    0.000    1.110    0.773 
    cseq13            1.280    0.032   39.683    0.000    1.280    0.855 
    cseq14            1.282    0.038   33.848    0.000    1.282    0.770 
    cseq15            1.093    0.031   34.822    0.000    1.093    0.786 
    cseq16            1.109    0.034   33.083    0.000    1.109    0.759 
    cseq17            1.221    0.037   33.320    0.000    1.221    0.762 
    cseq18            1.209    0.035   34.217    0.000    1.209    0.776 
    cseq19            0.968    0.033   29.154    0.000    0.968    0.694 
    cseq20            0.986    0.032   30.809    0.000    0.986    0.723 
  method =~                                                              
    cseq1             0.284    0.021   13.236    0.000    0.284    0.221 
    cseq2             0.318    0.026   12.235    0.000    0.318    0.229 
    cseq5             0.427    0.028   15.405    0.000    0.427    0.304 
    cseq8             0.477    0.029   16.314    0.000    0.477    0.342 
    cseq10            0.498    0.029   17.468    0.000    0.498    0.358 
    cseq11            0.407    0.030   13.384    0.000    0.407    0.282 
    cseq15            0.437    0.026   17.000    0.000    0.437    0.315 
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    cseq16            0.489    0.028   17.337    0.000    0.489    0.335 
    cseq19            0.746    0.027   27.519    0.000    0.746    0.535 
    cseq20            0.776    0.025   31.506    0.000    0.776    0.569 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 ~~                                                                  
    method            0.000                               0.000    0.000 
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Table A19. Factor Loadings for WLSMV CFA using Hawai‘i sample, Trait items, Two 
Factor Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  calmness =~                                                            
    trait1            0.834    0.007  126.533    0.000    0.834    0.834 
    trait6            0.696    0.010   67.801    0.000    0.696    0.696 
    trait7            0.809    0.008  106.417    0.000    0.809    0.809 
    trait10           0.871    0.006  136.999    0.000    0.871    0.871 
    trait13           0.815    0.008  108.704    0.000    0.815    0.815 
    trait16           0.596    0.012   50.925    0.000    0.596    0.596 
    trait19           0.721    0.010   73.735    0.000    0.721    0.721 
  anxiety =~                                                             
    trait2            0.495    0.015   33.295    0.000    0.495    0.495 
    trait3            0.738    0.011   67.096    0.000    0.738    0.738 
    trait4            0.726    0.011   69.165    0.000    0.726    0.726 
    trait5            0.625    0.013   48.476    0.000    0.625    0.625 
    trait8            0.733    0.010   74.269    0.000    0.733    0.733 
    trait9            0.714    0.010   70.054    0.000    0.714    0.714 
    trait11           0.604    0.013   47.013    0.000    0.604    0.604 
    trait12           0.671    0.012   55.769    0.000    0.671    0.671 
    trait14           0.161    0.018    9.007    0.000    0.161    0.161 
    trait15           0.782    0.010   77.400    0.000    0.782    0.782 
    trait17           0.710    0.010   70.402    0.000    0.710    0.710 
    trait18           0.658    0.012   54.629    0.000    0.658    0.658 
    trait20           0.755    0.009   80.086    0.000    0.755    0.755 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  calmness ~~                                                            
    anxiety           0.514    0.014   35.670    0.000    0.514    0.514 
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Table A20. Factor Loadings for WLSMV CFA using Hawai‘i sample, Trait items, Single 
Factor Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    trait1            0.760    0.007  102.281    0.000    0.760    0.760 
    trait2            0.445    0.014   30.906    0.000    0.445    0.445 
    trait3            0.681    0.011   61.896    0.000    0.681    0.681 
    trait4            0.667    0.010   63.562    0.000    0.667    0.667 
    trait5            0.564    0.013   43.930    0.000    0.564    0.564 
    trait6            0.604    0.011   56.137    0.000    0.604    0.604 
    trait7            0.732    0.008   88.289    0.000    0.732    0.732 
    trait8            0.670    0.010   66.302    0.000    0.670    0.670 
    trait9            0.646    0.011   61.212    0.000    0.646    0.646 
    trait10           0.799    0.007  114.673    0.000    0.799    0.799 
    trait11           0.527    0.013   40.704    0.000    0.527    0.527 
    trait12           0.616    0.012   53.021    0.000    0.616    0.616 
    trait13           0.733    0.008   88.926    0.000    0.733    0.733 
    trait14           0.099    0.017    5.963    0.000    0.099    0.099 
    trait15           0.718    0.010   70.822    0.000    0.718    0.718 
    trait16           0.501    0.012   41.658    0.000    0.501    0.501 
    trait17           0.645    0.010   61.532    0.000    0.645    0.645 
    trait18           0.592    0.012   48.239    0.000    0.592    0.592 
    trait19           0.628    0.010   60.735    0.000    0.628    0.628 
    trait20           0.691    0.010   70.588    0.000    0.691    0.691 
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Table A21. Factor Loadings for WLSMV CFA using Hawai‘i sample, Trait items, Single 
Factor, Method Variance Factor 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    trait1            0.447    0.015   29.719    0.000    0.447    0.447 
    trait2            0.495    0.015   33.278    0.000    0.495    0.495 
    trait3            0.738    0.011   67.135    0.000    0.738    0.738 
    trait4            0.726    0.010   69.162    0.000    0.726    0.726 
    trait5            0.625    0.013   48.510    0.000    0.625    0.625 
    trait6            0.352    0.016   21.594    0.000    0.352    0.352 
    trait7            0.415    0.015   27.044    0.000    0.415    0.415 
    trait8            0.734    0.010   74.530    0.000    0.734    0.734 
    trait9            0.714    0.010   70.179    0.000    0.714    0.714 
    trait10           0.513    0.015   35.154    0.000    0.513    0.513 
    trait11           0.605    0.013   47.086    0.000    0.605    0.605 
    trait12           0.671    0.012   55.780    0.000    0.671    0.671 
    trait13           0.431    0.015   28.504    0.000    0.431    0.431 
    trait14           0.163    0.018    9.097    0.000    0.163    0.163 
    trait15           0.782    0.010   77.580    0.000    0.782    0.782 
    trait16           0.213    0.017   12.589    0.000    0.213    0.213 
    trait17           0.710    0.010   70.505    0.000    0.710    0.710 
    trait18           0.659    0.012   54.679    0.000    0.659    0.659 
    trait19           0.330    0.016   20.282    0.000    0.330    0.330 
    trait20           0.755    0.009   80.076    0.000    0.755    0.755 
  method =~                                                              
    trait1            0.700    0.010   66.889    0.000    0.700    0.700 
    trait6            0.603    0.012   50.687    0.000    0.603    0.603 
    trait7            0.696    0.010   66.834    0.000    0.696    0.696 
    trait10           0.680    0.011   59.710    0.000    0.680    0.680 
    trait13           0.687    0.010   66.449    0.000    0.687    0.687 
    trait16           0.614    0.011   53.573    0.000    0.614    0.614 
    trait19           0.663    0.011   59.780    0.000    0.663    0.663 
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Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 ~~                                                                  
    method            0.000                               0.000    0.000 
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Table A22. Factor Loadings for WLSMV CFA using Hawai‘i sample, State items, Two 
Factor Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  calmness =~                                                            
    state1            0.808    0.007  120.694    0.000    0.808    0.808 
    state2            0.836    0.006  136.515    0.000    0.836    0.836 
    state5            0.780    0.008  102.044    0.000    0.780    0.780 
    state8            0.656    0.010   62.761    0.000    0.656    0.656 
    state10           0.837    0.006  134.864    0.000    0.837    0.837 
    state11           0.776    0.007  104.826    0.000    0.776    0.776 
    state15           0.875    0.005  174.635    0.000    0.875    0.875 
    state16           0.661    0.010   65.892    0.000    0.661    0.661 
    state19           0.812    0.007  124.603    0.000    0.812    0.812 
    state20           0.863    0.005  161.321    0.000    0.863    0.863 
  anxiety =~                                                             
    state3            0.772    0.011   70.974    0.000    0.772    0.772 
    state4            0.690    0.014   51.063    0.000    0.690    0.690 
    state6            0.853    0.010   82.768    0.000    0.853    0.853 
    state7            0.716    0.012   59.946    0.000    0.716    0.716 
    state9            0.300    0.018   16.433    0.000    0.300    0.300 
    state12           0.770    0.011   69.465    0.000    0.770    0.770 
    state13           0.806    0.012   66.633    0.000    0.806    0.806 
    state14           0.382    0.020   19.395    0.000    0.382    0.382 
    state17           0.827    0.009   88.453    0.000    0.827    0.827 
    state18           0.472    0.018   26.256    0.000    0.472    0.472 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  calmness ~~                                                            
    anxiety           0.508    0.014   36.296    0.000    0.508    0.508 
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Table A23. Factor Loadings for WLSMV CFA using Hawai‘i sample, State items, Single 
Factor Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    state1            0.786    0.007  114.891    0.000    0.786    0.786 
    state2            0.814    0.006  128.856    0.000    0.814    0.814 
    state3            0.618    0.012   53.181    0.000    0.618    0.618 
    state4            0.554    0.014   40.565    0.000    0.554    0.554 
    state5            0.758    0.008   97.307    0.000    0.758    0.758 
    state6            0.703    0.011   63.772    0.000    0.703    0.703 
    state7            0.577    0.013   46.110    0.000    0.577    0.577 
    state8            0.626    0.010   59.764    0.000    0.626    0.626 
    state9            0.125    0.017    7.370    0.000    0.125    0.125 
    state10           0.819    0.006  128.200    0.000    0.819    0.819 
    state11           0.750    0.008   99.132    0.000    0.750    0.750 
    state12           0.617    0.013   48.748    0.000    0.617    0.617 
    state13           0.642    0.014   46.319    0.000    0.642    0.642 
    state14           0.215    0.018   11.743    0.000    0.215    0.215 
    state15           0.856    0.005  167.242    0.000    0.856    0.856 
    state16           0.633    0.010   62.375    0.000    0.633    0.633 
    state17           0.683    0.011   64.215    0.000    0.683    0.683 
    state18           0.281    0.018   15.863    0.000    0.281    0.281 
    state19           0.790    0.007  118.620    0.000    0.790    0.790 
    state20           0.845    0.006  153.336    0.000    0.845    0.845 
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Table A24. Factor Loadings for WLSMV CFA using Hawai‘i sample, State items, Single 
Factor, Method Variance Factor 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    state1            0.494    0.015   33.438    0.000    0.494    0.494 
    state2            0.480    0.015   32.154    0.000    0.480    0.480 
    state3            0.769    0.011   71.140    0.000    0.769    0.769 
    state4            0.687    0.013   50.948    0.000    0.687    0.687 
    state5            0.448    0.015   29.224    0.000    0.448    0.448 
    state6            0.848    0.010   82.383    0.000    0.848    0.848 
    state7            0.712    0.012   59.606    0.000    0.712    0.712 
    state8            0.316    0.017   18.748    0.000    0.316    0.316 
    state9            0.307    0.018   16.885    0.000    0.307    0.307 
    state10           0.446    0.015   29.779    0.000    0.446    0.446 
    state11           0.375    0.016   23.295    0.000    0.375    0.375 
    state12           0.770    0.011   69.872    0.000    0.770    0.770 
    state13           0.806    0.012   67.207    0.000    0.806    0.806 
    state14           0.388    0.020   19.784    0.000    0.388    0.388 
    state15           0.535    0.014   39.549    0.000    0.535    0.535 
    state16           0.282    0.018   15.828    0.000    0.282    0.282 
    state17           0.824    0.009   87.925    0.000    0.824    0.824 
    state18           0.481    0.018   26.981    0.000    0.481    0.481 
    state19           0.262    0.017   15.319    0.000    0.262    0.262 
    state20           0.331    0.016   20.290    0.000    0.331    0.331 
  method =~                                                              
    state1            0.632    0.011   58.811    0.000    0.632    0.632 
    state2            0.680    0.010   66.715    0.000    0.680    0.680 
    state5            0.633    0.011   60.296    0.000    0.633    0.633 
    state8            0.580    0.012   48.616    0.000    0.580    0.580 
    state10           0.708    0.009   77.160    0.000    0.708    0.708 
    state11           0.684    0.010   69.474    0.000    0.684    0.684 
    state15           0.688    0.010   71.469    0.000    0.688    0.688 
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    state16           0.614    0.012   52.912    0.000    0.614    0.614 
    state19           0.802    0.008  102.720    0.000    0.802    0.802 
    state20           0.814    0.008  107.205    0.000    0.814    0.814 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 ~~                                                                  
    method            0.000                               0.000    0.000 
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Table A25. Factor Loadings for WLSMV CFA using British sample, Trait items, Two Factor 
Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  calmness =~                                                            
    ac1               0.681    0.016   41.541    0.000    0.681    0.681 
    ac6               0.546    0.019   28.413    0.000    0.546    0.546 
    ac7               0.723    0.014   49.925    0.000    0.723    0.723 
    ac10              0.780    0.015   53.356    0.000    0.780    0.780 
    ac13              0.766    0.015   51.619    0.000    0.766    0.766 
    ac16              0.797    0.014   56.012    0.000    0.797    0.797 
    ac19              0.727    0.016   46.416    0.000    0.727    0.727 
  anxiety =~                                                             
    ac2               0.436    0.020   21.433    0.000    0.436    0.436 
    ac3               0.623    0.016   38.291    0.000    0.623    0.623 
    ac4               0.673    0.017   39.462    0.000    0.673    0.673 
    ac5               0.698    0.016   43.054    0.000    0.698    0.698 
    ac8               0.770    0.012   62.698    0.000    0.770    0.770 
    ac9               0.716    0.013   55.691    0.000    0.716    0.716 
    ac11              0.661    0.014   45.771    0.000    0.661    0.661 
    ac12              0.629    0.014   44.708    0.000    0.629    0.629 
    ac14              0.452    0.017   26.281    0.000    0.452    0.452 
    ac15              0.705    0.015   46.510    0.000    0.705    0.705 
    ac17              0.717    0.012   58.400    0.000    0.717    0.717 
    ac18              0.769    0.012   63.290    0.000    0.769    0.769 
    ac20              0.756    0.012   63.099    0.000    0.756    0.756 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  calmness ~~                                                            
    anxiety           0.736    0.012   61.265    0.000    0.736    0.736 
 
  
259 
 
Table A26. Factor Loadings for WLSMV CFA using British sample, Trait items, Single 
Factor Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    ac1               0.613    0.017   37.056    0.000    0.613    0.613 
    ac2               0.423    0.020   21.475    0.000    0.423    0.423 
    ac3               0.604    0.016   37.823    0.000    0.604    0.604 
    ac4               0.647    0.017   39.105    0.000    0.647    0.647 
    ac5               0.668    0.016   41.881    0.000    0.668    0.668 
    ac6               0.484    0.018   26.836    0.000    0.484    0.484 
    ac7               0.650    0.014   46.314    0.000    0.650    0.650 
    ac8               0.742    0.012   61.523    0.000    0.742    0.742 
    ac9               0.689    0.013   53.729    0.000    0.689    0.689 
    ac10              0.706    0.015   47.472    0.000    0.706    0.706 
    ac11              0.634    0.014   44.184    0.000    0.634    0.634 
    ac12              0.604    0.014   43.861    0.000    0.604    0.604 
    ac13              0.695    0.015   46.704    0.000    0.695    0.695 
    ac14              0.432    0.017   25.815    0.000    0.432    0.432 
    ac15              0.682    0.015   46.467    0.000    0.682    0.682 
    ac16              0.724    0.014   50.417    0.000    0.724    0.724 
    ac17              0.690    0.012   56.667    0.000    0.690    0.690 
    ac18              0.740    0.012   61.106    0.000    0.740    0.740 
    ac19              0.657    0.016   42.151    0.000    0.657    0.657 
    ac20              0.728    0.012   60.852    0.000    0.728    0.728 
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Table A27. Factor Loadings for WLSMV CFA using British sample, Trait items, Single 
Factor, Method Variance Factor 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    ac1               0.470    0.020   23.030    0.000    0.470    0.470 
    ac2               0.436    0.020   21.415    0.000    0.436    0.436 
    ac3               0.623    0.016   38.301    0.000    0.623    0.623 
    ac4               0.673    0.017   39.419    0.000    0.673    0.673 
    ac5               0.698    0.016   43.078    0.000    0.698    0.698 
    ac6               0.413    0.019   21.322    0.000    0.413    0.413 
    ac7               0.576    0.016   35.371    0.000    0.576    0.576 
    ac8               0.770    0.012   62.720    0.000    0.770    0.770 
    ac9               0.716    0.013   55.758    0.000    0.716    0.716 
    ac10              0.542    0.019   28.743    0.000    0.542    0.542 
    ac11              0.661    0.014   45.794    0.000    0.661    0.661 
    ac12              0.629    0.014   44.800    0.000    0.629    0.629 
    ac13              0.581    0.018   31.861    0.000    0.581    0.581 
    ac14              0.452    0.017   26.298    0.000    0.452    0.452 
    ac15              0.705    0.015   46.429    0.000    0.705    0.705 
    ac16              0.576    0.018   31.674    0.000    0.576    0.576 
    ac17              0.717    0.012   58.479    0.000    0.717    0.717 
    ac18              0.769    0.012   63.349    0.000    0.769    0.769 
    ac19              0.533    0.019   28.054    0.000    0.533    0.533 
    ac20              0.756    0.012   63.130    0.000    0.756    0.756 
  method =~                                                              
    ac1               0.542    0.018   30.200    0.000    0.542    0.542 
    ac6               0.339    0.022   15.631    0.000    0.339    0.339 
    ac7               0.360    0.019   18.647    0.000    0.360    0.360 
    ac10              0.614    0.018   34.372    0.000    0.614    0.614 
    ac13              0.471    0.018   26.202    0.000    0.471    0.471 
    ac16              0.564    0.016   34.387    0.000    0.564    0.564 
    ac19              0.499    0.019   26.878    0.000    0.499    0.499 
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Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 ~~                                                                  
    method            0.000                               0.000    0.000 
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Table A28. Factor Loadings for WLSMV CFA using British sample, State items, Two Factor 
Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  calmness =~                                                            
    cseq1             0.807    0.011   76.366    0.000    0.807    0.807 
    cseq2             0.754    0.014   55.223    0.000    0.754    0.754 
    cseq5             0.775    0.013   59.425    0.000    0.775    0.775 
    cseq8             0.651    0.014   45.950    0.000    0.651    0.651 
    cseq10            0.691    0.013   52.175    0.000    0.691    0.691 
    cseq11            0.678    0.015   44.564    0.000    0.678    0.678 
    cseq15            0.832    0.011   75.956    0.000    0.832    0.832 
    cseq16            0.817    0.013   65.286    0.000    0.817    0.817 
    cseq19            0.708    0.011   61.985    0.000    0.708    0.708 
    cseq20            0.817    0.010   82.212    0.000    0.817    0.817 
  anxiety =~                                                             
    cseq3             0.823    0.014   56.804    0.000    0.823    0.823 
    cseq4             0.716    0.019   37.667    0.000    0.716    0.716 
    cseq6             0.754    0.018   41.668    0.000    0.754    0.754 
    cseq7             0.713    0.015   47.757    0.000    0.713    0.713 
    cseq9             0.703    0.014   49.235    0.000    0.703    0.703 
    cseq12            0.709    0.013   54.284    0.000    0.709    0.709 
    cseq13            0.830    0.012   70.723    0.000    0.830    0.830 
    cseq14            0.789    0.015   51.659    0.000    0.789    0.789 
    cseq17            0.793    0.013   59.193    0.000    0.793    0.793 
    cseq18            0.587    0.018   33.396    0.000    0.587    0.587 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  calmness ~~                                                            
    anxiety           0.725    0.011   64.613    0.000    0.725    0.725 
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Table A29. Factor Loadings for WLSMV CFA using British sample, State items, Single 
Factor Model 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    cseq1             0.766    0.010   72.970    0.000    0.766    0.766 
    cseq2             0.716    0.013   53.554    0.000    0.716    0.716 
    cseq3             0.754    0.014   54.670    0.000    0.754    0.754 
    cseq4             0.653    0.017   37.843    0.000    0.653    0.653 
    cseq5             0.740    0.013   57.976    0.000    0.740    0.740 
    cseq6             0.691    0.017   40.803    0.000    0.691    0.691 
    cseq7             0.656    0.015   44.579    0.000    0.656    0.656 
    cseq8             0.612    0.014   43.980    0.000    0.612    0.612 
    cseq9             0.640    0.014   45.181    0.000    0.640    0.640 
    cseq10            0.650    0.013   49.290    0.000    0.650    0.650 
    cseq11            0.643    0.015   43.242    0.000    0.643    0.643 
    cseq12            0.652    0.013   48.586    0.000    0.652    0.652 
    cseq13            0.763    0.012   62.576    0.000    0.763    0.763 
    cseq14            0.722    0.015   48.010    0.000    0.722    0.722 
    cseq15            0.792    0.011   72.870    0.000    0.792    0.792 
    cseq16            0.782    0.012   63.134    0.000    0.782    0.782 
    cseq17            0.733    0.013   55.014    0.000    0.733    0.733 
    cseq18            0.517    0.017   30.626    0.000    0.517    0.517 
    cseq19            0.665    0.012   57.822    0.000    0.665    0.665 
    cseq20            0.777    0.010   75.734    0.000    0.777    0.777 
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Table A30. Factor Loadings for WLSMV CFA using British sample, State items, Single 
Factor, Method Variance Factor 
 
Latent Variables: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 =~                                                                  
    cseq1             0.668    0.014   48.545    0.000    0.668    0.668 
    cseq2             0.608    0.017   36.321    0.000    0.608    0.608 
    cseq3             0.816    0.014   56.914    0.000    0.816    0.816 
    cseq4             0.710    0.019   37.485    0.000    0.710    0.710 
    cseq5             0.628    0.016   40.425    0.000    0.628    0.628 
    cseq6             0.750    0.018   41.778    0.000    0.750    0.750 
    cseq7             0.710    0.015   47.689    0.000    0.710    0.710 
    cseq8             0.455    0.017   26.630    0.000    0.455    0.455 
    cseq9             0.702    0.014   49.390    0.000    0.702    0.702 
    cseq10            0.486    0.017   28.372    0.000    0.486    0.486 
    cseq11            0.529    0.018   29.891    0.000    0.529    0.529 
    cseq12            0.710    0.013   54.484    0.000    0.710    0.710 
    cseq13            0.829    0.012   70.847    0.000    0.829    0.829 
    cseq14            0.787    0.015   51.904    0.000    0.787    0.787 
    cseq15            0.655    0.015   44.842    0.000    0.655    0.655 
    cseq16            0.609    0.016   37.349    0.000    0.609    0.609 
    cseq17            0.790    0.013   59.151    0.000    0.790    0.790 
    cseq18            0.590    0.018   33.694    0.000    0.590    0.590 
    cseq19            0.368    0.017   21.217    0.000    0.368    0.368 
    cseq20            0.479    0.017   28.030    0.000    0.479    0.479 
  method =~                                                              
    cseq1             0.397    0.018   21.964    0.000    0.397    0.397 
    cseq2             0.404    0.021   19.454    0.000    0.404    0.404 
    cseq5             0.417    0.018   22.928    0.000    0.417    0.417 
    cseq8             0.487    0.019   25.357    0.000    0.487    0.487 
    cseq10            0.512    0.018   27.906    0.000    0.512    0.512 
    cseq11            0.400    0.020   20.451    0.000    0.400    0.400 
    cseq15            0.480    0.017   28.528    0.000    0.480    0.480 
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    cseq16            0.539    0.016   32.944    0.000    0.539    0.539 
    cseq19            0.726    0.014   53.118    0.000    0.726    0.726 
    cseq20            0.747    0.013   59.084    0.000    0.747    0.747 
 
Covariances: 
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all 
  F1 ~~                                                                  
    method            0.000                               0.000    0.000 
 
 
 
 
